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
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PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

A Selection

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

from The Nelson Philosophical Texts
Raymond Klibansky
General Editor

Translated, with an Introduction, by

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John Duns Scotus: *ca.* 1266-1308

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First published in 1962 by
Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd.,
Edinburgh and London.
Reprinted by arrangement.

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Printed in the United States of America
THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY, INC., 1964
Third Printing

PREFACE

IN a volume of the present size, a compiler can give a broader if somewhat piecemeal view of a man's philosophy by limiting the length of the selections, or he may sacrifice comprehensiveness of subject matter in the interests of revealing his thinker at work. I have chosen the latter alternative, building the present selection around five key questions concerned with God and the human soul, the two philosophical topics of greatest interest to an *ex professo* theologian like Duns Scotus.

Following the Avicennian interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, like Albertus Magnus, Siger of Brabant, Aquinas and most scholastics of his day, Scotus envisioned God as the goal of any rational metaphysic whose subject is being *qua* being. The two selections dealing with the existence and unicity of God, then, form the core of his "first philosophy". They are introduced by a few short sections in which Scotus describes this "transcendental science" and the type of conclusion it purports to establish, followed by a question wherein the Subtle Doctor analyzes his philosophical concept of God in terms of his controversial thesis regarding the univocity of being. Of the two questions about the human soul, one touches on its spirituality and immortality, the other concerns its ability to attain certain knowledge.

Taken from Scotus's most important work, his *Ordinatio* (called more frequently, if less accurately, his *Oxford Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*), the key questions are presented in their entirety, except for certain minor marginal notes in the manuscript text and—where Scotus has combined several questions into one—those portions not germane to the question selected. The manuscript (Codex Assisii, bibliotheca communalis 137) from which the Latin text is taken, repre-

sents an early fourteenth-century attempt at a critical edition of this work and is the basis of the Vatican edition now in progress. Where the text is obviously at fault, however, I have not hesitated to adopt a better manuscript reading for the translation.

The short bibliography makes no attempt to do justice to the flood of recent Scotistic literature, especially in foreign languages, but is limited to larger English monographs on specific aspects of Scotus's philosophy or to works like those of Father Copleston or Miss Sharp, wherein a fairly brief but comprehensive account of Scotus's general philosophical positions can be found.

May I take this occasion to express my indebtedness to the late Father Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., and to Father Gaudens Mohan, O.F.M., of the Franciscan Institute, for help in preparing and checking the Latin text. I am deeply grateful also to Professor Raymond Klibansky for his part in bringing this volume to fruition, though I have not been able to accept all his suggestions. I take full responsibility both for the constitution of the text and for the translation.

ALLAN B. WOLTER

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INTRODUCTION

DOCUMENTARY data on the life of John Duns Scotus are scanty. Scarcely more than half a dozen definite chronological records are available. The earliest date mentioned in connexion with Scotus is found in the *Chronicle of the Scottish Franciscans*, transcribed in the sixteenth century by W. Tweedy, a notary public of Haddington. As preserved in the eighteenth-century *Monasticon Scotticanum* of Marianus Brockie, o.s.b., the chronicle states :

In the year 1278 Friar Elias Duns, guardian of Dumfries, came to Haddington and in the presence of the other guardians in a chapter of the Order received the office of vicar general of the Kingdom of Scotland and took back with him to Dumfries that celebrated theologian, John Duns, called Scotus by reason of his country, and gave him the habit of religion. For he [John] was his nephew by his brother Ninian Duns of Littledean and had attended the lower schools of Haddington, where he had given remarkable indications of his future learning.

Though L. Meier, o.f.m. has recently attempted to discredit the value of this entry, his reasons do not appear too convincing. Until further proof is forthcoming, we can hardly ignore or reject the testimony of this chronicle entirely.

More certain, however, is the next record, that of Scotus's ordination to the priesthood by Oliver Sutton, Bishop of Lincoln, on 17 March 1291. Of the forty-eight priests ordained that day in the priory of St Andrew, Northampton, five were Franciscans, including "Fr. Johannes Dons".

On 26 July 1300 Scotus was at Oxford, for we find his name among the twenty-two friars of the Oxford convent whose names the English provincial, Hugh of Hartlepool, submitted to John Dalderby, Bishop of Lincoln, for faculties to hear confessions.

The colophon of Codex 66 of Merton College, Oxford, contains this note by an early fourteenth-century hand : "This is from the *Ordinatio* of the Venerable Friar John Duns of the Order of Friars Minor who flourished at Cambridge, Oxford and Paris, and died in Cologne".

At the end of the Worcester manuscript (F 69), one of the earliest of Scotus's Parisian lectures on the *Sentences*, is the remark that Scotus began commenting on the first book "at Paris in the year of the Lord 1302, the third having started", and that he commented on the fourth book "in the study at Paris in the year 1303". The phrase "the third having started" seems to be a reference to the autumn term (from about 9 October 1302 until April 1303). According to "Gallican custom" the new year began on 25 March, the feast of the Annunciation.

Scotus's presence in Paris at this time is confirmed by the fact that we find his name listed among those friars who on 25 June 1303 refused to support King Philip IV in his appeal to a general council against Pope Boniface VIII. The penalty for such opposition was exile from France within three days.

Scotus was evidently back in Paris again by the end of 1304, for the Minister General of the Franciscans, Gonsalvus of Spain, sent a letter from Ascoli in the March of Ancona on 18 November 1304 to William, guardian of the Franciscan convent at Paris. It reads as follows :

In reference to the promotion of Friar Giles of Ligny, about whom I have been informed by your letters, we ought, as the custom is, to make provision for another similar presentation. Since, according to the statutes of the Order and the statutes of your convent, the bachelor to be presented at this time should belong to some province other than the province of France, I assign to you Friar John Scotus, of whose laudable life, excellent knowledge, and most subtle ability, as well as his other remarkable qualities, I am fully informed, partly from long experience and partly from report which has been spread everywhere—to be presented primarily and in the regular course after the

said Friar Giles. I enjoin you nevertheless that you make such presentation with due solemnity without much expense. If, however, you should be certain that the Chancellor be willing to license two of our friars at the same time, I desire that Friar Albert of Metz, if he shall be able to return to the convent, be promoted together with the said Friar John. In which case, I rule that Friar Albert on account of his seniority should incept first, Friar John incepting afterwards under him. Farewell in the Lord and pray for me. Given in the place of Ascoli of the province of the March of Ancona, xiv Kal. Dec. 1304.

A final mention of Scotus is found in the records of a provincial chapter at Cologne where he signed as "Fr. Johannes, lector Coloniae". The document gives permission for the erection of a convent and is dated *more Gallicorum* 20 Feb. 1307 (actually 1308).

These documents, when viewed against the general historical background of the times, make it possible to construct the following more or less probable sketch of Scotus's life.

His family name was Duns. At the time Scotus was in Paris there were more than forty other friars in the Franciscan convent by the name of John. Here he received the additional title of "Scotus" by reason of his nationality. At the time when John Duns studied at Paris "Scotus" apparently was used exclusively in the sense of "a native of Scotland"; and not, as in earlier times, to designate indiscriminately Irish or Scottish ancestry. This is confirmed if we accept the testimony of the *Chronicle of the Scottish Franciscans* as recorded by Brockie.

There are two main branches of the Duns family, the Duns of Duns in Berwickshire, who belonged to the nobility, and the Duns of Maxton-on-the-Tweed, who if not of the nobility owned rather extensive farming lands. According to E. Longpré, O.F.M., the estate of Ninian Duns, the father of Scotus, was known as Little-dean, and is situated on the southern bank of the River Tweed about two miles downstream from the village of

Maxton, Roxburghshire. A popular tradition, however, which goes back for centuries claims that John belonged to the Berwickshire branch. His father was the younger son of the Duns of Grueldykes and lived on an estate adjoining the present town of Duns. The house where tradition maintains John was born stood near the more westerly lodge, now called Pavilion Lodge, of Duns Castle. In the course of improvements made in 1790, the large stone marking the site of the house was built into the nearby dyke and, according to local historians, was pointed out for generations, but is now apparently forgotten.

Scotus was probably born early in 1266. Since Bishop Sutton ordained at Northampton on both 23 December 1290 and 17 March 1291, A. Callebaut, O.F.M. argues that Scotus must have come of canonical age somewhere between these two dates. This would place his birth somewhere between 23 December 1265 and 17 March 1266. Conflicting with this interpretation, however, is the statement of the *Chronicle*, above, that Scotus's uncle, Friar Elias Duns, took his nephew with him to Dumfries and "gave him the habit of religion". Now the earliest age at which Scotus could canonically have entered the novitiate of the Franciscans was fifteen. However, it is not unlikely, in view of the custom of the times, that Scotus would have stayed at the convent as a *puer oblatus* or postulant, continuing his studies under some of the friars, until he was old enough to enter the Order. On this score, Callebaut places his entrance into the novitiate late in 1279 or early in 1280 and his solemn profession of vows a year later.

If Scotus entered the Scottish branch of the friars, it may seem strange that he is referred to in some manuscripts as belonging to the English province, unless we recall the history of the Greyfriars in Scotland. In 1231 the Franciscan friars, who had come to England some seven years earlier, established friaries in Scotland. In

1235 these friaries were given the status of an independent vicariate, but soon after were returned to the jurisdiction of the English Custody of Newcastle. In 1260 the young King of Scots, Alexander III, petitioned Pope Alexander IV to restore the independence of the Scottish friars. The matter was referred to the General Chapter of the Franciscans, which refused the request, owing in part to pressure brought to bear on the Order by the King of England. But in 1278 Alexander, King of Scots, went to the Minister General of the friars, Jerome of Ascoli (later Pope Nicholas IV), who granted the Scots an independent vicariate. Elias Duns, Scotus's uncle, became the first Vicar General, directly responsible to the Minister General of the Franciscan order. In 1296, however, the vicariate was once more subjected to the English province, but the Scots were permitted to retain their Vicar General and were independent of the Custody of Newcastle.

What happened between Scotus's entry into the Order and his ordination in 1291 is a matter of conjecture, as is also the period between 1291 and 1300 when he was again at Oxford. L. Meier, basing his speculation on the requirements of Oxford University, suggests that Scotus devoted some eight years to the studying and teaching of philosophy (1283-91) in England, and locates the Cambridge teaching episode during this period. The nine prescribed years devoted to the study of theology at Oxford, Meier places between Scotus's ordination and 1300. Callebaut, on the other hand, stresses the requirements of the University of Paris. Scotus, according to his theory, must have spent at least four years in the study of theology at Paris some time after 1292. The teaching period at Cambridge could have followed this. If Scotus did go to Paris before 1300 it might explain why the Minister General, Gonsalvus of Spain, could speak of having learned of Scotus's fitness "partly from *long* experience". Where would the

Spanish friar have met the young Scot if not at Paris, where Gonsalvus had taught both as a bachelor (c.1297) and later as master of theology (1302-3)?

At any rate, by 1300 Scotus was back at the Oxford convent. In addition to the testimony of the document of the English Provincial mentioned above, Scotus's presence at Oxford is confirmed by the fact that he took part as a bachelor in the *Vesperies* of Friar Philip Bridlington (one of the public disputations connected with the licensing of a new master). Philip, however, became a regent master at Oxford around 1300. That Scotus was commenting on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard at Oxford around this time is also attested to by Thomas Sutton O.P., a contemporary and hostile critic of Scotus who was at the English university between 1300 and 1302.

Scotus never became a master at Oxford, for his superiors sent him on to Paris to take the doctorate or mastership of theology there. According to the Worcester manuscript we can infer that he must have arrived in Paris in time for the autumn term of 1302. According to Pelster, S.J., John Duns lectured on Book I of the *Sentences* from 9 October 1302 to about April 1303. He then began immediately with Book IV and finished his lectures on it in June of that year. Ordinarily the bachelor had to begin on the day before the feast of St Denis (10 October) and end by 29 June, the feast of St Peter and St Paul. If he had not finished all his lectures owing to sickness, absence or the like, the *sententiarius* had to make up during the summer as many lectures as he had missed. Lectures on Books II and III (up to Dist. xvii) must have occurred between 1303 and 1304, for on 18 November 1304 he was recommended by the Minister General, Gonsalvus, for the mastership and must therefore have completed the requisite lectures on the four books of the *Sentences*.

Apparently Scotus's Parisian lectures were interrupted,

by the decree of King Philip the Fair. The French monarch had quarrelled with Pope Boniface VIII over the taxation of church property to support Philip's standing armies for his wars with England. When the Pope excommunicated the King, the latter appealed to a General Council of the Church to depose the Pope. He won over the French clergy, the universities and others to his cause. A great anti-papal demonstration took place on 24 June 1303. Mendicants of Paris marched in the procession. Berthold of St Denis, Bishop of Orleans and ex-Chancellor of the University of Paris, together with two Dominicans and two Franciscans, addressed the meeting. The following day royal commissioners examined each friar at the Franciscan convent to find out whether he was with or against the King. Some seventy friars, mostly French, sided with the King, while the rest (some eighty odd) remained loyal to the Pope. Among the latter we find the name of Scotus. According to royal orders, the Pope's partisans were to leave France within three days. Boniface countered with the Bull of 15 August 1303, in which he suspended the University's right to give degrees in theology, canon and civil law. This ban was withdrawn by Pope Benedict X in April 1304, and shortly afterwards the King facilitated the return of students.

Where Scotus went during this exile is unknown. England, Bologna and Cologne have all been suggested. Pelster believes that the exile must have been short and that Scotus was soon back in Paris commenting on Books II and III at least by 1304. He either finished his lectures on Book III by June of that year, or perhaps continued to lecture during the summer until the following September. The remaining parts of Book III, Pelster maintains, were completed at another time in England.

Be that as it may, by November 1304 Scotus must have completed all of his requirements as a bachelor *formatus*. In fact, he was the respondent in Giles of Ligny's *disputatio*

in aula (which followed the *vesperies* as a part of the formalities connected with Giles's inception as master of theology). To participate in such a disputation, however, Scotus had to have completed his lectures on the *Sentences* before the beginning of the autumn term.

Probably Scotus's own inception as master took place early in 1305. That the customary interval between the completion of the lectures on the *Sentences* and being licensed as master (four years according to university statutes) did not intervene was due probably to one of the many privileges granted to the friars.

The fact that we have but one *Quodlibet* of Scotus argues that he may not have taught as regent master for more than one year. Glorieux dates this 1306-7, though if Scotus began teaching in the autumn of 1305 his regency could have terminated in 1306. Pelster believes he returned to England in that year and composed the *Lectura completa*, but this is little more than a surmise. He may have gone directly from Paris to Cologne. At any rate, the last record of Scotus's life indicates that he was in Cologne in February 1308, and if he had been teaching during the current semester, as the title "lector Coloniae" indicates, he must have begun at least by the autumn of 1307.

Various reasons have been assigned for his presence in Cologne. Callebaut and others have argued that the Minister General of the Friars sent him there to escape the consequences of his opposition to the King's action against the Knights Templars or that Scotus's departure was connected in some way with his defence of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception against its Dominican adversaries. Longpré suggests a more prosaic reason, and one perhaps nearer the truth, namely the common custom in the Order of sending the more brilliant lectors from one study house to another in rotation. At any rate, Scotus served a brief lectorship at Cologne. The

traditional date of his death is 8 November 1308. His remains are still venerated in Cologne.

It is deplorable that Scotus's early death left almost every one of his great works in an unfinished state. But so great was his fame and following that his disciples made every effort to put his writings before the public. With apparently more haste than prudence, they shuffled together earlier and later redactions, inserted parts to be deleted alongside their corrected substitutes and incorporated notes found in the margins or on scattered slips sandwiched between the pages of the master. It is only after some thirty odd years of intense research by men like Pelster, Pelzer, Longpré, Balić and others that some semblance of order has begun to emerge from the chaos. Not only have many treatises been proved spurious, but even the certainly authentic writings appear in a new light. Today the following works are ascribed to Scotus.

THEOLOGICAL WORKS

1. *Commentaries on the Sentences*

Scotus commented on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard at least twice, once at Oxford and again at Paris. From the seventeenth century down to our own, these two commentaries were referred to respectively as the *Opus oxoniense* (or *Ordinatio*) and the *Opus parisiense* (or *Reportata parisiensia*). Modern research has not only revealed the existence of other unedited reports of these lectures on the *Sentences* but has rediscovered the meaning of the terms *ordinatio* and *reportatio*. The original lecture of a master or bachelor as copied down by one of his students, or some scribe, is known as a *reportatio*. If such a "reported version" was later checked by the teacher himself, it is referred to as a *reportatio examinata*. In many cases the author would revise his original lectures before presenting them for final publication. This last redaction

or finished product is known as an *ordinatio*, inasmuch as it represents the final draft as ordered or arranged by the author himself. As applied to Scotus's *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *Ordinatio*, to which the redactor of the Assisi manuscript, used by us (Communalis 137), had access, is a revision of the Oxford lectures. Internal evidence suggests that some parts of the redaction antedate the Paris lectures, while for other portions Scotus made use of a *reportatio* of the latter. The *Opus oxoniense* as we have it in the Wadding and Vivès editions is not the pure *Ordinatio*, however, but contains other elements. One of the principal tasks of the Scotistic Commission under the direction of Carl Balić, O.F.M. at Rome is to reconstruct the text of the original *Ordinatio* and separate it from the major and minor additions taken from other writings of Duns Scotus. The enormity of this task can be realised from the fact that it was only after twelve years that Balić and his many collaborators published the first small fraction of the monumental *Ordinatio* in the two initial volumes of the critical Vatican edition of the *Opera omnia* of Scotus (Rome 1950).

In addition to the *Ordinatio*, which constitutes the principal part of the *Opus oxoniense*, there is the *Lectura oxoniensis* (*Opera omnia*, Vatican ed., VOL. XVI) on the first and second books of the *Sentences*. Sometimes referred to as *Prima lectura*, it is believed to be a *reportatio* of Scotus's first lectures at Oxford. Still another *reportatio* is the *Lectura in III Sententiarum* (still unedited). It is also called the *Lectura completa* in contradistinction to the Parisian *reportatio* of the third book which ends abruptly after Dist. xvii.

Another set of questions on the first two books of the *Sentences* goes by name of *Additiones magnae*. Unlike the "small additions" consisting of a paragraph or so, these are a series of complete questions intended by Scotus to supplement his previous courses on the first and second books of the *Sentences*. The first book of the *Additiones* was

edited by Wadding and Vivès as part of the *Reportata parisiensia*.

The different redactions of the *reportationes* of Paris lectures are now generally recognised to be due to a difference in the scribes who reported the lectures or to changes made later, perhaps even at the suggestion of Scotus himself. The most important of these *reportationes* is that authenticated by Scotus and known as the *Reportatio magna* or *Reportatio examinata* (unedited). One redaction of the *Reportatio parisiensis* was edited at Paris (1517-18) and differs considerably from the version found in Wadding and Vivès. The latter is a mixture of various elements, including the *Additiones magnae* and even parts of the *Opus oxoniense* (especially in the third book).

2. *Disputations*

Scotus held several isolated disputations both as bachelor and as master. He functioned in the former role at the *Vesperies* of Philip of Bridlington, O.F.M. in Oxford as well as in the *disputatio in aula* on the occasion of Giles of Ligny's promotion as master in Paris. The dispute with Peter Godin, O.P. on the principle of individuation as well as the *Quaestio disputata de formalitate*, referred to by Adam Wodam as *Logica Scoti*, seem to be the work of Scotus as master. More important than these isolated, and for the most part unedited, disputations are the *Quaestiones quodlibetales* and the *Collationes parisienses et oxonienses*. The former comprise twenty-one questions (though there is some doubt as to the authenticity of the twenty-first) disputed by Scotus as regent master in Paris, and represent one of the latest and most mature of Scotus's works. The *Collationes* are much shorter questions. Little and Pelster consider them as "private disputations of the students in the Franciscan house . . . in which the bachelor Duns Scotus, probably as master of students, took a leading part". According to Balić

they are forty-six in number, nineteen of which were held in Paris and the rest in Oxford. Only forty are found in Wadding-Vivès (one being printed among the inauthentic *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus*, q. 1 Vivès, v.5, 338-53). Of the remaining six, five have been edited by Harris (*Duns Scotus*, v.2., Oxford 1927) and Balić later made another edition of the first three *Collationes* found in Harris (*Bogoslovni Vestnik* ix, 1939, 185-219).

Philosophical Works

The *Tractatus de primo principio* is a short but important compendium of Scotus's natural theology. It seems to be one of his latest works and draws heavily on the *Ordinatio*. It is available in two modern editions, that of M. Mueller, O.F.M. (Freiburg im Breisgau 1941) and E. Roche, O.F.M. (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 1949). Also authentic are the *Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, although the last two books (X and XII) found in the Wadding and Vivès editions are spurious. Once believed to be an earlier work of Scotus, it seems to have been composed or at least revised about the time Scotus was working on the *Ordinatio*. Like the latter, the text of these questions as found in our editions is in a deplorable state.

Somewhat less certain is the question of the authenticity of the *Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De anima*, which in addition to doctrinal discrepancies with the certainly authentic works, contains passages that are found literally in Gonsalvus of Spain.

Of the logical writings found in the Wadding and Vivès editions, the following are generally accepted as genuine works of Scotus: *Quaestiones super Universalia Porphyrii*, *Quaestiones in librum Praedicamentorum*, *Quaestiones in I et II librum Perihermenias*, *Opus secundum sive octo quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias*, *Quaestiones in libros Elenchorum*. There are still some difficulties connected with

these works, however, so that perhaps the final word on their authenticity still remains to be said.

Even more dubious are the *Theoremata*. Internal evidence militates very strongly against their authenticity, though external reasons favour it. Even if Duns Scotus is definitely established as their author, the problem of interpretation still remains, for this small tract seems to be simply notes or outlines of problems, rather than a finished composition.

The following philosophical works found in the Wadding and Vivès collections, however, are definitely spurious: *Grammatica speculativa* (Thomas of Erfurt), *Quaestiones in librum I et II priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis* (unknown Scotist), *Quaestiones in librum I et II posteriorum Analyticorum* (John of Cornwall), *Expositio et quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Marsilius of Inghen), *Meteorologicorum libri quatuor* (author unknown), *Expositio in XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis seu Metaphysica textualis* (Antonius Andreas), *Conclusiones utilissimae ex libris Metaphysicorum Aristotelis collectae* (Gonsalvus of Spain), *Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio* (Vitalis du Four), *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus*—except the first question—(Nicholas of Lyra and William of Alnwick), and *De cognitione Dei tractatus imperfectus*.

The editions most frequently used are these. *Opera omnia*, edited by Luke Wadding, O.F.M. (Lyons 1639) in twelve volumes. In addition to the text, this edition contains notes, summaries and commentaries by famous Scotists. The Vivès edition (Paris 1891–5) in twenty-four volumes is practically a reprint of Wadding without the latter's indices. The new critical edition of the *Opera omnia*, prepared by the Scotistic Commission in Rome and published by the Vatican City Press, was begun in 1950 and is still incomplete. Of the single works we have the two modern editions of the *Tractatus de primo principio* mentioned above. The edition of Roche is accompanied by an English translation. The first two

books of the *Opus oxoniense* were edited by M. Fernandez Garcia, O.F.M. under the title *Commentaria oxoniensia* (Quaracchi, 1912-14) and the *Quaestiones quodlibetales* of the Wadding edition are available in a photo-offset reprint by the Franciscan Institute (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 1950).

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I

CONCERNING METAPHYSICS

Summary

1. Metaphysics, the science of the transcendentals
2. Concept and articulation of the transcendental
3. Primacy of “being” among the other transcendentals
4. On the deduction of the attributes of “being”
5. Being as the subject and God as the goal of metaphysics

[I. CONCERNING METAPHYSICS]

[1. METAPHYSICS, THE SCIENCE OF THE
TRANSCENDENTALS]

There must necessarily exist some universal science which considers the transcendentals as such. This science we call "metaphysics", from "meta", which means "beyond", and "the science of nature".¹ It is, as it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned with the transcendentals.

[2. CONCEPT AND ARTICULATION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL]

Now a doubt arises as to what kind of predicates are those which are predicated formally of God, for instance, "wise", "good", and the like. I answer that before "being" is divided into the ten categories, it is divided into infinite and finite. For the latter, namely finite being, is common to the ten genera. Whatever pertains to "being", then, in so far as it remains indifferent to finite and infinite, or as proper to the Infinite Being, does not belong to it as determined to a genus, but prior to any such determination, and therefore as transcendental and outside any genus. Whatever [predicates] are common to God and creatures are of such kind, pertaining as they do to being in its indifference to what is infinite and finite. For in so far as they pertain to God they are infinite, whereas in so far as they belong to creatures they are finite. They belong to "being", then, prior to the division into the ten genera. Anything of this kind, consequently, is transcendental.

But then another doubt arises. How can wisdom be

considered a transcendental if it is not common to all beings, for transcendentals seem to be common to all? I answer that just as it is not of the nature of a supreme genus to have many species contained under it, but it is of its nature not to have any genus over and above it (the category of "when", for instance, is a supreme genus since it has no genus over and above it, although it has few, if any, species contained under it), so also whatever is not contained under any genus is transcendental. Hence, not to have any predicate above it except "being" pertains to the very notion of a transcendental. That it be common to many inferior notions, however, is purely incidental. This is evident too from the fact that "being" possesses not only attributes which are coextensive with it, such as "one", "true" and "good", but also attributes which are opposed to one another such as "possible-or-necessary", "act-or-potency", and suchlike.

But if the coextensive attributes are transcendental because they pertain to "being" as not determined to a definite genus, then the disjunctive attributes are transcendental too. And both members of the disjunction are transcendental since neither determines its determinable element to a definite genus. Nevertheless, one member of the disjunction is proper and pertains formally to one being alone, for instance, "necessary" in the disjunction "necessary-or-possible", or "infinite" in the disjunction "finite-or-infinite", and so also with the others.

And so "wisdom", or anything else, for that matter, which is common to God and creatures, can be transcendental. A transcendental, however, may also be predicated of God alone, or again it may be predicated about God and some creature. It is not necessary, then, that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated of every being, unless it be coextensive with the first of the transcendentals, namely "being".

[3. PRIMACY OF "BEING" AMONG THE
OTHER TRANSCENDENTALS]

And I say that . . . since nothing can be more common than "being", and that "being" cannot be predicated univocally and *in quid* ² of all that is of itself intelligible (because it cannot be predicated in this way of the ultimate differences ³ or of its attributes),⁴ it follows that we have no object of the intellect that is primary by reason of a commonness *in quid* in regard to all that is of itself intelligible.

And yet, notwithstanding, I say that "being" is the first object of the intellect, because in it a twofold primacy concurs, namely, a primacy of commonness and of virtuality.⁵ For whatever is of itself intelligible either includes essentially the notion of "being" or is contained virtually or essentially in something else which does include "being" essentially. For all genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being all include "being" quidditatively. All the ultimate differences are included essentially in some of these. All the attributes of "being" are virtually included in "being" and in those things which come under "being".

Hence, all to which "being" is not univocal *in quid* are included in those to which "being" is univocal in this way. And so it is clear that "being" has a primacy of commonness in regard to the primary intelligibles, that is, to the quidditative concepts of the genera, species, individuals, and all their essential parts, and to the Uncreated Being. It has a virtual primacy in regard to the intelligible elements included in the first intelligibles, that is, in regard to the qualifying concepts of the ultimate differences and proper attributes.

My supposition that "being" is predicated commonly *in quid* of all the aforementioned quidditative concepts

is established by the two arguments used in the initial question to prove that being is predicated commonly of created and uncreated being [Cf. pp. 20-3]. That what I have supposed may be evident, I now explain these reasons a little.

I explain the first reason thus. Of each of the aforementioned concepts, the intellect can be certain that it is a being and still be in doubt about the differences which delimit "being" to the concept in question. And so the concept of being, in so far as it agrees with the concept in question, is other than the dubious concepts which come under it. But it is other in such a way that it is included in both of the concepts which come under it, for these limiting differences presuppose the same concept of being which they limit.

The second reason I explain as follows : We argued that God cannot be known naturally unless being is univocal to the created and uncreated. We can argue in the same way of substance and accident, for substance does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, but only the sensible accident does so. From this it follows that we can have no quidditative concept of substance except such as could be abstracted from the concept of an accident. But the only quidditative concept of this kind that can be abstracted from that of an accident is the concept of being.

Our assumption that substance does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, we prove thus : If something moves the intellect when it is present, then whenever the intellect is not so moved, it will be able to know naturally that this object is absent. This is clear from the *De anima*, вк. II,* according to which the sense of sight can perceive darkness when, presumably, light is not present, and the sense, in consequence, is not moved. Therefore, if substance immediately moved the intellect naturally to know the substance itself, it would follow that when a substance was absent, the intellect

* II, cap. x (420^a, 23).

could know that it was not present. Hence, it could know naturally that the substance of bread does not exist in the Consecrated Victim of the Altar, which is clearly false.⁶ Naturally, then, we have no quidditative concept of substance caused immediately by substance itself. Our only quidditative concept thereof is that caused by, or first abstracted from, an accident, and this is none other than the concept of being.

By the same token, our conclusion holds for the essential parts of substance. For if neither matter nor form move the intellect to an act of knowledge about themselves, I ask "What simple concept shall we have of matter or form?" If you say that it is some relative concept, for instance, of some part, or that it is an incidental concept, for instance, of some property of matter or form, then I ask "What is the quidditative concept to which this incidental or relative concept is attributed?" And if there is no quidditative concept, there will be nothing to which this incidental concept may be attributed. But the only quidditative concept possible is caused by, or abstracted from, that which does move the intellect, viz. an accident. And this will be the concept of being. Consequently, nothing is known of the essential parts of substance unless "being" is univocal, common to them and to the accidents.

These reasons do not imply that "being" is predicated *in quid* of the ultimate differences and attributes.

The first does not, for the intellect [according to the argument] is certain that some such thing is a being while it doubts whether it is this being or that. The intellect, however, is certain that it [viz. an ultimate difference or attribute] is not being quidditatively, but it is as it were "being" by way of accidental predication.

Or another and better way. Every such concept is irreducibly simple⁷ and therefore one part of it cannot be conceived while another part remains unknown, as is evident from the statement of the Philosopher (in

Metaphysics, BK. IX, near the end) that there is no deception regarding irreducibly simple concepts as there is regarding the quiddity of what is complex. This is not to be understood as though the simple intellect⁸ is formally deceived regarding the knowledge of quiddities, for in simple intellection there is neither truth nor falsity. In regard to a quiddity that is composed, however, the simple intellect can be virtually deceived. For if such a notion is false in itself, then it includes virtually a false proposition. But what is irreducibly simple includes a false proposition neither virtually nor formally, and therefore there is no deception in its regard. Either it is grasped totally or not at all, in which case it remains completely unknown. Of no irreducibly simple concept, therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful about another.

From this, it is clear also as far as the second reason stated above is concerned, that what is so irreducibly simple remains completely unknown unless it is grasped fully as it is in itself.

A third reply is possible regarding the first reason. This concept of which we are certain is other than those of which we are in doubt. Now if this same element of which we are certain is preserved with both of the doubtful concepts, it is truly univocal in the sense that it is grasped with both of them. It is not necessary, however, that it be contained in both of them *in quid*, but it may either be contained *in quid* or be univocal to them as determinable is univocal to determinant, or as what can be denominated to what denominates. To put it briefly, then, "being" is univocal for all. But for concepts that are not irreducibly simple, it is predicated of them univocally *in quid*; for concepts irreducibly simple, it is univocal as something determinable or denominable, but it is not univocal in the sense that it is predicated of them *in quid*, for that would be a contradiction.

And so it is clear how in "being" there concurs a two-

fold primacy, namely, a primacy of commonness *in quid* in regard to all concepts that are not irreducibly simple and a primacy of virtuality in itself or in its inferiors regarding all concepts which are irreducibly simple.

[4. ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF "BEING"]

I say that this disjunction "necessary-or-possible", like the countless other such found among beings, is an attribute of "being" that is equivalent to a coextensive attribute. But the coextensive attributes, as something more common, are affirmed immediately of "being", because "being" is an irreducibly simple concept and consequently no middle term can exist between "being" and its attribute, for neither has a definition that might serve as a middle term. Also, if there is some attribute of "being" that is not immediate, it is difficult to see what prior attribute could be used as a middle term to link it with "being", for it is not easy to discern any order among the attributes of "being". And even if we knew of such an order among them, any propositions about them we might use as premises seem scarcely more evident than the conclusions. In the disjunctive attributes, however, while the entire disjunction cannot be demonstrated from "being", nevertheless as a universal rule by positing the less perfect extreme of some being we can conclude that the more perfect extreme is realised in some other being. Thus it follows that if some being is finite, then some being is infinite. And if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary. For in such cases it is not possible for the more imperfect extreme of the disjunction to be existentially predicated of "being", particularly taken, unless the more perfect extreme be existentially verified of some other being upon which it depends.

But we see that the less perfect member of such a

disjunction cannot be established in this fashion, for if the more perfect exists in some being, there is no necessity on this score that the less perfect should exist in some other being, unless, of course, the two extremes of the disjunction should happen to be correlatives, such as "cause" and "caused". Consequently, this disjunction "necessary-or-contingent", cannot be established of "being" through some prior medium. Neither could the contingent part of the disjunction be established of anything on the supposition that something necessary exists. The proposition: "Some being is contingent", therefore, seems to be a primary truth and is not demonstrable by an *a priori* demonstration, which gives the reason for the fact.⁹ That is why the Philosopher, in arguing against the theory that future events are necessary, makes no attempt to deduce from it something even more impossible than the hypothesis, but he deduces from it an impossibility that is more apparent to us, namely, that there would be no need to deliberate [about the future]. And therefore, those who deny such manifest things need punishment or knowledge or sense, for as Avicenna puts it (*Metaphysics* 1) †: "Those who deny a first principle should be beaten or exposed to fire until they concede that to burn and not to burn, or to be beaten and not to be beaten, are not identical". And so too, those who deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented.

[5. BEING AS THE SUBJECT AND GOD AS THE GOAL
OF METAPHYSICS]

We must first see whether metaphysics, the first and highest of the naturally acquired habits perfecting man's intellect in the present life, has God as its first object.

On this point there is a controversy between Avicenna

† Aristotle, *Topica*, 1, cap. xi (105^a, 4-5).

and Averroes. Avicenna claims that God is not the subject of metaphysics, because no science proves [the existence of] its own subject. The metaphysician, however, proves that God exists. Averroes reproves Avicenna in his final comment on the *Physics*, bk. 1, because he wishes, by using the same major premise against Avicenna, to prove that God and the pure spirits are the subject of metaphysics, and that God's existence is not proved in metaphysics, since it is only by means of motion, which pertains to the science of natural philosophy, that any kind of pure spirit can be proved to exist.

It seems to me, however, that of the two, Avicenna has spoken better. Wherefore I argue against Averroes as follows. The proposition they both hold, viz. "No science proves the existence of its subject" is true, because of the priority the subject holds in regard to the science. For if the subject were posterior to the science, then its existence would have to be established in some lower science, where it would be conceived under some inferior aspect which is inadequate for its role as the object [of the higher science]. Now a subject enjoys a greater priority over the lower than over the higher science. If the highest science, therefore, cannot prove that its subject exists, it is even less possible for a lower science to do so.

Or to put the argument in another way, if the philosopher of nature can prove that God exists, then God's existence is a conclusion of natural philosophy. Now if metaphysics cannot prove the existence of God in this way, then God's existence is presupposed as a principle in metaphysics. Consequently, a conclusion of natural philosophy is a principle of metaphysics, and therefore the philosophy of nature is prior to metaphysics.

Again, if a certain property can exist only in virtue of such and such a cause, from every such property that appears in the effect, we can infer the existence of the cause. Now it is not just such properties of the effect as are treated in the philosophy of nature that are possible

only on condition that God exists, for the same is true of the properties treated of in metaphysics. Not only does motion presuppose a mover, but a being that is posterior presupposes one that is prior. Consequently, from the priority that exists among beings the existence of the First Being can be inferred, and this can be done in a more perfect way than the existence of a Prime Mover can be established in natural philosophy. We can infer, then, in metaphysics from act and potency, finiteness and infinity, multitude and unity, and many other such metaphysical properties, that God or the First Being exists.

So far as this article is concerned, then, I say that God is not the subject of metaphysics, because, as has been proved above in the first question, there is but one science that has God as its first subject, and this is not metaphysics.¹⁰ And this is proved in the following manner. Of every subject, also of a subordinate science, it is known through the senses that it is of such a nature that to exist is not repugnant to it, as is evident of the subject of optics, for the existence of a visible line is grasped immediately from the senses. Just as principles are grasped immediately once the terms are apprehended through the medium of the senses, so likewise if a subject is not to be posterior to, or less known than, its principle,¹¹ it must needs be grasped through the senses. But no proper notion that we can form of God is apprehended immediately by man's intellect in this life. Therefore, we can have no naturally acquired science about God under some notion proper to Himself. Proof of the minor: The first [proper] concept we have of God is that He is the First Being. But this notion is not grasped through the senses, but we must first ascertain that the union of these two terms is compatible. Before we can know this compatibility, however, it is necessary that we demonstrate that some being is first. Therefore, etc.

Hence, I concede with Avicenna that God is not the subject of metaphysics. The Philosopher's statement

(*Metaphysics*, BK. I) * that metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes, presents no difficulty. For he speaks here as he did in the *Prior Analytics*, BK. I, † where he says : “First it is necessary to determine with what [Prior Analytics] is concerned and what it has to do. It is concerned with demonstration and has to do with the demonstrative branch of learning, that is with the general science of demonstrating or syllogising”. Hence, “concerned with” denotes properly the circumstance of the final cause just as much as it does that of the material cause. Wherefore, metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes as its end. In knowing them, metaphysical science attains its goal.

* I, cap. ii, *passim*. † *Analytica priora*, I, cap. i (24^a, 10 ff.).

II

MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Summary of the Argument

QUESTION : Is the intellect of man in this life able to know
God naturally ?

PRO ET CONTRA

BODY OF THE QUESTION

Preliminary observations

The opinion of Henry of Ghent

Scotus's own opinion

First statement : It is possible to have a quidditative
concept of God

Second statement : God is conceived not only analogously,
but also univocally

Third statement : God's essence is not known intuitively
by man in this life

Fourth statement : Man can have many proper concepts
of God

Fifth statement : We know God through the intelligible
species of creatures

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

Reply to Henry's arguments

[II. MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD]

Concerning the third distinction I ask first whether it is possible to know God. And I ask first : *whether the intellect of man in this life is able to know God naturally.*

[Pro et Contra]

I argue that it cannot ¹ :

[Arg. i]. The Philosopher in *De anima*, BK. III, † says : "Sense images are related to the intellect in the same way as sense objects are related to the senses". But the senses perceive only what is sensible. Therefore the intellect is unable to grasp anything whose sense image cannot be known by the senses. Of God there is no sense image. Neither is He such that He could be perceived by such a sense faculty. Therefore, etc.

[Arg. ii]. Again, according to *Metaphysics*, BK. II ‡ : "As the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is our intellect to the things which are by nature most evident". But if it is impossible to know such things, it is impossible to know God.

[Arg. iii]. Also, according to *Physics*, BK. I ** : "The infinite as infinite is unknowable". And according to the *Metaphysics*, BK. II †† : "It is not possible to know an infinite [number] of things". Therefore, neither can the Infinite Being be known, since an infinite number and an Infinite Being would seem to be equally disproportionate to our intellect ; for an Infinite Being exceeds the powers of our intellect in the same measure as, or certainly to no less a degree than, does the infinite in number.

[Arg. iv]. Gregory, also, in his commentary on Ezechiel says ‡‡ : "No matter how far our mind may have

† III, cap vii (431^a, 14).

‡ II, cap. i (993^b, 9).

** I, cap. iv (187^b, 8).

†† II, cap. ii (994^b, 22).

‡‡ *Sermons on Ezechiel*, I, hom. viii, n. 30 (Migne, P.L., LXXVI, 868).

progressed in the contemplation of God, it does not attain to what He is, but to what is beneath Him”.

To the contrary :

According to *Metaphysics*, BK. v * : “Metaphysics is a theology of God and is primarily concerned with the divine”. And [Aristotle] places man’s happiness in the actual possession of such knowledge, that is to say, in the actual speculation about the pure spirits.

[Body of the Question]

[Preliminary Observations]

In this first question there is no need to make the distinction that we cannot know what God is : we can only know what He is not.² For every denial is intelligible only in terms of some affirmation. ‡ ** It is also clear that we can know negations of God only by means of affirmations ; for if we deny anything of God, it is because we wish to do away with something inconsistent with what we have already affirmed.

Neither are negations the object of our greatest love.

Furthermore, if something is negated, either the negation is considered simply in itself or as predicated of something. If a negation, such as “not-stone”, is considered simply in itself, it is as characteristic of nothing as it is of God, for a pure negation is predicated of both what is and what is not a being. Consequently, what we know through such a negation is no more God than it is a chimera or nothing at all. If the negation is understood as modifying something, then I inquire after the underlying notion of which the negation is understood to be true. It will be either an affirmative or a negative notion. If it is affirmative, we have what we seek. If it is negative, I inquire as I did before. Either the negation is conceived simply in itself or as predicated of something.

* v, cap. vii (1064^a, 36).

‡ *De interpretatione*, cap. xiii (22^a, 33) ; cf. also cap. xiv *in fine*.

** iv, cap. ii (1004^a, 10-16).

If the first be true, then the negation applies to nothing as well as to God. If it is conceived as predicated of something, then I argue as before. And no matter how far we proceed with negations, either what we know is no more God than nothing is, or we will arrive at some affirmative concept which is the first concept of all.

In the second place, there is no point in distinguishing between a knowledge of His essence and a knowledge of His existence,³ for I intend to seek a simple concept of which existence may be affirmed or denied by a judgment of the intellect. For I never know anything to exist unless I first have some concept of that of which existence is affirmed. And this is what we seek here.

Thirdly, in regard to God's existence there is no need to distinguish between the question of the truth of the proposition and the question of His existence.⁴ For before there can be any question of the truth of a proposition wherein existence is predicated of a subject, it is necessary first of all to conceive the terms of this proposition. Now the question is this: "Is it possible to have a concept of the subject [of this proposition: 'God exists'] by natural means?"

Fourthly, the distinction between a natural and supernatural concept is out of place, because we are interested here only in the former.⁵

Fifthly, in regard to the natural, there is no necessity for a distinction between "nature, absolutely speaking" and "nature, in our present state", for we are interested only in the latter.⁶

Sixthly, the distinction between knowing God in Himself and knowing Him in a creature is not to the point.⁷ For if our knowledge comes through a creature in the sense that the reasoning process begins with what can be known from a creature, then I ask "What do we know at the conclusion of this process?" If it is God Himself, then I have what I seek, for I am looking for a concept of God Himself. If it is not God, but a creature,

then the beginning and conclusion of the reasoning process are identical, and therefore I have no knowledge of God at all—or at least God is not grasped at the end of the reasoning process so long as the mind does not get beyond the object that served as the initial point of the argument.

The meaning of the question, then, is this: "Is it possible by natural means for man's intellect in the present life to have a simple concept in which concept God is grasped?"

[*The Opinion of Henry of Ghent*]

A certain teacher ⁸ answers the question in this way: An act of knowledge can be distinguished in terms of its object, and on this score we can distinguish: (a) a knowledge of a thing through the thing itself; (b) a knowledge of the thing through something incidental to it; (c) a knowledge of the thing in particular; and (d) a knowledge of the thing in general.

In reality there is no knowledge of God *through something incidental to Him*, for whatever is known of God is God Himself. Nevertheless, we do know what God is in a *quasi-incidental* manner when we know some one of His attributes. Hence, Damascene says * that the attributes "do not bespeak the nature of God, but something about the nature".

God is also known *in a general way*, that is, through some universal attribute. Not indeed that any attribute, universal by way of predication, is affirmed of Him in whom nothing is universal, for His essence is singular of its very nature. He is known, however, in a "universal" that is only analogically common to Himself and to a creature. This universal is conceived by us as though it were one notion, because of the close resemblance of the concepts it contains, although the latter in reality are diverse.

* Migne, P.G., xciv, 800.

God is not known *in particular* from creatures, because a creature bears only an external likeness to Him, since it resembles Him only in those attributes which do not constitute Him as this particular nature. Now since one thing can be known through another only by reason of the similarity existing between the two, it follows that God is not known in particular through creatures.

Furthermore, there are three ways in which we may have a general knowledge of God : (a) in a *most* general way, (b) in a *less* general way, and (c) in the *least* general manner.

(a) The *most* general knowledge we have of God comprises three stages. To know any being as "this being" is already to conceive God in a very indistinct way ; for "being" is included, as it were, as part of the concept. This is the first step. The second step consists in removing the "this" and conceiving simply "being". For "being", in so far as it is a concept and not simply a part of a concept, is already conceived as analogically common to God and creature. We are in the third stage, if the concept of "being" which pertains to God is distinguished from the concept of "being" which pertains analogically to creatures, if, for instance, God is conceived as a being that is *negatively* undetermined, that is, incapable of being determined, while a creature is conceived as a being that is *privatively* undetermined.⁹ In the first instance, "undetermined" is conceived abstractly as something self-subsistent and incapable of being participated in, like a form that lacks all matter. In the second, "undetermined" is a universal abstracted from particulars and not actually shared by them.¹⁰

(b) In addition to these three stages of most general knowledge, God is grasped in a *less general* and more specific way, when any given attribute is conceived not in an unqualified manner as before, but as existing in the highest degree of perfection possible to such an attribute.

(c) God is known in the *least general manner*, however,

when the mind, on the basis of God's simplicity, identifies any of His other attributes with His primary attribute, namely, *being* itself.

Since nothing is simpler than God, He is known not through a species proper to Him, but, in a manner reminiscent of the operation of the estimative power through a species, alien to Him, derived from creatures. And this holds for all three of the aforementioned ways of knowing God.

[*Scotus's own opinion*]

My answer to the first question is different. I shall contradict the preceding view on five points. The reasons I give for my position will refute the other.

[*First Statement*]. In the first place, then, I say that it is naturally possible to have not only a concept in which God is known incidentally, as it were—for instance, under the aspect of some attribute—but also one in which He is conceived by Himself and quidditatively.

This I prove as follows. According to [Henry of Ghent], by conceiving "wise" we grasp a property or quasi-property which perfects the nature after the manner of a secondary act. In order to conceive "wise", therefore, it is necessary to have a conception of some prior subject, because I understand this property to be verified existentially. And so we must look beyond all our ideas of attributes or quasi-attributes, in order to find a quidditative concept to which the former may be attributed. This other concept will be a quidditative notion of God, for our quest for a quasi-subject will not cease with any other kind of concept.

[*Second Statement*]. Secondly, I say that God is conceived not only in a concept analogous to the concept of a creature, that is, one which is wholly other than that which is predicated of creatures, but even in some concept univocal to Himself and to a creature.

And lest there be a dispute about the name "univocation", I designate that concept univocal which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term of a syllogism, so that wherever two extremes are united by a middle term that is one in this way, we may conclude to the union of the two extremes among themselves. Univocation in this sense I prove by the following four arguments.

[Arg. 1]. The first is this. Every intellect that is certain about one concept, but dubious about others has, in addition to the concepts about which it is in doubt, another concept of which it is certain. (The subject includes the predicate.) Now, in this life already, a man can be certain in his mind that God is a being and still be in doubt whether He is a finite or an infinite being, a created or an uncreated being. Consequently, the concept of "being" as affirmed of God is different from the other two concepts but is included in both of them and therefore is univocal.

Proof of the major. One and the same concept cannot be both certain and dubious. Therefore, either there is another concept (which is our contention), or there is no concept at all, and consequently no certitude about any concept.

I prove the minor. Every philosopher was certain that what he postulated as a first principle was a being ; for instance, one was certain that fire was a being, another that water was a being. Yet he was not certain whether it was a created or an uncreated being, whether it was first or not first. He could not be certain that it was the first being, for then he would have been certain about something false, and what is false is not strictly knowable.¹¹ Neither was he certain that it was not first ; for then he would not have claimed the opposite.

This reason is confirmed as follows : Someone

perceiving the disagreement among philosophers can still be certain that any of the things that they have acclaimed as the first principle is a being. Nevertheless, in view of the contrariety of opinions, he could be in doubt whether this or that being is primary. Now if we could demonstrate for such an individual the truth or falsity of one of these alternatives, for example that fire is not the first being, but is posterior to the first being, we would not destroy his first certain notion of it as a being, but this notion would survive in the particular conception which we had proven about fire. And this also proves the proposition stated as the final conclusion of the argument, namely that this certain concept, since as such it is neither of the doubtful notions, is preserved in both of them.

You may not recognise the force of this argument based on the diversity of opinion among the philosophers, but insist that each has in his mind two concepts closely resembling each other. Yet because of the very closeness of the analogy, they seem to be one concept. The following consideration, however, may be urged against this. By such an evasion all possibility of proving the unity of any univocal concept would be destroyed. For if you say that "man" is one concept applicable to both Socrates and Plato, some one will deny it, asserting that there are two concepts, but they seem to be one because of their great similarity.

Furthermore, these two concepts are irreducibly simple. Unless, therefore, they are known distinctly and *in toto*, they cannot be known at all. Consequently, if these concepts are not perceived as two concepts now, they will not be perceived as two later on.

Again, either these two concepts are conceived as opposed to each other, and then it is strange how they are perceived as one. Or they are compared according to analogy, or according to similarity or distinction, in which case they are conceived as distinct either prior to

or simultaneously with the comparison, and therefore they are not perceived as one concept.

Likewise, in postulating two concepts, you assume that two formal objects are known. How then can two formal objects be known and not be known as distinct?

Furthermore, if singulars were known under their proper notions even though the concepts of two of the same species were so very much alike, the intellect would still readily distinguish the concept of one singular from the other. And yet there is no doubt that such concepts are even more alike than the two concepts in question [viz. of God and of a creature], for the latter differ specifically.

[Arg. II]. My second principal argument is this. In the present life no concept representing reality is formed naturally in the mind except by reason of those factors which naturally motivate the intellect. Now these factors are the active intellect, and either the sense image or the object revealed in the sense image.¹² No simple concept, then, is produced naturally in our mind except that which can arise in virtue of these factors. Now, no concept could arise in virtue of the active intellect and the sense image that is not univocal but only analogous with, or wholly other than, what is revealed in the sense image. In the present life, since no other such analogous concept could arise in the intellect naturally, it would be simply impossible to have any natural concept of God whatsoever. But this is false.

Proof of the assumption. With the co-operation of the active and possible intellect, any object revealed in the sense image or existing as an intelligible species at the very most can produce in the intellect as its adequate effect (*a*) a proper concept of itself and (*b*) a concept of all that is essentially or virtually included in it. Now this concept which they postulate to be analogous is neither a proper concept of the object in the sense image nor is it a proper concept of anything virtually or essentially

included in it.¹³ Consequently, it cannot arise by any such moving factor.

And this argument is confirmed by the fact that except through a reasoning process the mind can know nothing from this object besides the proper and adequate concept of the object itself and whatever is included therein in one of the two aforementioned ways. But such a reasoning process presupposes a knowledge of the simple thing towards which one reasons.

Consequently, the argument may be formulated as follows: No object will produce a simple and proper concept of itself and a simple and proper concept of another object, unless it contains this second object essentially or virtually. No created object, however, contains the "Uncreated" essentially or virtually—at least in the way that the two are actually related, namely as what is by nature secondary is related to what is by nature prior. For it is contrary to the very notion of what is essentially secondary to include virtually what is prior to it. It is also obvious that the created does not contain, as part of its essence, something that is not merely common, but is exclusively proper to the "Uncreated". Therefore, it produces no simple and proper concept of the "Uncreated" at all.

[Arg. III]. The third argument is this. The proper concept of any subject provides sufficient ground for concluding to everything conceivable which necessarily inheres in that subject. We have no concept of God, however, that enables us to know every necessary attribute which we conceive of Him, as is evident from the fact of the Trinity, and the other necessary attributes that we know of Him by faith. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the major. We know any immediate proposition in so far as we know its terms. Consequently, the major clearly holds for every concept that is immediately verified existentially of the subject-concept. If it is a question of a notion that is only mediately verified, our

argument will continue to apply to the middle term in reference to the subject-concept until we have what we are seeking—some immediate propositions. Through these immediate truths, then, the mediate truths will be known.

[Arg. iv]. A fourth argument can also be adduced. Either some pure perfection ¹⁴ has a common meaning as applied to God and creatures (which is our contention), or not. If not, it is either because its meaning does not apply formally to God at all (which is inadmissible), or else it has a meaning that is wholly proper to God, in which case nothing need be attributed to God because it is a pure perfection. For such an assumption is equivalent to saying that the meaning of such a perfection in so far as it applied to God, is a pure perfection and therefore is affirmed of God. But this is to bring to nought what Anselm teaches in the *Monologion*,* namely that, with regard to everything except relations, whatever is unconditionally better than something which is not it, must be attributed to God, even as everything not of this kind [i.e. everything that is not better than anything positive that is incompatible with it] must be denied of Him. According to Anselm, then, we first know something to be a pure perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God. Therefore, it is not a pure perfection precisely in so far as it is in God.

This is also confirmed by the fact that otherwise no pure perfection would exist in creatures. The consequence is evident, for in this hypothesis only such concepts as express such pure perfections analogously can be applied to a creature. But such a notion in itself is imperfect since it is only analogous to the pure perfection. And therefore, nothing is any better for having this analogous perfection than it would be if it did not have it, for otherwise such a perfection would be affirmed of God.

This fourth reason is also confirmed as follows. Every

* Cap. xv (Migne, P.L., CLVIII, 162-3).

metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this fashion : the formal notion of something is considered ; the imperfection associated with this notion in creatures is removed, and then, retaining this same formal notion, we ascribe to it the ultimate degree of perfection and then attribute it to God. Take, for example, the formal notion of "wisdom" or "intellect" or "will". Such a notion is considered first of all simply in itself and absolutely. Because this notion includes formally no imperfection nor limitation, the imperfections associated with it in creatures are removed. Retaining this same notion of "wisdom" and "will", we attribute these to God—but in a most perfect degree. Consequently, every inquiry regarding God is based upon the supposition that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it obtained from creatures.

If you maintain that this is not true, but that the formal concept of what pertains to God is another notion, a disconcerting consequence ensues ; namely that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures nothing at all can be inferred about God, for the notion of what is in each is wholly different. We would have no more reason to conclude that God is formally wise from the notion of wisdom derived from creatures than we would have reason to conclude that God is formally a stone. For it is possible to form another notion of a stone to which the notion of a created stone bears some relation, for instance, stone as an idea in God. And so we could say formally, "God is a stone", according to this analogous concept, just as we say, "He is wise", according to another analogous concept.

What kind of univocation is ascribed to being and how far and to what it extends, will all be discussed more at length in a subsequent question on the primary object of the intellect.¹⁵

[*Third Statement*]. Thirdly, I say that God is not known naturally by anyone in the present life in a proper and

particular manner ; that is to say, we do not know Him in His essence itself precisely as this essence.

But the reason given for this in the preceding opinion is not conclusive. For, when [Henry] argues that one thing can be known from another only by reason of what is similar, we can only understand this likeness to be one of univocation or of imitation. If the first is meant, then nothing is known about God, for according to this opinion there is no likeness of univocation between God and creatures whereby He might be known by us. If the second is meant, then creatures would not imitate God's essence merely under the aspect of some general attribute, but also precisely as "this essence", unveiled and as it exists in itself, for in this way it is more an idea or exemplar than if it were conceived under some general attribute. By reason of this similarity, therefore, a creature, according to him, could be a principle of knowing the divine essence in itself and in particular.

There is, however, another reason for this conclusion that God Himself as this essence is not an object of natural knowledge for us ; for if He be known in this way by any intellect other than His own, it is as a voluntary and not as a natural object.¹⁶ Therefore He cannot be known naturally by any created intellect precisely as "this essence". Neither is there any essence naturally knowable to us that would suffice to reveal "this essence" as "this essence" whether by reason of a likeness of univocation or of imitation. For there is univocation only where general notions are concerned. Imitation too is deficient because it is imperfect, for creatures only imperfectly imitate Him.

Whether there is another reason for the impossibility of such knowledge based on the nature of the primary object of the intellect, which some claim to be the quiddity of a material thing, will be discussed in the question on the primary object of the intellect.

[*Fourth Statement*]. Fourthly, I say that we can arrive

at many concepts proper to God in the sense that they do not apply to creatures. Such are the concepts of all the pure perfections when taken in the highest degree. And the most perfect concept of all, by which we know God most perfectly, as it were, in a descriptive sort of way, is obtained by conceiving all the pure perfections and each in the highest degree. Now a less perfect but simpler concept is possible to us, namely the concept of an infinite being. For this is simpler than the concept of "good being" or "true being" or other similar concepts, since infinite is not a quasi-attribute or property of "being" or of that of which it is predicated. Rather it signifies an intrinsic mode of that entity, so that when I say "Infinite Being", I do not have a concept composed accidentally, as it were, of a subject and its attribute. What I do have is a concept of what is essentially one, namely of a subject with a certain grade of perfection—infinity. It is like "intense whiteness", which is not a notion that is accidentally composed, such as "visible whiteness" would be, for the intensity is an intrinsic grade of whiteness itself. Thus the simplicity of this concept "Infinite Being" is evident.

Now the perfection of this concept is proved first from the fact that it virtually includes more than any other concept we can conceive. As "being" virtually includes the "good" and the "true", so "Infinite Being" includes the "infinitely good", the "infinitely true", and all pure perfections under the aspect of infinity. It is also proved from this fact. With a demonstration of fact,¹⁷ the existence of an Infinite Being, or the fact that something has infinite being, is the last conclusion to be established. This is clear from Dist. II, q. I.¹⁸ The more perfect, however, are the last to be established by a demonstration of fact which begins with creatures. For their very remoteness from creatures makes knowledge of them from creatures most difficult of attainment.

But if you say that "highest good" or "Highest Being"

expresses an intrinsic mode of being and includes other concepts virtually, I reply that if "highest" be taken in a comparative sense, then it includes a relation to something extrinsic to the being, whereas "infinite" is an absolute concept. But if "highest" is understood in an absolute sense, i.e. as meaning that the very nature of the thing is such that it cannot be exceeded, then this perfection is conceived even more expressly in the notion of an infinite being, because "highest good" does not indicate as such whether it is infinite or finite.

This obviously refutes the assertion made in the previous opinion [of Henry], namely that the most perfect knowledge we have of God is to know His attributes as identified with the divine being in virtue of His simplicity. A knowledge of the divine being as infinite is, however, more perfect than a knowledge of Him as simple, for simplicity is shared with creatures, whereas infinity, as God possesses it, is not.

[*Fifth Statement*]. In the fifth place, I say that what we know of God is known through intelligible species of creatures. Whether the more universal and less universal have each their own proper intelligible species, or whether both are known through one and the same species, namely that which is less universal, this in any case is true. Whatever can imprint or cause a species of what is less universal, can also cause any species of that which is more universal. Thus it is that creatures which impress their own proper species on the intellect can also impress the species of the transcendentals which are common to themselves and to God.¹⁹ Then, the intellect in virtue of its own power can make use of many such species simultaneously, in order to conceive at one time those things of which these are the species. For instance, it can use the species of "good", the species of "highest", the species of "act", to conceive the "highest good which is pure act". This is clear from an instance of the dialectical rule *a minori*,²⁰ for the imagination is able to use

the species of different things perceptible to the senses and thus imagine a composite of these different elements, as is apparent, for instance, when we imagine a gold mountain.

This obviously refutes the assertion made in the previous opinion regarding the process whereby the intellect burrows beneath the concept of creatures. For by such a process, we can unearth only what lies beneath the surface. In the concept of a creature, however, no notion or species will be found to represent something proper to God which is wholly different in nature from anything pertaining to a creature, as we have proved in the second reason for the second statement. Consequently, we shall never discover such a concept by this burrowing process.

And as to the analogy of the estimative power, I would say that he seems to adduce one false instance to confirm another. For if a sheep were to remain the same in nature and to retain its natural affection towards a lamb, and yet by some miracle were to be changed accidentally so as to resemble a wolf in all its sensible manifestations, for instance in its colour, its shape, its cries, and all the rest of it, a lamb would flee from such a sheep just as it would flee from a wolf. And still such a sheep has only friendly, and not harmful, intentions towards the lamb. Consequently, the estimative power would not dig beneath the sense images to discover the friendliness, if it were moved according to the sense appetite in the precise way that the sensible appearances move it.

It does not help at all to say that this friendliness is not conveyed sensibly in such a case, since the external manifestations do not agree with the intent in question, and that it is only when the two agree that the friendly intent will be conveyed in a perceptible manner. For if the lamb flees from the wolf only because, by its estimative power, it perceives something inimical, and in the present case the intention [of friendliness] is not transmitted perceptibly where the sensible manifestations are

those [of a wolf], it follows that the lamb unearths a non-existent intention of enmity ; or if the lamb does not flee in virtue of what it discovers by such a burrowing process in the present instance, then neither does it do so in other cases.

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

As to the arguments at the beginning of this question :

*To the first,*²¹ I reply that the Philosopher's comparison applies to the initial movement of the intellect by the object, for in this case the sense images together with the active intellect function in the role of primary moving object. It must not be understood, however, of all the actions which follow this initial movement. For the intellect can abstract any object which is included in that which produces the initial movement. It is able to consider the former without considering that from which it was abstracted. Now when the intellect considers something that has been abstracted in this way, it grasps what is common to both sensible and insensible. In its consideration the intellect can unite a second abstract notion with the first so that the latter becomes proper to something else, namely to the insensible, for in the abstracted are considered both the insensible (in the universal) as well as the sensible. The sense faculty, however, is incapable of making abstractions. Therefore, in all its acts, whether they be primary or secondary, it requires some object to first put it in motion. But this is not the way that the sense image is related to the intellect.

*To the second,*²² I reply that the Commentator restricts this comparison of the Philosopher to what is difficult, but not impossible, to know. And his reason is that otherwise nature would have made these separate substances intelligible in vain, for no intellect would be able to know them. But this reason is invalid, first of all,

because we cannot say that the sole purpose or reason for the intelligibility of these substances is that we may know them. Consequently, even if we could know nothing about them, we still could not say they are intelligible to no purpose. Secondly, it does not follow that just because these substances are unintelligible to our minds, they are unintelligible to all minds, for they could be intelligible to themselves. Therefore, we have the fallacy of affirming the consequent.²³ Wherefore I say that even though there are many ways in which this citation of the Philosopher could be explained, still the eye of the bat has only a natural and intuitive knowledge. And on the basis of these two characteristics the Philosopher's words can be explained even in terms of impossibility. For just as it is impossible for the eye of the bat to consider such an object naturally and intuitively, so it is also impossible for our intellect to possess a natural and intuitive knowledge of God.²⁴

*To the third,*²⁵ I reply that the potentially infinite is unknown, because only to the extent that something is in act it is knowable. But it is not so unknown that it would be impossible for an infinite intellect to know it. Nevertheless the [potentially] infinite cannot be known by an intellect which proceeds to know it in the way that it is infinite. For it is infinite only in so far as the mind in considering only one thing after another never comes to an end. Now the mind which considers only one thing after another in this way always considers something finite and never something infinite. An infinite intellect, however, can know the whole thing at once, and not simply one part after another. And to the argument from *Metaphysics*, bk. II, concerning infinite numbers and the "Infinite", I reply that there is no parity between the two, for a knowledge of an infinite number of objects would imply that the faculty of knowledge itself is infinite (as is clear from q. I of dist. II regarding the infinity of God),²⁶ since one can infer a greater power of

intellect from a greater number of objects known. But a knowledge of something infinite does not imply that the act of knowledge itself is infinite unless it be an act which fully comprehends the object, for it is not necessary that the act and object should have the same mode of reality, since an act which by nature is finite can be related to an object which by nature is infinite. I admit, however, that we neither have, nor can have, such a comprehensive act of knowledge in regard to an infinite object.

*To the [fourth] argument,*²⁷ [that] of Gregory, I reply that we should not think that contemplation terminates in some creature beneath God, for this would be to enjoy as an end what is to be used as a means. According to Augustine,* this would be the greatest perversion. But the concept of God's essence under the aspect of "being" is less perfect than the concept of the same essence as "this essence". Because it is less perfect, it falls below the latter concept in intelligibility. But the contemplation that is characteristic of the ordinary dispensation rests with just such an [imperfect or] common concept, and hence with one of inferior intelligibility to God Himself considered as this essence. Consequently "to what is beneath God" must be understood in terms of being intelligible, [that is to say it refers to a concept] whose intelligibility is less than that of God considered in Himself as this singular essence.

[A Reply to the Arguments in Support of Henry]

To the arguments for the first opinion ²⁸ I reply that when it is argued that God by reason of His unique singularity cannot be known through some concept univocally common to Himself and creatures, the consequence is invalid. For Socrates, in so far as he is Socrates, is singular. Nevertheless several predicates can be abstracted from Socrates. Consequently, the singularity

* Migne, P. L., XL, 20.

of a thing is no impediment to the abstraction of a common concept. Though in reality everything in God, since it exists of itself, is singular, so that one thing does not contract another to singularity, nevertheless one and the same thing can be conceived indistinctly or as "this thing existing in reality", and thus it can be conceived either as common or as singular.

There is no need to refute what he says regarding an incidental knowledge of God, because God is known in a quasi-incidental manner in an attribute. However, this is not the sole way He can be known, as has been proved above.

III

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Summary of the Argument

QUESTION : Among beings does one exist which is actually infinite ?

PRO ET CONTRA

BODY OF THE QUESTION

Article I. Relative properties of God

Part I. The triple primacy

- a. Primacy of efficient causality
- b. Primacy of finality
- c. Primacy of pre-eminence

Part II. Interrelation of the three primacies

Part III. Unity of the divine nature

Article II. Absolute properties of God

Part I. Intellect and will

Part II. The infinity of the First Being

- a. First proof
- b. Second proof
- c. Third proof
- d. Fourth proof
- e. An ineffective proof

Solution of the Question

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

[III. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD]

First I inquire about those things which pertain to the unicity of God, and *I ask first whether in the realm of beings something exists which is actually infinite?*

[Pro et Contra]

To prove that no such thing exists the following arguments are cited ¹ :

[Arg. i]. If one of two contraries were actually infinite, then nothing contrary to it would exist in nature ; therefore if some good were actually infinite, nothing evil would exist in the universe. One answer given to this objection is that the major is true only of formal contraries, and evil is not formally contrary to God.² To the contrary : It makes no difference whether contrariety be virtual or formal. If something is infinite, it will not tolerate anything contrary to its effect, since by reason of its infinite power, it will destroy anything incompatible with its effect. Therefore, the major is just as true of virtual contraries as it is of formal contraries. For example : if the sun were infinitely hot either virtually or formally, in either case it would leave nothing cold in the universe.

[Arg. ii]. Again, just as an infinite body would not permit the coexistence of another body, even so an infinite being would not tolerate the coexistence of any other being. Proof of the consequence : Actuality seems to be opposed to actuality in the same way as dimension is opposed to dimension. Furthermore, if a being other than the infinite could exist, it would seem to increase the infinite just as to add another body to an infinite body would produce something greater than the infinite.

[Arg. iii]. Furthermore, anything present in this

place in such a way that it is nowhere else, is limited with regard to its whereabouts. What exists at just this moment and no other, is finite with regard to temporal duration. And so on with the single categories. Whatever does just this and nothing else, is finite in its action. Therefore, whatever is just this thing and no other, is limited in its entity. Now God above all is a "this", for He is singularity of His very nature. Therefore, God is not infinite.

[Arg. iv]. Again, according to *Physics*, BK. VIII,* if an infinite force existed it would move or act instantaneously ; but no force can move things instantaneously, for if it could movement would take place in an instant. Consequently, nothing is infinite.

To the contrary :

[Arg. i]. In the same place in *Physics*, BK. VIII,† the Philosopher proves that the First Mover is infinite in power because He moves with an infinite movement. But this conclusion cannot be understood of power that is infinite only in duration. The reason why it cannot be this. Aristotle proves that because this power [of the First Mover] is infinite, it cannot reside in a [finite] magnitude. But it is not contradictory, according to him, that a power infinite merely in duration should reside in a [finite] magnitude, for he assumes this to be the case with the heavens.³

[Arg. ii]. Also, in the Book of Psalms ‡ : "Great is the Lord and exceedingly to be praised".

[Arg. iii]. Also, in the fourth chapter of the first book of Damascene **: "He is a sea [of infinite perfections]".

[Body of the Question]

My reason for proceeding as I do in this first question is this. Although the proposition "An infinite being

* VIII, cap. x (266^a, 24-266^b, 6). † loc. cit. (266^b, 6).

‡ Ps. xlvii. 2 ; cxliv. 3.

** *De fide orthodoxa*, I, cap. ix (Migne, P.G., xciv, 835).

exists" can, by the very nature of its terms, be demonstrated by a demonstration of the reasoned fact,⁴ *we* are not able to demonstrate it in this way. Nevertheless, we can demonstrate the proposition by a demonstration of fact beginning with creatures. However, those properties of the infinite being which refer to creatures are related more closely than the absolute properties to what we must use as middle terms in a demonstration of fact, so that in virtue of such a demonstration the relative properties are established prior to the absolute properties, for the existence of one term of the relation implies immediately that of its correlative. Consequently, I shall show first the existence of such relative properties of the infinite being as primacy and causality. Secondly, from these I shall show that an infinite being exists, because these relative properties pertain exclusively to a being that is infinite. And so there will be two principal articles.

[*Article I. Relative Properties of God*]

As to the first article, I say that the properties of the infinite being which refer to creatures are either of causality or of pre-eminence. Those of causality in turn are twofold, the properties of efficient and final causality. What is added about the exemplar does not involve another cause different in kind from the efficient, for then there would be five kinds of causes. Wherefore, the exemplar cause is a certain kind of efficient cause, namely an intelligent agent in contradistinction to a natural agent ; but more of this elsewhere.⁵

In the first main article, I shall set forth three principal points : *first*, in the realm of beings something actually exists which is simply first by every primacy that includes no imperfection. For a part, though prior to, is less perfect than, the whole, since the part shares in the unity of the whole and yet is not the whole itself. Other

primacies, however, include no imperfection. Such is the primacy of pre-eminence and of independence in regard to the three kinds of causes, viz. efficient, formal or exemplar, and final. The primacy of pre-eminence, however, is not a primacy of causality. For just because one thing is more perfect than another, it does not follow that the former is the cause of the latter ; for the first and most perfect in any given genus is more perfect than any other of its kind and yet is not the cause of the others.⁶ Neither is the primacy of exemplarity to be differentiated from that of efficiency, for the principle which copies what exists in thought is nothing else than an intelligent efficient cause. For just as a natural efficient cause⁷ is not considered as distinct from efficient cause but rather as a subdivision thereof, so also the exemplar cause. Consequently, we have but two causalities distinct from one another, that of the efficient cause and that of the final cause. And none of these primacies which we attribute to God include any imperfection. Wherefore, I shall show that in the realm of beings something indeed exists which is simply first according to efficiency, and also that something exists which is simply first in the order of ends, and that something exists which is simply first by reason of pre-eminence. Secondly, I shall show that what is first in virtue of one kind of primacy is also first in virtue of the others. And thirdly, I shall show that this triple primacy pertains to but one nature, so as not to be found in several specifically or essentially different natures. This first article, then, will contain three subordinate parts.

[*Part I. The Triple Primacy*]. This first part comprises three principal conclusions corresponding respectively to the threefold primacy. Each of these three conclusions in turn depends upon three others : (1) Something is first, (2) It cannot be caused, (3) It actually exists in the realm of beings. And so the first part contains nine conclusions, three of which are principal.

[*a. The Primacy of Efficient Causality*]. Now the first of these nine conclusions is this : *Among beings which can produce an effect one is simply first*, in the sense that it neither can be produced by an efficient cause nor does it exercise its efficient causality in virtue of anything other than itself. Proof : Some being can be produced. Therefore, it is either produced by itself or by nothing or by something other than itself. Now it cannot be produced by nothing, for what is nothing causes nothing. Neither can it be produced by itself, for as Augustine points out in his work *De Trinitate*, BK. I,* nothing ever makes itself or begets itself. Therefore it can only be produced by another. Now let this other be called *A*. If *A* is first in the way we have described, then I have what I seek to prove. But if it is not first, then it is some posterior agent—either because it can be produced by something else or because it is able to produce its effect only in virtue of something other than itself. To deny the negation is to assert the affirmation. Let us assume that this being is not first and call it *B*. Then we can argue of *B* as we did of *A*. And so we shall either go on *ad infinitum* so that each thing in reference to what precedes it in the series will be second ; or we shall reach something that has nothing prior to it. However, an infinity in the ascending order⁸ is impossible ; hence a primacy is necessary because whatever has nothing prior to itself is posterior to nothing prior, for a circle in causes is inadmissible.

Against this argument, it is objected, first, that the argument assumes an end in the series of causes ; secondly, that it begins with contingent propositions and hence is not a demonstration. This second objection is argued in this way. The premises assume the existence of something that has been caused, and everything caused exists contingently. The first objection is confirmed from the admission of those who philosophise that an infinity is possible in an ascending order, as for instance, when they assume infinite generations, where no single one is

* *De Trinitate*, I, cap. i (Migne, P.L., XLII, 820).

first but each is second to some other. For they find nothing inconvenient about proceeding to infinity with productions of the same kind, where nothing is first and every member [of the series] is second [to some other member]. And still they assume no circle in causes.

To exclude this first objection, I say that the philosophers do not assume the possibility of an infinity in causes essentially ordered, but only in causes accidentally ordered, as is evident from Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, BK. VI, c. v, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species. To understand better what we have in mind, one should know that some causes are essentially ordered and others accidentally ordered. Here it should be noted that it is one thing to speak of incidental causes (*causae per accidens*) as contrasted with those which are intended by their nature to produce a given effect (*causae per se*). It is quite another to speak of causes which are ordered to one another essentially or of themselves (*per se*) and those which are ordered only accidentally (*per accidens*). For in the first instance we have merely a comparison one-to-one, namely of the cause to that which is caused. A *per se* cause is one which causes a given effect by reason of its very nature and not by reason of something incidental to it. For instance, the subject is a *per se* cause of its proper attributes. Other such instances are "white dilating"⁹ or "a builder building". On the contrary, "Polycletus building" would be an incidental cause.¹⁰ In the second instance, two causes are compared with each other in so far as they are causes of the same thing.

Per se or essentially ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes in three respects. The first difference is that in essentially ordered causes, the second depends upon the first precisely in its act of causation. In accidentally ordered causes this is not the case, although the second may depend upon the first for its existence or in some other way. Thus a son depends upon his father for

existence but is not dependent upon him in exercising his own causality, since he can act just as well whether his father be living or dead. The second difference is that in essentially ordered causes the causality is of another nature and order, inasmuch as the higher cause is more perfect. Such is not the case, however, with accidentally ordered causes. This second difference is a consequence of the first, since no cause in the exercise of its causality is essentially dependent upon a cause of the same nature as itself, for to produce anything one cause of a given kind suffices. The third difference is that all *per se* and essentially ordered causes are simultaneously required to cause the effect, for otherwise some causality essential to the effect would be wanting. In accidentally ordered causes this is not so, because there is no need of simultaneity in causing inasmuch as each possesses independently of the others the perfection of causality with regard to its own effect. For it is enough that one cause after the other exercises causality successively.

From all this we propose to show that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible ; secondly, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is also impossible unless we admit a terminus in an essentially ordered series ; therefore an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible in any case ; thirdly, even if we deny the existence of an essential order, an infinity of causes is still impossible. Consequently, in every instance, of necessity some first being able to cause exists. For the sake of brevity, let us call the first of these three assumptions *A*, the second *B* and the third *C*.

Proof of the first of these propositions, *A* (namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible) : I prove this first, because in essentially ordered causes where our opponent assumes an infinity, the second of the series depends upon the first. This is a consequence of the first difference between essentially and accidentally ordered causes. Now if these causes were infinite so

that not only would each single cause be posterior to something but every other cause which precedes it would be dependent in turn upon the cause that goes before it, then whole series of effects would be dependent upon some prior cause. Now the latter cannot be a cause that is part of the series, for then it would be its own cause. The series as a whole, then, is dependent on something which does not pertain to the group that is caused, and this I call the first efficient cause. Even if the group of beings caused were infinite, they would still depend upon something outside the group.

Then, too, if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes concurred to produce some effect, it would follow that an infinite number would simultaneously cause this effect, for it follows from the third difference that essentially ordered causes must exist simultaneously. Now no philosopher assumes this.

Then, thirdly, to be prior, a thing must be nearer to the beginning.¹¹* Consequently, where there is no beginning, nothing can be essentially prior to anything else.

Then, fourthly, by reason of the second difference, the higher cause is more perfect in its causality, therefore what is infinitely higher is infinitely more perfect, and hence of infinite perfection. Now nothing infinitely perfect can cause something only in virtue of another, because everything of this kind is imperfect in its causality since it depends on another in order to cause its effect.

Then, fifthly, inasmuch as to be able to produce something does not imply any imperfection, it follows that this ability can exist in something without imperfection, because that which implies no imperfection can be asserted of beings without imperfection. But if every cause depends upon some prior cause, then efficiency is never found without imperfection. Hence an independent power to produce something can exist in some nature, and this nature is *simply* first. Therefore, such an efficient power is possible, and this suffices, for later

* v, cap. xi (1018^b, 9-11)

we shall prove that if such a first efficient cause is possible, then it exists in reality. And so *A* becomes evident from these five arguments.

Now *B* (namely, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless we admit that the essentially ordered series has an end) is proved in this way. If we assume an infinity of accidentally ordered causes, it is clear that these causes do not exist simultaneously but only successively, one after the other, so that what follows flows in some way from what precedes. Still the succeeding cause does not depend upon the preceding for the exercise of its causality, for it is equally effective whether the preceding cause exists or not. A son in turn may beget a child just as well whether his father be dead or alive. But an infinite succession of such causes is impossible unless it exists in virtue of some nature of infinite duration from which the whole succession and every part thereof depends. For no change of form is perpetuated save in virtue of something permanent which is not a part of the succession. And the reason for this is that everything of this succession which is in flux, is of the same nature and no part thereof can be coexistent with the entire series for the simple reason that it would no longer be a part of the latter. Something essentially prior to the series then exists, for everything that is part of the succession depends upon it, and this dependence is of a different order from that by which it depends upon the immediately preceding cause where the latter is a part of the succession. Therefore, whatever depends upon an accidentally ordered cause depends more essentially upon an essentially ordered cause. Indeed, to deny the essential order is to deny the accidental order also, since accidents do not have any order save in virtue of what is fixed and permanent. Consequently, neither will an infinite multitude exist. *B*, then, is evident.

Proposition *C* (namely that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible), also is proved.

Proof: From the first reason adduced here, viz. that nothing can come from nothing, it follows that some nature is capable of causing effectively. Now, if an essential order of agents be denied, then this nature capable of causing does not cause in virtue of some other cause, and even if we assume that in one individual it is caused, nevertheless in some other it will not be caused, and this is what we propose to prove to be true of this nature. For if we assume that in every individual this nature is caused, then a contradiction follows immediately if we deny the existence of an essential order, since no nature that is caused can be assumed to exist in each individual in such a way that it is included in an accidental order of causes without being at the same time essentially ordered to some other nature. This follows from proposition *B*.

Then we come to the second objection cited above,¹² namely that when I argue: "Some nature is capable of producing an effect, therefore something is an efficient cause", the argument is not a demonstration, since it proceeds from contingent propositions. I reply that I could indeed argue that some nature is produced because some subject undergoes a change and therefore the term of the change comes into existence in the subject, and consequently this term or the composite [i.e. the subject and term] are produced or effected. Hence by the nature of the correlatives, some efficient cause exists. Formulated in this fashion, this first argument would be based upon a contingent but manifest proposition. However, to prove our conclusion the argument can be reformulated in such a way that it proceeds from necessary premises. Thus it is true that some nature is able to be produced, therefore something is able to produce an effect. The antecedent is proved from the fact that something can be changed, for something is possible ("possible" being defined as contrary to "necessary"). In this case, the proof for the first conclusion proceeds

from what the thing is or from its possible existence, but not from its actual existence. The actual existence of this being which up to now we have shown to be merely possible, however, will be established in the third conclusion.

The *second conclusion* about the first possible efficient cause is this. *Among those things which can produce an effect that which is simply first is itself incapable of being caused.* Proof: Such a being cannot be produced and is independently able to produce an effect. This was proved above, for if such a being could cause only in virtue of something else or if it could be produced, then either a process *ad infinitum* or a circle in causes would result, or else the series would terminate in some being which cannot be produced and yet independently is able to produce an effect. This being I call "first", and from what you grant, it is clear that anything other than this is not first. Therefore, the further conclusion follows that if such a being cannot be produced, it has no causes whatsoever, for it cannot be the result of a final, material or formal cause. Proof of the first consequence, viz. that if such a being cannot be produced, neither can it have any final cause. A final cause does not cause at all unless in a metaphorical sense it moves the efficient cause to produce the effect. Only in this way does the entity of what exists for the sake of an end depend on the end as prior. Nothing, however, is a *per se* cause unless the thing caused depends upon it essentially as upon something prior. Now the other two consequences are proved simultaneously. If something cannot be produced, then it can be the result neither of a material nor of a formal cause. The reason is this. If something has no extrinsic cause, neither does it have an intrinsic cause, for while to be an extrinsic cause does not imply imperfection but perfection, to be an intrinsic cause necessarily includes some imperfection since the intrinsic cause is a part of the thing it causes. For this reason, the very notion of

an extrinsic cause has a natural priority over that of intrinsic cause ; to deny what is prior is to deny also what is posterior.

Another way of proving these same consequences is this. Intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic causes either in their very being or in so far as they cause the composite, or in both of these ways, for the intrinsic causes of themselves and without the intervention of some agent cannot constitute the composite. This suffices to make the second conclusion evident.

The *third conclusion* about this being capable of exercising efficient causality is this. *Such a being actually exists and some nature actually existing is capable of such causality.* Proof : Anything to whose nature it is repugnant to receive existence from something else, exists of itself if it is able to exist at all. To receive existence from something else, however, is repugnant to the very notion of a being which is first in the order of efficiency, as is clear from the second conclusion. That it can exist, is also clear from the first conclusion [namely *A*], where the fifth argument, which seems to be less conclusive than the others, establishes this much at least.¹³ However, the other proofs of proposition *A* can also be used to establish the existence of this being as proposed by this third conclusion, but in this case they are based on contingent though manifest propositions. If *A*, however, is understood of the nature, the quiddity and the possibility, then the conclusions proceed from necessary premises. From all this it follows that an efficient cause which is first in the unqualified sense of the term can exist of itself. Consequently, it does exist of itself, for what does not actually exist of itself, is incapable of existing of itself. Otherwise a non-existent being would cause something to exist ; but this is impossible, even apart from the fact that in such a case the thing would be its own cause and hence could not be entirely uncaused.

Another way to establish this last conclusion, viz. the

existence of this first efficient cause, would be to argue from the impropriety of a universe that would lack the highest possible degree of being.

A kind of corollary contained, as it were, in these three conclusions concerning the first being able to exercise efficient causality, is the following. Not only is such a cause prior to all the others, but it would be contradictory to say that another is prior to it. And, in so far as such a cause is first, it exists. This is proved in the same way as the preceding. The very notion of such a being implies its inability to be caused (which is proved from the second conclusion). Therefore, if it can exist, owing to the fact that to be is not contradictory to it (as the first conclusion proves), then it follows that it can exist of itself, and consequently that it does exist of itself.

[*b. The Primacy of Finality*]. Concerning the final cause, I propose three conclusions similar to the first three conclusions about the being which is able to produce something. The *first conclusion* is that *some end is simply ultimate*, that is, it can neither be ordained to something else nor exercise its finality in virtue of something else. This is proved by five arguments similar to those advanced for the first conclusion concerning the possibility of a first efficient cause.

The *second conclusion* is that *the ultimate end cannot be caused in any way*. This is proved from the fact that it cannot be ordained for another end ; otherwise it would not be ultimate. It follows in addition that it cannot be caused by an efficient cause. This latter consequence is proved from the fact that every agent *per se* acts for the sake of an end as is said in *Physics*, БК. II,* where the Philosopher understands this proposition to hold also of "nature" where it seems to apply less than in the case of an agent who acts according to purpose.¹⁴ Now a thing cannot be produced if no *per se* efficient cause of it exists, for the first of any given kind of cause is never an incidental cause (*causa per accidens*). This is clear from

* II, cap. v (196^b, 17-22).

what is said in particular of incidental causes, which are chance and fortune. These, according to Aristotle in *Physics*, bk. II,* must be reduced respectively to the prior causes of "nature" and "intellect" as purpose, neither of which are incidental causes. Hence, whatever has no *per se* efficient cause has no efficient cause whatsoever. But whatever has no end, also has no *per se* efficient cause. Therefore, it will not be something that could be produced, for whatever could be the result of a final cause will be surpassed in goodness, and consequently in perfection, by the end. Further, as has been shown above of the first potential efficient cause [such a being will have no material or formal cause either].

The *third conclusion* is that *the being which can be an ultimate end actually exists and that this primacy pertains to some actually existing nature*. The proof for this is like that used in the first way from efficiency.¹⁵

It follows that such a being is first in the sense that it is impossible that anything should be prior to it. This is proved in the same fashion as the preceding corollary about the efficient cause.

[c. *The Primacy of Pre-eminence*]. Having already established three conclusions of each of the two orders of extrinsic causality, I submit three similar conclusions concerning the order of pre-eminence. The *first conclusion* is that *some eminent nature is simply first in perfection*. This is evident because an essential order exists among essences, for as Aristotle puts it,† forms are like numbers. And in such an order an ultimate nature is to be found. This is proved by the five reasons given above for a first being in the order of efficient causality.

The *second conclusion* is that *the supreme nature cannot be caused*. This is proved from the fact that it cannot be ordained to an end, for whatever is ordained to an end is surpassed in goodness, and therefore also in perfection, by the end. But if it is not ordained to an end, then, it cannot be caused by an efficient cause, and consequently

* II, cap. vi (198^a, 5-13).

† VIII, cap. iii (1043^b, 33).

it cannot be caused in any way. These last two consequences are proved from the second conclusion about the efficient cause.

Another consideration proves that this supreme nature cannot be an effect. Everything which can be produced has some essentially ordered cause, as is evident from the proof of the proposition *B* in support of the first conclusion about the possibility of a first efficient cause. Now an essentially ordered cause excels its effect ; therefore, if it could be produced, it would not be supreme.

The *third conclusion* is that *the supreme nature actually exists*, and this is proved from what we have said above.¹⁶ Corollary : It is contradictory that any nature should be more excellent or higher than this nature. This is proved in the same way as were the corollaries about the efficient and final cause.¹⁷

[*Part II. Interrelation of the Three Primacies*]. Regarding the second part, I say that *the first cause is the ultimate end*. Proof : Every *per se* efficient cause acts for the sake of an end, and a prior cause acts for a prior end ; therefore, the first cause acts for the sake of the ultimate end. Now the first efficient cause does not act primarily or ultimately for the sake of anything distinct from itself ; hence, it must act for itself as an end ; therefore, the first efficient cause is the ultimate end. If it were to act *per se* for the sake of any end other than itself, then something would be more noble than the first efficient cause, for if the end were anything apart from the agent intending the end, it would be more noble than the agent.

Now *the first efficient cause is also the supreme nature*. Proof : The first efficient cause is not a univocal cause with reference to the other efficient causes but rather an equivocal cause. Such a cause, therefore, is more excellent and noble than they. Consequently, the first efficient cause is the most excellent.¹⁸

[*Part III. Unity of the Divine Nature*]. Regarding the third part, I say that since this triple primacy is

found together (for where one is, there also are the others), it follows further that this triple identity is such that *there is but one first efficient cause according to essence and nature.*¹⁹

To show this, I will first establish a preliminary conclusion and only afterwards the principal conclusion. Now the preliminary conclusion is this. *The efficient cause which is first by this triple primacy is of itself necessarily existent.* Proof: It is completely incapable of being caused, for it is contradictory that it should have anything prior to it in the order of efficiency or finality, and consequently in any causal order. Hence, it is wholly incapable of being caused. From this I argue, nothing can be non-existent unless something either positively or privatively incompatible with it can exist. Now nothing can be positively or privatively incompatible with a being which exists of itself and is totally uncaused; therefore, etc. The major is clear, inasmuch as no being can be destroyed except by something positively or privatively incompatible with it. The minor is proved as follows. What is incompatible could exist either of itself or in virtue of some other being. If it can exist of itself, then it will exist of itself. Consequently, two incompatible entities will coexist or rather neither will exist because each will destroy the other. But can this incompatible entity exist in virtue of another being? No, for no cause is able to destroy something by reason of an effect incompatible with the thing to be destroyed unless it is able to give a more perfect and intense existence to its effect than that which the thing to be destroyed possesses. Now the existence which a cause imparts to a being is never as perfect as that of a self-existent being, for the existence of what is caused is dependent whereas that of the self-existent being is independent.

Now to proceed to what we primarily intended to prove in this third part, the unity of this first nature.

Three reasons are adduced by way of proof, the first of which is this. If two necessary natures existed, some reality proper to each would distinguish one from the

other. Let us call these real differences *A* and *B*. Now either *A* and *B* are formally necessary or they are not. If we assume them to be necessary, then each necessarily existing nature will possess two formal reasons for its necessary existence, for in addition to *A* or *B*, each is formally necessary by reason of that part of its nature in which it is like the other. Now this is impossible, for since neither of the two reasons of itself includes the other, if either be excluded, the being would still exist necessarily in virtue of the other. In such a case the being would exist necessarily in virtue of something which, if eliminated, would still leave the nature existing as necessarily as before. On the other hand, if neither nature is formally necessary in virtue of these real differences, then the latter are not of the essence of necessary existence and consequently neither is included in a necessary being. For any entity which is not of itself necessary being is only possible being.²⁰ Nothing merely possible, however, is included in what exists necessarily.

Second proof : Two pre-eminent natures cannot exist in one universe ; therefore neither can two beings first in the order of efficient causality. Proof of the antecedent : Species are like numbers (*Metaphysics*, BK. VIII)* and hence no two occur in the same order. Still less could two be first or pre-eminent.

This is also evident in the third place from the fact that this Being has the character of an end. Now if there were two ultimate ends, then we should have two separate series of co-ordinated beings where the members of one group would have no relation to the other inasmuch as they are not ordered to the same end. For what is ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another, as it is impossible to have two total and perfect causes of the same order causing one and the same thing. In such a case, something could be a *per se* cause in a given order, although its effect would exist no less perfectly even should this cause never have existed. Therefore, things

* VIII, cap. iii (1043^b, 33).

ordered to one end cannot be ordered to another. Neither then, can they be ordered to things which in turn are ordered to something else. Consequently, they would not form one universe [with the latter].

This is also confirmed in general because one and the same thing cannot be totally dependent upon two things. For then it would be dependent upon something which, if removed, would still leave the thing in question as dependent as before. Hence, the thing would not really be dependent upon it at all. Now some things depend essentially upon an efficient cause which is also pre-eminent and they depend essentially upon an end. They cannot, then, be dependent upon two natures in this triple way. Consequently, some one nature is the term of this triple dependence, and thus enjoys this triple primacy.

[Article II. *Absolute Properties of God*]

Having shown the existence of the relative properties of the First Being, we go on to prove that this Being possesses infinity and, consequently, that an Infinite Being exists. I proceed as follows: First I show that the first efficient cause is endowed with will and possesses such intelligence that this cause understands an infinity of distinct things and that its essence, which indeed is its intelligence, represents an infinity of things. Secondly, I go on from this to infer the infinity of this Being. This approach coupled with the triple primacy which we have established provides four ways of showing the infinity of this Being. . . .

[Part I. *Intellect and Will*]. [First Conclusion]. I argue that *this being is intelligent and endowed with will* as follows:

Some agent is *per se* and first, for according to *Physics*, BK. II,* every incidental cause is preceded by one that is not incidental but *per se*. In this passage the Philosopher applies this to nature where it would seem to hold still

* II, cap. vi (198^a, 8-9).

less [than of a deliberate cause]. Now every *per se* agent acts for the sake of an end. From this I draw a double argument : First, that every natural agent, considered precisely as natural, acts of necessity²¹ and would act just as it does now even if it had no other end but was an independent agent. Therefore, if it acts only because of an end, this is so only because it depends upon an agent which loves the end. But the first efficient cause is such an agent, therefore, etc.

[Secondly,] if the first agent acts for the sake of an end, then this end moves the first efficient cause inasmuch as it is loved either naturally or by an act of the will. If the latter be the case, you grant what I seek to prove. If you assume that the end is loved naturally, the assumption is false, for the first agent loves naturally no end other than itself, as matter, for instance, naturally loves form or the heavy object the centre [of the earth]. If it did, the first agent would be oriented to it as an end, since it is inclined to it by its very nature. But if this end which it loves naturally is nothing other than itself, then we assert nothing more than that the thing is itself.²² In such a case, however, the twofold [causal] aspect would not be saved.

In confirmation of the argument just given we could argue that the first efficient cause directs its effect to some end. Now, it directs it either naturally or by consciously loving this end. The first alternative is untenable, inasmuch as whatever lacks knowledge can direct its effect to some end only in virtue of something which does possess knowledge, for "to order ultimately" pertains to wisdom according to *Metaphysics*, BK. I.* Now just as the first efficient cause does not cause in virtue of something else, neither does this cause direct its effect to an end by reason of something other than itself, for otherwise it would not be first ; therefore, etc.

Another proof is this. Something causes contingently. Therefore, the first cause causes contingently ;

* I, cap. ii (982^a, 17-18).

consequently, it causes voluntarily. Proof of the first consequence : Every secondary cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first cause. If the first cause moves necessarily, then, every other cause will be moved necessarily and everything will be caused necessarily. Consequently, if any secondary cause moves contingently, the first cause also moves contingently, since the secondary cause can cause only in so far as it is moved by the first. Proof of the second consequence : The only source of contingent action is either the will or something accompanied by the will. Everything else acts with a natural necessity and, consequently, not contingently ; therefore, etc.

One objection to this argument is directed against the first consequence, namely that our volition would still be able to cause something contingently and therefore it is unnecessary that the first cause should cause contingently. Furthermore, the Philosopher ²³ concedes the antecedent (that something is caused contingently), yet denies the consequent (that the first cause causes contingently). He places contingency in the lower beings and not in the fact that God wills things contingently. Contingency arises from motion, which, though it is caused necessarily in so far as it is uniform, gives rise to difformity owing to its parts.

The other objection is to the second consequence. Just because something causes contingently, it does not seem to follow that therefore this cause is endowed with a will, for even what is moved naturally can be impeded. Hence, the opposite can happen either contingently or violently.

To the first objection we must reply that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with regard to our will, then the same holds of our will as of other things. Whether God moves our will immediately with necessity or whether He first moves something else necessarily and this latter in turn moves our will with necessity,

in any case the will would be necessarily moved by whatever is proximate to it. This would be true even if this proximate cause were itself will. The will, therefore, would will necessarily and would be a necessary voluntary agent. And there is still another absurdity that would follow, viz. that it would cause necessarily anything that is caused, and there would be nothing contingent.

As to the second objection, let me say that by "contingent" I do not mean something that is not necessary or which was not always in existence, but something whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this actually did. That is why I do not say that something is contingent, but that something is *caused contingently*. Now I maintain that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent and still save the antecedent through the expedient of motion, because if the motion as a whole proceeds from its cause in a necessary manner, every single part of it is caused necessarily at the time it occurs. In other words, it is inevitable, so that the opposite effect could not possibly be caused at just this moment. Furthermore, whatever is caused by any part of this motion is caused necessarily and inevitably. Therefore, either nothing ever happens unavoidably or contingently, or the first cause immediately causes what it was also able not to cause.

To the third objection, I say that if any cause can impede a natural cause, it can do so only in virtue of a higher cause, and so we are forced back again to the first cause. If this first cause necessarily moves the cause immediately below it, this necessity will continue down to the last cause, which will consequently be necessarily impeded in its action. As a result, this last cause could not cause anything naturally.

There appears to be three ways, then, of proving that the first agent is intelligent and endowed with will. The first of these is that nature acts on account of an end,

and it does this, only because it is dependent upon and directed by someone who knows the end. The second is that this first agent acts for the sake of an end. The third is that some effects are caused contingently. But let us proceed with the preliminaries to the proof for infinity.

[Second Conclusion]. The *second conclusion* I establish is this: *the knowledge and volition of this First Being is the same as its essence*. This is true, first, of its volition of itself as object, so that to love the first cause is something essentially identified with the nature of this cause, and the same holds for every act of its will. Proof: The causality and causation of the final cause is simply first according to Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, BK. VI, where he says: "If we had scientific knowledge of any cause, that of the final cause would be the most excellent". The reason is this. The final cause from the standpoint of causality precedes the efficient cause inasmuch as it moves it to act. Therefore, the causality of the ultimate end and its causation is completely incapable of being caused in any way. Now the causality of the ultimate end consists in this. By being loved it moves the first efficient cause. But it is one and the same thing whether the ultimate end moves the first efficient cause by being loved by this cause or whether the first efficient cause loves for the sake of an end. For an object being loved by the will means the same as a will loving an object. Hence, the love by which the first efficient cause loves the ultimate end is completely incapable of being caused. Therefore, it exists necessarily and consequently is the same as the first nature. Or to use the argument in reverse, if this first love is directed towards anything other than the first nature itself, it can be caused and therefore produced, and this by some *per se* efficient cause which in turn loves some end. Consequently, this first love of itself would be caused by some prior love of an end, which is impossible.

Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, BK. XII,* proves that the knowledge which the First Being possesses is the same as

* XII, cap. ix (1074^b, 28-29).

its essence, first, because it would not be the best substance, were such not the case, since this is the most excellent of substances precisely because of the knowledge it possesses. And secondly, because otherwise the First Being would grow weary if it continued to think, for if its thought were not its substance, the latter would be in potency of contradiction ²⁴ to thinking, and this would produce weariness according to Aristotle.

These arguments from authority can be established by reason. As to the first, every being which is in first act finds its ultimate perfection in its second act, through which it is united to that which is best for it.²⁵ This is true especially if this being is capable of acting in the proper sense of the term and not merely in the sense of producing or fashioning some external object.²⁶ Now whatever is intelligible is active in the proper sense of the term, and the first nature is intelligible from what we said above. Therefore, it follows that the ultimate perfection of this Being will be in its second act. But if this act is not the substance itself, the latter will not be the best inasmuch as its ultimate perfection is something other than itself.

[Aristotle's] second reason can be put in this way. Only a receptive potency is in potency of contradiction. But this Being has no receptive potencies ; therefore, etc. Since Aristotle, however, did not consider his proof demonstrative but merely probable, some ²⁷ would prove the thesis in another way, viz. since the faculty and the object are identical, therefore the act is identified with them. This inference, however, is invalid as is clear from the case of an angel, which knows and loves itself and nevertheless, its acts of loving and knowing are not identical with its substance.

This conclusion, viz. that the divine essence is identical with its volition, is fruitful because of its corollaries. First of all, it follows that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing is a function only of the will ; wherefore, if the volition itself is uncausable, the same is true of the

will to which it belongs ; consequently [the will is identified with the nature]. Furthermore, since the act of the will is conceived as though it were posterior to the will, if the former is identical with that nature, then the latter will be all the more so.

Secondly, it follows that this self-knowledge is identical with that nature, for nothing is loved unless it is known. Hence it follows that just as this self-love exists necessarily in virtue of itself, so also this self-knowledge.

Then too, knowledge, as it were, is more closely connected with that nature than is volition. Therefore, it follows in the third place that the intellect is the same thing as that nature. We prove this in the same way as we previously established the identity of the will from the act of willing.

Fourthly, it follows that whatever is required for this nature to know itself is also identical with the nature,²⁸ for if the knowledge exists in virtue of itself, then the same is true of the reason for knowing, because the latter, as it were, must first be known to the intellect.

[Third Conclusion]. Having proved that this self-knowledge and self-love of the first being are the same as its essence, I go on to show the same to be true of other acts, namely of all its knowledge and all its acts of volition. Let the *third conclusion* be that *no knowledge can be an accident of the first nature*. Proof : The first nature has been shown to be first in the order of efficiency, and therefore has of itself and apart from anything else, the ability to produce whatever can be produced, at least in so far as it is the first cause of that which can be produced. But without a knowledge of the latter, the first nature would be unable to produce what can be produced. Hence, the knowledge of any of these other beings is not something distinct from its own nature. Proof of the last assumption : Nothing can cause an effect except by willing it for the sake of an end. Otherwise it would not be a *per se* agent, since it would not

be acting for an end. But before anything can be willed for the sake of an end, it must be known. Hence, before we can even conceive of the First Being as willing or causing *A*, we must conceive it as knowing *A*, for without such knowledge the first cause would not be properly a cause. And the same holds true of everything else it could produce.

Another proof of the same is that all the acts of knowledge of any given intellect are related in the same way to that intellect, so that either all are accidents or all are of the essence of that intellect. This is clear in regard to all created intellects and their respective acts of knowledge, all of which seem to be of the same kind of perfection. Therefore, if some of the acts are received by the intellect, all the acts are, and if one of them is an accident, the remainder are likewise. But from the preceding conclusion, the self-knowledge of the first being cannot be an accident ; therefore none of its knowledge will be accidental to it.

Furthermore, if some act of knowledge can be an accident, it will be received by the intellect as by its subject. In such a case, however, the act of knowledge which is identical with the intellect and is the more perfect of the two acts of knowledge, would itself be the recipient of the less perfect, which is absurd.²⁹

Furthermore, the same act of knowledge can embrace several interrelated objects, and the more perfect this act is, the greater can be the number of objects. Consequently, an act that is so completely perfect that it would be impossible to have anything more perfect, will embrace all that can be known. Now the understanding of the First Being is of such perfection ; therefore there is but one act for all that can be known. Now, from the preceding conclusion, self-knowledge is identical with its very being ; consequently, all knowledge is identical with its being. This same conclusion I wish to be understood of the act of volition.

It is also said that this intellect is nothing more than a certain kind of knowing ; but this intellect is the same for all things so that it cannot differ for different objects. Therefore, neither is the act of understanding different. Hence, one act of understanding suffices for all objects. However, to argue in all cases from the identity of two things among themselves to their identity with relation to a third object distinct from both, as this argument does, is to commit the fallacy of accident. For instance, just because an act of understanding is identified with the act of willing, it does not follow that whatever is known by the act of knowledge is also loved by the will. All that follows is that an act of volition exists and that this act of will is something which is related to object known [not indeed by a relation of love] but in so far as it is also an act of knowledge. The inference can be made only in disjunction, not in conjunction, for only an incidental relation exists between the two.

Another argument advanced is that inasmuch as the First Being's act of self-knowledge is identical with itself, its intellect has one coeternal and completely adequate act, and therefore can have no other. The inference is invalid. Take the example of one who is beatified. He has an intellectual vision of God and of other things as well. Even though he sees God to the utmost of his ability, as we assume to be the case with the soul of Christ, he can still see something else.

Still another argument employed is this. Since this intellect is identified with the most perfect knowledge possible [viz. knowledge of the supreme nature itself], it also possesses all other knowledge. I reply that this does not follow, for this other lesser knowledge could be caused, and therefore it could be different from the most perfect self-knowledge, which is uncaused.

[Fourth Conclusion]. The *fourth principal conclusion* which concerns the intellect and will of God is this : *the intellect of the First Being knows everything else that can be*

known with a knowledge that is eternal, is distinct, is actual, is necessary and is prior by nature to the existence of these things in themselves.

Proof of the first part. To be able to know actually and distinctly each and every other thing that can be known is something that pertains to the perfection of knowledge. Indeed, the very notion of an intellect makes it necessary to assume the possibility of such knowledge, for every intellect (as will be determined in distinction three) has to do with all being in general. But the intellect of the First Being can have no knowledge that is not one with itself (from the preceding conclusion). Therefore, it knows everything intelligible actually and distinctly. Since this knowledge is identified with the First Being, it is eternal and necessary.

The second part about the priority of this knowledge is proved as follows. As we have made clear above, whatever is identical with this Being, exists necessarily. But the existence of other things which are not self-existent is not necessary. Necessary being, however, is prior by nature to everything that does not necessarily exist.—Another proof is this. Every being other than the first depends upon the latter as upon a cause. Now to be a cause of something, it must necessarily possess a knowledge of what it can cause. Consequently, this knowledge will be naturally prior to the existence of the thing known.—Still another proof for the second part of this conclusion is the following. The perfect artisan has a distinct knowledge of everything to be done before he does it. Otherwise he would not act perfectly, for knowledge is the norm which regulates his work. God, therefore, has some previous distinct knowledge, either actual or at least habitual, of everything that he can make.—Against this last argument, the objection is raised that the possession of some universal art suffices for the production of both the universal and the singular. For the solution to this objection, see what I have said elsewhere.³⁰

[*Part II. The Infinity of the First Being*]. Now that these preliminary conclusions have been established, I argue in four ways for the infinity [of the First Being]. The notion of efficiency really provides two of the arguments, the first of which is drawn from the fact that this Being is the first efficient cause of all other things ; the second, that as efficient cause, this Being has a distinct knowledge of all that can be made. The third way is that of finality ; the fourth, that of eminence.

[*a. First Proof*]. The Philosopher treats of the first way from efficient causality in *Physics*, BK. VIII,* and his *Metaphysics*, BK. XII,† where he argues that the First Being has infinite power, because it moves with an endless movement.

The antecedent can be reinforced inasmuch as the desired conclusion follows equally well from the fact that the First Being *can* cause such motion as it would if it actually did so ; for in either case, the actual existence of such a being would be necessarily required. Now it is clear that, so far as the First Being exists in virtue of itself, it has this ability to produce endless movement. Therefore, even though such a being may not actually cause an endless movement as Aristotle thought, still the proposed conclusion can be inferred with equal validity if the antecedent be understood of the ability of the first cause to produce such movement.

The proof of the consequence is this. If the First Being, by itself and not in virtue of another, moves with an infinite movement, then it has not received such power of movement from another. Hence it has in its power at one and the same time the totality of its effect, because it has this power independently. But, whatever has an infinite effect in its power at one and the same moment is infinite ; therefore, etc.

Another way to reinforce the first consequence is this. At one and the same moment, the First Mover has in its power all the possible effects to be produced by motion.

* VIII, cap. x (266^a, 10-24).

† XII, cap. vii (1073^a, 3-13).

If the motion is without end, however, these effects are infinite ; therefore, etc.

Against these statements of Aristotle : Whatever is to be said of the antecedent, the first consequence still does not seem to be validly established. Certainly not in the first way for a perfection does not increase simply because it endures for a greater length of time. Whiteness which exists for a year does not become any more perfect than if it existed just for a day. Therefore, movement which continues for howsoever long a time, is not a more perfect effect than the movement which lasts for a day. Consequently, just because at one and the same moment an agent virtually possesses infinite movement, we cannot conclude to any greater perfection in this case than in any other—except that here the agent moves by itself and for a longer time. And so we would have to prove that the eternity of the agent implied its infinity ; otherwise, the latter could not be inferred merely from the endlessness of the movement.

As to the form of the argument, the last proposition of the reinforced argument [viz. that whatever has an endless effect virtually is infinite] may be denied if used to prove anything more than an infinity of duration. Also the second reinforcement of the consequence breaks down, inasmuch as we cannot conclude to greater intensive perfection merely from this that an agent, if it remains in existence long enough, can produce successively any number whatsoever of the same species. For what an agent can do in one moment to one thing, by the very same power it can do to a thousand in a thousand such moments, if it exists for such a length of time. However, according to the philosophers, who assumed only a finite number of species, the only infinity possible is the numerical infinity of effects that come into existence and go out of existence through motion. Hence, there is no more reason for concluding that the agent is intensively infinite ³¹ just because it can do an infinite number of

things successively (for only a numerical infinity is possible according to the philosophers) than there would be if it could do but two. But suppose someone should prove that an infinity of species is possible by proving that some heavenly movements are incommensurable and so the same arrangement would never recur even though the movement should continue *ad infinitum*. The infinite variety of [planetary] conjunctions, then, would cause an infinite variety in the effects that can be produced. Whatever is to be said of this view, however, it is definitely not the position of Aristotle, who denies the infinity of the species.³²

The final probable interpretation advanced to reinforce the Philosopher's reasoning may be put in this way. If an agent can do many things at once, where each of the things in question needs some perfection proper to itself, then the greater the number of such things, the greater the perfection of the agent. And so it seems that we must concede that if the power of the First Agent could produce an infinity of effects at one and the same time, it must be infinite. This conclusion would follow even where the nature of the effect was such as to make its simultaneous existence in an infinite number impossible, provided that, so far as the causal power of the agent was concerned, it could produce simultaneously an infinite multitude.—This last inference is proved as follows. An agent that can cause both whiteness and blackness is not less perfect because it cannot cause the two simultaneously, for this inability to exist simultaneously arises from the repugnance of the effects to each other, and not from any defect in the agent.

From this I prove infinity in this way : If the First Being at one and the same time *formally* possessed all causal power, even though the things which it could cause could not be given simultaneous existence, it would be infinite, because—as far as it is concerned—it has power enough to produce an infinite number all

at once, and the more one can produce simultaneously, the greater the power in intensity. But if the First Being possessed such power in an even more perfect way than if it had it formally [as Avicenna, for instance, assumes], its intensive infinity follows *a fortiori*. But the full causal power that each thing may have in itself, the First Being possesses even more perfectly than if it were formally present.

Therefore, although I believe that the omnipotence in the proper sense of the word as the theologians understand it,³³ cannot be proven by natural reason, but is only believed (as will be shown in dist. XLII and *Quodlibet* q. vii),* nevertheless we can establish naturally the existence of an infinite power which on its part possesses simultaneously the fulness of causality and could produce an infinite number of things at once, if only they were capable of existing simultaneously.

It is objected that the First Cause on its part cannot cause an infinite number of effects at one time, so long as it is not proved that it is the total cause of these effects. This objection, however, presents no obstacle, since the requirements to be a total cause would not make it any more perfect than it would have to be if it were the First Cause. This is clear, first of all, because secondary causes are not required simply to supply some additional perfection to the causality, for if that were the case, the more remote effect would be the more perfect inasmuch as it would require a more perfect cause. But if secondary causes are needed in addition to the First Cause, the reason, according to the philosophers,³⁴ lies in the fact that the effect is imperfect. That is to say, the First Cause, which immediately would be unable to cause anything imperfect, could do so in conjunction with another imperfect cause. Also, the First Being, according to Aristotle, contains all the perfections in a more perfect manner than if they were formally present, were this latter possible. The proof of this lies in the fact that

* *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. XLII, q. unica ; *Quodlibet*, q. vii.

the secondary cause closest to the first receives all of its causal perfection exclusively from the first. Consequently, the First Cause has the whole of this perfection in a more eminent way than the second cause, which possesses it formally. The consequence is evident, since the first is the total equivocal cause of the second. We can argue the same way regarding the relation of the third cause to the second or first cause. If we take it in relation to the first, we have the proposed conclusion. If we take it in relation to the second, then it follows that the second cause contains the total perfection found formally in the third. But as we have shown, the second cause owes this all to the First Cause ; therefore, the First Cause must contain the perfection of the third in an even more perfect way than does the second. And the same is true with all the other causes down to the very last. Therefore, we conclude that the First Cause contains eminently the total causal perfection of all the other causes, and this in a way that is even more perfect than if it contained this causality formally, were that possible. To my mind, it seems that Aristotle's argument for an infinite substance in *Physics*, BK. VIII,* and *Metaphysics*, BK. XII,† can be made to hold.

Using this way of efficiency, some³⁵ argue that the First Cause has infinite power, because any power which can bridge the distance between infinite extremes is itself infinite. The divine power in creation, however, is of such a nature, for between the extremes of creation (i.e. between nothing and something) an infinite distance intervenes. If existence be understood as true of the real order where non-existence precedes existence by a priority of duration, then the antecedent is an assumption based on faith alone ; whereas if we take creation as Avicenna does in *Metaphysics*, BK. VI,‡ in the sense that non-existence precedes existence merely by a priority of nature, then the antecedent is no longer an assumption of faith.³⁶ For it is sufficiently demonstrated that the first

* VIII, cap. x (266^a, 10-24). † XII, cap. vii (1073^a, 3-13).

‡ *Metaphysica*, VI, cap. ii.

nature after God does not exist of itself but is dependent upon Him ; neither is anything [viz. matter] presupposed in order to give it existence. Consequently, it is created. For if a first efficient cause exists, everything else receives its total being from it. Otherwise, these other beings would not be dependent upon it, nor could it really be the first efficient cause. But anything that receives its total being from another so that by its nature it has existence after non-existence, is created ; therefore, etc. If we understand nature as being prior to both existence and non-existence in this [viz. ontological] sense, then existence and non-existence are not termini of a change ; neither does "to be produced in this way" necessarily imply "to be changed".

Whatever is to be said of the antecedent of this argument, the consequence remains unproved. When there is no interval between the extremes as is the case in a continuum, whose extremes are two points, it is how one extreme compares with the other that determines how "distant" it is said to be. Consequently, it will be as distant from, as it is greater than, the other. God, for example, is infinitely distant from even the greatest creature possible, not indeed because of any interval between the two, but because of the infinity of the one extreme. And so I argue that contradictories are distant from one another in virtue of the extremes themselves, and not by reason of some interval between them, for contradictories are immediate. No matter how little something departs from one extreme, it immediately comes under the other. In the present instance, then, there will be as much "distance" as there is [entity] in the more perfect extreme. But the latter is finite ; therefore, etc. This is confirmed, inasmuch as to possess complete power over the positive term of this "distance" is to have power over the distance or the passage from one extreme to the other. Infinity, therefore, cannot be inferred from the power of the agent to effect this transi-

tion, unless it is already implied by its power to produce the positive extreme. But the latter, in the present case, is finite ; consequently, it is not demonstratively established that infinite power is required to effect such a transition.

Still, the common saying that "contradictories are infinitely distant" can be understood in the sense of "indeterminately". For just as no "distance" is too small to produce a contradiction, so likewise, none is too great, even if it were greater than the greatest possible. Therefore this "distance" is infinite in the sense that it is not determined to any definite interval, howsoever great or small. Such an infinity or indeterminateness, then, does not imply the consequent about a power that is intensively infinite, just as the minimum distance characterised by such an infinity does not imply it. For what does not follow from the antecedent, does not follow from the consequent. Contradictories, therefore, are at the greatest "distance" and in the greatest opposition to each other, but privatively and indeterminately. Positively, however, the greatest "distance" is between contraries, as is clear from *Metaphysics*, BK. X.*

[b. Second Proof]. Having established the proposed conclusion by the first way of efficiency inasmuch as the first efficient cause implies infinity, we proceed to the second, where, from the fact that the First Being knows distinctly everything that can be made, we argue as follows: The things that can be known are infinite in number. But they are all actually known by an intellect which knows all things. Therefore, that intellect is infinite which, at one and the same moment, has actual knowledge of all these things. Now such is the intellect of the First Being.

I prove the antecedent and consequence of this enthymeme. Things potentially infinite or endless in number, if taken one at a time, are actually infinite if they actually exist simultaneously. Now what can be known is of such

* X, cap. iv (1055^a, 9).

a nature so far as a created intellect is concerned, as is sufficiently clear. Now all that the created intellect knows successively, the divine intellect knows actually at one and the same time. Therefore, the divine intellect knows the actually infinite. I prove the major of this syllogism, although it seems evident enough. Consider these potentially infinite things as a whole. If they exist all at once, they are either actually infinite or actually finite. If finite, then if we take one after the other, eventually we shall actually know them all. But if we cannot actually know them all in this way, they will be actually infinite if known simultaneously.

The consequence of this first enthymeme, I prove as follows. Whenever a greater number implies or requires greater perfection than does a smaller number, numerical infinity implies infinite perfection. For example, greater motive power is required to carry ten things than to carry five. Therefore, an infinite motive power is needed to carry an infinity of such things. Now in the point at issue, since to know *A* is one perfection and to know *B* also is another perfection, it follows that *A* and *B* as two equally distinct objects will never be known by one and the same act of knowledge unless the latter includes in a more eminent way these two perfections. The same holds for three objects, and so *ad infinitum*.

A similar argument to that based on the intellect and the act of knowing could be constructed in regard to the reason for knowing (*ratio intelligendi*).³⁷ For the greater the number of things known distinctly through this medium of knowledge, the more perfect is the act of knowing since the act by which all things are known must include in a more eminent way the perfections of each proper act of knowledge, where each of these includes some perfection proper to itself. Where the latter are infinite, therefore, infinite perfection is required.

A second proof from the knowledge of the First Being in support of our thesis is this. Suppose a secondary

cause can add some perfection to the causality of the First Cause, even when the latter acts to the utmost of its power. In such a case, if the First Cause were to act alone, its effectiveness would seem to be less perfect than that of the two causes together. Therefore, if something which a secondary cause can produce together with the First Cause, can be done much more perfectly by the First Cause alone, the secondary cause adds no perfection to the first. But a finite thing always adds some perfection to what is finite. Hence, a first cause whose causality cannot be perfected is infinite. To apply this to the question at issue. Knowledge of any object is by its very nature apt to be engendered by that object as its proximate cause, and this is especially true of intuitive knowledge or vision. Therefore, if some intellect possesses such knowledge without any action on the part of the object known, but solely in virtue of some prior object which by nature is a higher cause of such knowledge, it follows that the higher object is infinitely intelligible, because the lower object adds nothing to it in the way of cognoscibility. Now, the supreme nature is such a superior object, since in the absence of all other objects by the mere fact that it is present to the intellect of the First Being, it gives to that intellect a knowledge of every object without exception. Therefore, nothing else that can be known adds anything to this nature in the way of cognoscibility. Consequently, it is infinitely intelligible ; therefore, its entity is also infinite, for a thing can only be known to the extent that it has entity, according to *Metaphysics*, BK. II.*

[c. Third Proof]. The fact that the First Being is also the ultimate end provides a third way of arguing to infinity. Our will can always love and seek something greater than any finite being, even as our intellect is always able to know more. And, what is more, there seems to be a natural inclination to love an infinite good to the greatest degree possible, because the free will of

* II, cap. i (993^b, 30-31).

itself and without the aid of any habit promptly and delightfully loves this good, so that we seem to experience an act of love for an infinite good. Indeed it seems that the will is not perfectly satisfied with anything else. And if such an infinite good were really opposed to the natural object of the will, why is it that the will does not naturally hate an infinite good, just as it naturally hates non-existence, according to Augustine in *De libero arbitrio*, III, viii? * For it seems that if "infinite" and "good" were incompatible, then there would be no way in which the will could be satisfied in such a good, nor could it readily tend towards such a good just as it cannot readily tend towards anything which is opposed to its proper object. This argument will be confirmed in the following by a similar argument from the intellect.

[*d.* Fourth Proof]. The thesis is shown also by the way of eminence, and here I argue that it is incompatible with the idea of a most perfect being that anything should excel it in perfection, as has been previously explained. Now there is nothing incompatible about a finite thing being excelled in perfection; therefore, etc. The minor is proved from this, that to be infinite is not incompatible with being; but the infinite is greater than any finite being.

Another formulation given to the same argument is this. That to which intensive infinity is not repugnant is not all perfect unless it be infinite, for to be infinite is compatible with it. And if it is finite, it can be exceeded or excelled. Now infinity is not repugnant to being, therefore the most perfect being is infinite. The minor of this proof, which was used in the preceding argument, cannot, it seems, be proven *a priori*. For, just as contradictories by their very nature contradict each other and their opposition cannot be made manifest by anything more evident, so also these terms [viz. "being" and "infinite"] by their very nature are not repugnant to each other. Neither does there seem to be any way of

* III, cap. vi, viii (Migne, P.L., xxxii, 1280, 1282).

proving this except by explaining the meaning of the notions themselves. "Being" cannot be explained by anything better known than itself. "Infinite" we understand by means of finite. I explain "infinite" in a popular definition as follows : The infinite is that which exceeds the finite, not exactly by reason of any finite measure, but in excess of any measure that could be assigned.

The following persuasive argument can be given for what we intend to prove. Just as everything is assumed to be possible, if its impossibility is not apparent, so also all things are assumed to be compatible, if their incompatibility is not manifest. Now there is no incompatibility apparent here, for it is not of the nature of being to be finite ; nor does finite appear to be an attribute coextensive with being. But if they were mutually repugnant, it would be for one of these reasons. The coextensive attributes which being possesses, seem to be sufficiently evident.

Another persuasive argument adduced is this. Infinity, in its own way, is not opposed to quantity (that is, where parts are taken successively) ; therefore, neither is infinity, in its own way, opposed to entity (that is, where perfection exists simultaneously).

Again, if the quantity characteristic of power is simply more perfect than that characteristic of mass, why is it possible to have an infinity [of small parts] in an [extended] mass and not an infinite power ? And if an infinite power is possible, then it actually exists, as is evident from the third conclusion about the first efficient cause, and will also be proved again later.³⁸

Again, why is it that the intellect, whose object is being, does not find the notion of something infinite repugnant ? Instead of this, the infinite seems to be the most perfect thing we can know. Now, if tonal discord so readily displeases the ear, it would be strange if some intellect did not clearly perceive the contradiction between infinite and its first object [viz. being] if such existed.

For if the disagreeable becomes offensive as soon as it is perceived, why is it that no intellect naturally shrinks from the infinitely intelligible as it would from something out of harmony with, and even destructive of, its first object?

In this same way Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion* * about the highest conceivable good can be touched up. His description must be understood in this way. God is a being conceived without contradiction, who is so great that it would be a contradiction if a greater being could be conceived. That the phrase "without contradiction" must be added is clear, for anything, the very knowledge or thought of which includes a contradiction, is called "inconceivable", for it includes two conceivable notions so opposed to each other that they cannot in any way be fused into a single conceivable object, since neither determines the other. Thus "man is irrational" cannot be conceived. Hence, just as in the world of reality nothing exists that is not either simple or at least composed of act [the determining element] and potency [the determinable element], so also with concepts. Contradictories, however, do not form a unity, be it simple or composed.

It follows then, that the greatest object conceivable without contradiction can actually exist in reality. This is proved first of its essential being, for in such an object the intellect is fully satisfied; therefore, in it the primary object of the intellect, viz. "being", is verified and this in the highest degree.

It is further argued, then, that this being actually exists because the highest conceivable object is not one which is merely in the intellect of the thinker, for then it both could exist, because as something possible it is conceivable, and yet could not exist, because the idea of existing in virtue of some cause is repugnant to its very nature. This latter was shown above in the second conclusion of the proof from efficiency.³⁹ Therefore, what

* Cap. iii (Migne, P.L., CLVIII, 228).

exists in reality is conceivably greater than what exists only in the intellect. This is not to be understood, however, in the sense that something conceived if it actually exists, is, by the fact of existing, conceivable to any greater extent. The meaning is that whatever exists is greater than whatever is solely in the intellect.

Or the argument could be retouched in this way. Whatever exists is conceivable to a greater extent [than what does not] ; that is to say, it can be known more perfectly, because it is intuitively intelligible or visible. What does not exist either in itself or in something more noble to which it adds nothing, is not capable of being intuited. Now what can be seen is able to be known more perfectly than what can not be intuited, but known only abstractively. Therefore, the most perfect thing that can be known exists. The difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, and the superiority of the former over the latter, will be treated in distinction three and elsewhere as occasion offers.⁴⁰

[*ε*. An Ineffective Proof]. Finally, some ⁴¹ argue to the proposed conclusion from the absence of any intrinsic cause, for matter is determined by form as the potential is determined by act, perfection, and the existence of its form. Conversely, the form is limited by matter as act is limited by potency. Any form incapable of being in matter, therefore, is infinite. God is of such kind.

This reason does not hold, for according to these men,⁴² the angel is immaterial ; therefore, its nature is infinite. They cannot avoid this conclusion by saying that the existence of the angel limits its essence, for they maintain that existence is accidental to the essence and naturally posterior to it. And so in the first instance of nature,⁴³ the essence, considered in its own right and as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite. Consequently, it cannot be limited by existence in the second instance of nature.

Briefly, then, I reply to the argument. If an entity is finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something incidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic degree of finite or infinite perfection respectively.

It is also argued that,⁴⁴ if form is limited with reference to matter, where there is no matter, there the form is infinite. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, just as is the following : a body is limited with reference to a body ; therefore, if a body is not limited with reference to another body, it will be infinite ; hence, the outermost heaven will be actually infinite. This is the fallacy of *Physics*, bk. III.* For, just as a body is first limited in itself by its own proper boundaries before it is limited with respect to anything else (as is the case with the heavens), so the finite form is first limited in itself before it is limited with respect to matter. That is to say, it is of such a nature that it is limited, and this, prior to any union with matter ; for the second limitation presupposes, and does not cause, the first. The finite character of the angelic essence, then, is something that is prior by nature to its existence. Consequently, it is not its subsequent existence that makes such an essence limited. To put the argument briefly in one sentence, I say that every finite essence is such absolutely and prior to any reference it may have to another essence.

[*Solution of the Question*] ⁴⁵

The solution to the question, then, is clear from the foregoing, for the first article establishes the existence of some being that is simply first by the triple primacy of efficiency, finality and eminence, and is first in such an unqualified sense that it would be impossible for anything to be prior to it. This is to establish the existence of God so far as the divine properties that have reference to creatures are concerned, or in so far as creatures are dependent upon him. The second article shows in four

* III, cap. iv (203^b, 20-22).

ways that this First Being is infinite, first, because it is the first efficient cause ; secondly, because as first agent it knows all that can be made (this second way contains four conclusions regarding the knowledge of the first being) ; thirdly, because it is the last end ; and fourthly, because it is most excellent.

In our treatise on the first way, we rejected as useless a certain argument regarding creation. With the second, we considered another way based on the perfection of the first object and its intelligibility. In connection with the fourth, we expounded the argument of Anselm in the *Proslogion*, cap. ii, namely that God is that, greater than which nothing can be thought. Finally, we rejected as useless the argument that would infer infinity from immateriality.

Having proved these conclusions, one can answer the question as follows. *In the realm of beings there actually exists a being which has a triple primacy, and this being is infinite. Therefore, some infinite being actually exists.* This notion of God as an infinite being is the most perfect absolute concept we can have of him, as we point out in dist. III.⁴⁶ Consequently, we prove that God, conceived under the most perfect aspect possible to us, actually exists.

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

To the first ⁴⁷ of the arguments at the beginning of the question, I say that an infinite cause that acts by a necessity of nature would not suffer anything contrary to itself, whether such a thing be formally contrary (i.e. opposed to some essential perfection of the First Cause) or only virtually contrary (i.e. opposed to some effect which it includes virtually). For in either case, an infinite cause would impede anything incompatible with its effect, as the argument states above.

To the contrary : Did not the philosophers who assumed that God acted out of a necessity imposed by

his nature, also admit the existence of evil in the universe? As I have already made clear in proving that God acts with knowledge,⁴⁸ I reply that they could not consistently explain the contingent character of the evil in the universe. All they could maintain would be that one order of causes could produce something capable of receiving a given perfection, whereas another order of necessity would produce the opposite of this perfection. In other words, if we considered all the causes actually concurring at that time, this perfection could not be induced at this particular moment. Absolutely speaking, however, if we consider not this particular event, but one similar in kind, then a thing produced by some of these causes could also be the recipient of a perfection which *de facto* was necessarily absent at this particular time. According to them, therefore, just as the efficient causes in one group act necessarily, so the impeding efficient causes of the other group act necessarily. The sun dissolves something, then, with the same necessity with which Saturn condenses it. Therefore, since every defect of matter is due to a deficiency in the strength of the efficient causes, if each efficient cause acts necessarily, then every defect, monstrosity, or evil in the universe occurs necessarily. What the philosophers can say of our free will and moral evil, however, will have to be treated elsewhere.

*To the second argument,*⁴⁹ I say that the consequence is invalid. As to the proof adduced in its favour, I show that there is no parity between the impossibility of several extended things filling the same place and several essences existing simultaneously. For no entity so fills the whole nature of being as to render impossible the coexistence of another. "Coexistence" in this latter case, however, should not be understood in the sense of filling a place, but rather as a kind of essential commensuration.⁵⁰ The extension of one thing, however, fills any place to the utmost of its capacity. More than one entity, therefore,

can exist at once, even though one body cannot fill a place already occupied by another. The other consequence is also invalid, for if an infinite body were to coexist with another body, the reason the combination of the two would be greater than either taken singly lies in the nature of extension, for the dimensions of this other body would be different from those of the infinite body and still they would be qualitatively the same. Therefore, the union of two extended bodies implies an increase in extension because of the distinct dimensions and yet the sum total could not represent an increase, because an infinite extension cannot be exceeded. In our case, however, the total amount of infinite perfection is not increased quantitatively by the coexistence of some qualitatively similar finite entity.

To the third ⁵¹ *argument*, I say that the consequence does not hold unless, in the antecedent, the thing singled out from all the others is something finite. For example, to assume the impossible, if an infinite place were occupied by an infinite body, it still would not follow that this body is "here" in such a way that it is nowhere else, because the word "here", in this case, only designates what is infinite. Then too, according to the Philosopher,⁵² if motion and time were infinite, from the proposition "this motion is at this time and not at another", it does not follow that motion is finite in duration. Consequently, if the desired conclusion is to be established, it would be necessary to prove that whatever is designated by the word "this" is finite. To assume it simply begs the question.

To the last ⁵³ *argument*, I say that the Philosopher argues that if the antecedent be true (viz. that some power is of infinite magnitude), it would move instantaneously, where he understands "moves" in the proper sense as different from mutation. In this sense, according to him, the consequent as well as the antecedent is self-contradictory. I will show, however, how this consequence could be made

to hold. If a power is infinite and acts by necessity of nature, then it acts instantaneously. If it were to act in time, let us call this time *A*. Now take another finite power, which acts in the finite time *B*. Then let the finite power, which acts in *B* time, be increased by the amount that *A* exceeds *B*, e.g. if *A* is one hundred or one thousand times as great as *B*, let the finite power be increased a hundred—or a thousand fold. Now, this increased power would act in *A* time. Consequently, this finite power would act in the same time as the infinite, which is impossible if the infinite power moves necessarily and to the utmost of its ability. Therefore, if an infinite power acts necessarily, it follows that it acts instantaneously. On the other hand, however, if we assume, as the antecedent does, that this power has magnitude, i.e. is extended accidentally, then it follows that if it acts on a body, it moves this body in the proper sense of moving. But if such a power acted upon a body, it would be at unequal distance from the different parts of this body, that is, one part of the body would be closer, whereas another would be farther away. Then, too, this power would meet with some resistance in the body on which it acts. Now these two causes (viz. resistance and the difference in distance between the mover and the various parts of the thing moved) give rise to succession in motion and, therefore, cause the body to be moved in the proper sense of that term. From the fact, then, that we assume in the antecedent a power with magnitude, it follows that it moves in the proper sense, and thus by combining these two notions simultaneously, namely that it is infinite and that it has magnitude,⁵⁴ it follows that it moves in the strict sense of the term and, nevertheless, does so instantaneously, which is a contradiction. This contradiction, however, does not follow from the notion of an infinite power which has no magnitude. For although it would act instantaneously, were it infinite and necessarily acting, still it

would not move, properly speaking, since the two reasons for succession would be absent in that on which it acts. The Philosopher, therefore, does not mean that an infinite power would move instantaneously as the argument assumes, but that a power infinite in magnitude, though it is not in time, nevertheless moves in the proper sense, which is a contradiction. From this it follows that such an antecedent includes contradictory notions, namely a power infinite in magnitude.

But a doubt arises. Since an infinite motive power acting of necessity is assumed, it would seem to follow necessarily that this power acts instantaneously, even though it may not move instantaneously. Consequently, it follows further, that no agent will move another properly speaking. That this would follow is clear from what was just proved above regarding an infinite necessarily acting power.

Averroes in *Metaphysics*, bk. xii,* replies that it is not enough simply to have an infinitely powerful First Mover. What is further required is that this First Mover and some additional finite power co-operate in such a way that the infinity of the motion is due to the First Mover, whereas the succession is due to the other. Without the co-operation of some finite mover, succession would be impossible ; for if only the infinite agent acted, it would act instantaneously. This solution will be disproved in the last question of distinction eight † where the philosophers who assume that whatever the First Cause does immediately, it does with necessity, are attacked.

But for Christians, who say that God acts contingently, the objection presents no difficulty, since they can answer it with ease. For, even if an infinite power which acts necessarily and to the utmost of its power, does instantaneously whatever it does immediately, this is not true of an infinite power which acts freely and contingently. As it is in the power of such an agent either to act or not to act, so it has the power either to act in time or to act

* xii, com. 41.

† *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. viii, q. v, nn. 3, 8 ff.

instantaneously. Consequently, it is easy to defend the position that the First Cause moves a body in time even if it be of infinite power, for it does not act necessarily neither to the full extent of its power nor in as short a time as it could.

IV

THE UNICITY OF GOD

Summary of the Argument

QUESTION : Is there but one God ?

PRO ET CONTRA

BODY OF THE QUESTION

First opinion : The unicity of God is known only by faith

Scotus's opinion : Natural reason can prove the unicity of God

First proof : From the infinite intellect

Second proof : From the infinite will

Third proof : From the infinite goodness

Fourth proof : From the infinite power

Fifth proof : From absolute infinity

Sixth proof : From necessity of existence

Seventh proof : From the omnipotence

Reply to the arguments for the first opinion

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

[IV. THE UNICITY OF GOD]

I ask whether there is but one God ?

[Pro et Contra]

Some argue there is not merely one God ¹ :

[Arg. i]. "For indeed there are many gods and many lords".

[Arg. ii]. Also, if God exists, then gods exist. Proof of the consequence : (1) Singular and plural signify the same, although they differ in the way in which they do so. Therefore, the predication proportionately implies the same. As the singular mode then implies a singular thing, so the plural implies several things.² (2) Just as God is that greater than which nothing can be conceived, so gods are those greater than which nothing can be thought. Things that could not be conceivably greater, however, actually exist. This is clear from the fact that if they did not actually exist, we could think of something greater than they. Therefore, etc.

[Arg. iii]. Furthermore, everything which is a being by participation can be traced back to something which is such by its very essence.³ Now the individuals in any created species are beings by participation ; otherwise more than one individual per species would not exist. Therefore, they can be traced back to something which is such by its very essence. Consequently, there is some man who is by his essence, some ox which is by its essence, and so on. Now whatever is by its essence and not by participation is God. Therefore, etc.

[Arg. iv]. Likewise, a greater number of good things is better than a lesser number.⁴ But we should assume the best to exist in the universe. Therefore, etc.

[An additional argument].⁵ Also, whatever is a

necessary being, if it exist, is necessary being without qualification. But if another God exists, He is a necessary being. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major : If you grant the opposite of the predicate (viz. "[it] is not necessary being without qualification"), the opposite of the subject follows (viz. "It is not necessary but only possible being, if it exists").—Reply : The opposite of the subject which is to be inferred is this. "It is not a necessary being, if it exists." Here, then, the relation between antecedent and consequent may be denied.

To the contrary :

In *Deuteronomy** we read : "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", and in *Isaias*† : "There is no God besides me".

[Body of the Question]

In this question, the conclusion is certain.

[*First Opinion*]

Some say,⁶ however, that the unicity of God cannot be demonstrated but is accepted only on faith. And in this they follow the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides]‡ who says that it is known from the Law that God is one. Reason supports this view, for if the mind by its natural powers could know that God is one, then it could also know naturally that God is singular. In this case, natural reason could know the singularity of God and could also know the essence of God as singular, which is false and contradicts what was said in the question about the subject of theology.⁷

[*Scotus's Opinion*]

Nevertheless, it seems that natural reason could establish the unicity of God by arguing from (1) the infinite

* Deut. vi. 4.

† Isaias, XLV. 5.

‡ *Doctor perplexorum*, I, cap. lxxv.

intellect, (2) the infinite will, (3) the infinite goodness, (4) the infinite power, (5) the notion of infinity considered absolutely, (6) the nature of necessary being, and (7) omnipotence.

[*First Proof*]. The first argument, based on the infinite intellect, is this. Such an intellect knows whatever can be known in the most perfect way that it could be known. Suppose then that two gods existed, let us call them *A* and *B*. *A*, therefore, would know *B* as perfectly as *B* could be known. This, however, is impossible. Proof: Either *A* knows *B* through the essence of *B* or not. If not, and *B* can be known through its essence, then *A* knows *B* neither in the most perfect manner nor to the extent that *B* can be known. For nothing that can be known through its essence is perfectly known unless it be known either through its essence or through something which includes the essence in a more perfect way than the latter exists in itself. But the essence of *B* is not included in anything more perfect than *B*, for if it were, *B* would not be God. But if *A* knows *B* through the latter's essence, then *A*'s act of knowledge is posterior to the essence of *B* and therefore *A* would not be God. I prove that in such a case *A*'s act would be posterior to *B* in this fashion. Every act of knowing not identical with its object is posterior to that object. For an act by nature is simultaneous only with itself. Neither is it prior to its object, for then the act could be known without the object and vice versa.

But suppose we say that *A* through its own essence knows *B* because of the great similarity between the two, so that *A* knows *B* through some nature common to *A* and *B*. To the contrary: This answer saves neither of these two points: viz. (1) that *A* knows *B* most perfectly, and therefore, (2) that *A* is God. For any such knowledge that is merely general and in virtue of some likeness is neither perfect nor intuitive. Consequently, *A* would not know *B* intuitively or most perfectly, which is what we set out to prove.

A second argument based on the intellect is this. One and the same act of intellection cannot have two adequate objects. Now *A* is its own adequate object of intellection, for the essence of *A* is the adequate object of *A*'s intellection. Consequently *B*'s essence is not its adequate object. But if *A* could know perfectly both itself and *B* at one and the same time, then *B* would be an adequate object of *A*'s intellection. The major is evident, for otherwise the intellect could be perfectly satisfied and have all that it is capable of even though its adequate object were non-existent. Such an object, consequently, would be useless.

[*Second Proof*]. A second way is this. Any will that is infinite wills things the way they should be willed. Therefore, it loves whatever is lovable to the extent that it is lovable. If the object is infinitely lovable, then such a will loves it to the utmost of its ability. But since *B* is assumed to be another God, it must be loved infinitely. Consequently, *B* inasmuch as it is infinitely good must be loved infinitely by any power capable of infinite love. The will of *A*, then, loves *B* infinitely. Now this is impossible since *A* naturally loves itself more than *B*.⁸ Proof: Everything naturally loves its own being more than any other if it is neither a part nor an effect of this other. But *A* is neither a part nor the effect of *B*; therefore *A* loves itself naturally more than *B*. But a free will that loves things as they should be loved conforms itself to this natural will; otherwise the natural will would not always be as it should be. Therefore, if *A* wills as it should, then it elicits a greater act of love for itself than for *B* and hence does not love *B* infinitely.

A second argument based on the will runs as follows. Either *A* finds its happiness in *B* or it simply uses *B*. If it merely uses *B*, then *A*'s love is inordinate.⁹ If it finds its happiness in *B* as well as in itself, then *A* is beatified by two distinct objects, neither of which depends upon the other, for *A* is made just as happy by *B* as it is by itself.

But the consequent is impossible, for nothing finds its complete happiness in each of two objects.¹⁰ Proof: Either object could be destroyed and nevertheless the being would still be happy. Therefore in neither object is it completely happy.

[*Third Proof*]. The third way, based on the notion of the infinite good, is this. It is proper for a will to seek the greater good and love it more ardently. But if more than one thing could be infinitely good, then together they would contain more goodness than a single infinite good. An orderly will, consequently, could not be perfectly satisfied with but one infinite good. Yet to be unable to satisfy perfectly any will whatsoever contradicts the very notion of an infinite good.

[*Fourth Proof*]. My fourth argument, from infinite power, is this. Two causes of the same order cannot each be the total cause of the same effect. But an infinite power is the total primary cause of every single effect that exists. Therefore, no other power can be the total primary cause of any effect. Consequently, no other cause is infinite in power. My proof of the first proposition: If this proposition did not hold, then a thing could be the cause of something which does not depend upon it. Proof: Nothing depends essentially on anything if it could exist even when this other is non-existent. But if *C* has two total causes, *A* and *B*, each of which is in the same order, then either could be non-existent and still *C* would continue to exist in virtue of the other. For if *A* were non-existent, *C* would still exist by reason of *B* and if *B* were non-existent, *C* would exist by reason of *A*.

This argument can be used to establish the unicity of any of the primacies mentioned above [viz. efficiency, finality and eminence].¹¹ What exists for the sake of an end is never essentially ordered to two ultimate ends, for then, as we argued above, it would exist for the sake of something which, as non-existent, would still be the

end for whose sake the other exists. Neither is anything excelled to the ultimate degree by two most perfect beings, for then something could be non-existent and still excel something either as its essential measure of perfection or as that from which it receives its essential perfection. This, however, is impossible. It is not possible, then, that two infinite beings should be ultimate ends, or that of two more perfect beings, both should be the most excellent.

[*Fifth Proof*]. As to the fifth way, I say that what is absolutely infinite, cannot be excelled. And I argue thus. Any perfection that can exist in numerically different things is more perfect if it exist in several than if it exist merely in one, as [Augustine] points out in *De Trinitate*, BK. VIII, c. i.* Therefore, what is absolutely infinite cannot be found in several numerically different things.

[*Sixth Proof*]. The sixth way that I argue is this. A species which can be multiplied in more than one individual, is not of itself determined to any certain number of individuals but is compatible with an infinity of individuals. This is evident in the case of all perishable species. Therefore, if the perfection of necessary existence can be multiplied in more than one individual, it is not of itself restricted to any certain number, but is compatible with infinity. But if an infinity of necessary beings can exist, they do exist. Therefore, etc. The consequence is false ; hence the antecedent is also false.

This argument can be reformulated on the basis of [God's] primacy as follows. One thing of a given kind is not related to others of its kind in such a way that it is limited to just this plurality or to a certain number of such things. There is nothing in the nature itself which requires that there be just so many individuals, nor in a cause that says there must be only so many things caused, unless you insist on what we seek to prove [viz. that the nature is such that it be found in but one individual]. But "deity" is one given kind of thing, and

* VIII, cap. i (Migne, P.L., XLII, 947-948).

according to you is found in more than one individual of its kind. Therefore, deity as such is not determined to any certain number of individuals nor can it be so determined by anything other than itself, for this would be repugnant to what is truly first. Therefore, deity exists in an infinite number of individuals. This argument, as we see, is based upon the notion that primacy of itself is indetermined.

The second argument I give, based on this way, runs as follows. If several necessary beings existed, they would be distinguished from one another by some real perfections. Let us call these *A* and *B*. Then I argue, either these two necessary beings which differ by *A* and *B* are necessary formally in virtue of *A* and *B*, or they are not. If not, then *A* is not a formal reason for necessary existence, and the same is true of *B*. Hence, whatever includes *A* or *B* is not primarily a necessary being, because it includes some entity which is neither its necessity of existence nor is it necessary of itself. If, however, these two beings are formally necessary in virtue of *A* and *B*, in addition to being necessary by reason of what they have in common, then each being contains two reasons why it is formally necessary. This, however, is impossible for neither of these two reasons includes the other, and hence if either of the two were absent, the being would still exist necessarily in virtue of what remains. In such an impossible situation, something would owe its formal necessity to what could be removed and still leave the being a necessary being.

[*Seventh Proof*]. As regards the seventh way, from omnipotence, it seems that the thesis cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, for omnipotence—as Catholics understand the term—cannot be demonstrated from natural reason, nor does it follow from the notion of infinite power, as will be shown later. Still, if omnipotence be accepted on faith, then one can argue that if *A* is omnipotent, it can make everything other than itself

come into existence or go out of existence. Consequently, it can destroy *B* and thus render *B* impotent. From this it follows that *B* is not God.

Some ¹² object that this reason does not hold since *B* is not an object of omnipotence, for omnipotence has as its object only what can, yet need not, exist, whereas *B* is assumed to be just as necessary as *A*.

Wherefore, we must reformulate the argument of Richard [of St Victor] in his work *De Trinitate** where he says: "Whoever will have been omnipotent, will easily be able to make everything else impotent". Just as an omnipotent being can produce whatever is possible simply by willing that it should be, so also he can impede or destroy everything that is possible by willing that it should not be. But if *A* is omnipotent, he can will everything other than himself and so, by his will, cause everything to exist. It is not necessary, however, that *B* will everything which *A* wills because the will of *B* is related only contingently to what *A* wills, even as the will of *A* is related contingently to what *B* wills, assuming here that each is God. But if *B* wills that none of these things should exist, then none will exist. Consequently, if two omnipotent beings exist, each will make the other impotent, not indeed by destroying the other, but because one by his positive will could keep non-existent what the other wills should exist.

And if you say, to argue sophistically, that they voluntarily agree on a common way of acting through some sort of pact, even though there is really no intrinsic necessity that they do so, still I prove that neither will be omnipotent. For if *A* is omnipotent, by willing he can produce every possible thing that can be produced and thus *B* can produce nothing by willing and hence will not be omnipotent. That this follows is clear from what was said in the fourth way. For it is impossible that two total causes should produce one and the same effect,

* 1, cap. xxv (Migne, P.L., cxcvi, 902).

for what is caused completely by one cannot be caused by the other.

[*Reply to the arguments for the First Opinion*] ¹³

First I answer the arguments for the other opinion, replying first to the authority of Rabbi Moses. I say that the reason God's unicity was a matter of belief in the Law is to be found in the fact that the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry. Consequently, they needed the Law to tell them that there is but one God even though this truth could be demonstrated by natural reason. The fact that God exists is also known from the Law, for instance, *Exodus*, III* : "I am who am", and the Apostle to the Hebrews† : "For he who comes to God must believe that God exists". Nevertheless, we do not deny that God's existence is demonstrable. On the same grounds, then, we must not deny that reason can demonstrate that there is but one God just because this is accepted from the Law. Indeed it is good that many things demonstrable in themselves be transmitted to the human race by way of authority also because of man's weakness of intellect, his neglect to seek the truth and because of the mistakes he makes when he tries to demonstrate something. As Augustine says in the *City of God*,‡ much falsity is mixed with truth, and since simple people following such demonstrators could still be in doubt about what they must assent to, the firm, safe and common way is by means of authority so certain it can neither deceive nor be deceived.

As for the second reason about the singular, I say that it is one thing to conceive singularity as an object or part of an object. It is quite another thing to have singularity as a mode of conception or as the aspect under which the object is conceived. For example, when I say "a universal", the object conceived is plurality, but singularity is the mode of conception, that is, it is conceived as a singular thing. So also with logical intentions. When

* *Exodus*, III. 14.

† *Heb.* XI. 6.

‡ *XVIII*, cap. xli (*Migne*, P.L., xli, 601).

I say "singular", it is singularity that is conceived, but the mode of conception is that of a universal, for what I conceive is indifferent to being more than one. And so my answer to their assumption is this. The divine essence can be conceived as singular in the sense that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object. From this, however, it does not follow that the divine essence can be known as singular in such a way that singularity is the mode of conception, for to know something as singular in this way is to know it as "a this" just as a white object is seen as *this* white object. As we said above,¹⁴ the divine essence is not known under the aspect of singularity in this manner. Therefore, the argument involves a fallacy of speech by substituting the mode for the thing.

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

To the initial arguments,¹⁵ I say that the Apostle is speaking of idols and hence of so-called "gods", for in the same passage he adds : "Yet for us there is only one God", "for all the gods of the Gentiles are devils".

To the *second argument*,¹⁶ I declare the consequence to be invalid inasmuch as number is not like some of the other grammatical modes which express precisely a mode of conception without any reality that corresponds to the conceptual mode, and consequently do not express precisely something in reality by which the intellect could be moved to conceive a thing the way it does, even where that motive be not something in the thing as such. For a noun to be masculine, for instance, it is not necessary that the thing designated by the noun be itself masculine. It suffices if it have something resembling masculinity, namely some active power or some such thing. Number, on the contrary, includes the underlying thing. Consequently, from the proposition "Men are running" it follows that several men are running. Such is not the

case, however, with the other co-significates of a noun or verb, for from the proposition "God is" [where the noun God or *Deus* is masculine gender] it does not follow that God Himself is masculine, for it suffices for a noun to be masculine if there is something about the reality that would justify this gender, for instance, activity. I say, therefore, that the subject "gods" conceived in the plural form includes a contradiction since the mode of conception is repugnant to what is conceived under this mode. As for the proof of the consequence, viz. that the singular and plural include the same thing, I reply that the singular includes it in a conceptual mode that is in harmony with the thing conceived whereas the plural includes it in a conceptual mode that is incompatible with the thing conceived. So far as the conceptual mode and the thing conceived are concerned, then, the singular includes a notion that is, as it were, true in itself, whereas the plural includes a notion that is, as it were, false in itself. Consequently, it does not follow that the plural is true of several as the singular is true of one, for nothing is true that is false in itself. And in this way we can answer the other proof for the consequence based on the proposition: "There is something in comparison with which nothing greater can be conceived." For "gods" is not something conceivable without contradiction, since the mode of conception is repugnant to the thing conceived. Consequently, the major must be glossed the way it was in the previous question. For if the proposition is to be true or to make any sense, it is necessary that the notion of the subject includes no inherent contradiction, as has been pointed out in the second question of this distinction.*

To the *third argument* ¹⁷ I reply that its major premise is not a primary truth but is reduced to this: "Everything imperfect is traced back to something perfect".¹⁸ Since every being by participation is imperfect and only that being which is such by its essence is perfect, therefore this

* *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. II, q. II, n. 5.

proposition follows: "Every being by participation is traced back to a perfect being that is such by its essence". Hence in order that the conclusion follow, the major premise regarding the "imperfect" must be distinguished as follows. Something is imperfect according to pure perfection. A pure perfection inasmuch as it includes no limitation in itself does not necessarily include some concomitant imperfection. Something imperfect according to pure perfection, for instance, would be "this good", "this true thing", "this being". Such imperfect things are reducible to something perfect of the same character, namely to "the Good", "the True", "Being", all of which imply pure perfection. Other things, however, are imperfect according to mixed perfection. A mixed perfection is one which includes some limitation and therefore necessarily has some added imperfection. "This man", "this donkey", and such like, would be imperfect in this way. Such things are not reduced specifically to something which possesses the same perfection absolutely by its essence, for the latter would still be imperfect because it is limited. They are reduced, however, to a perfect First Being which contains them in a more perfect and equivocal manner. What is imperfect in the first way, then, is reduced to a pure perfection of the same formal character, for something of this kind can be simply perfect. What is imperfect in the second way, however, cannot be reduced to something perfect of the same formal character, for the latter includes imperfection. Such a thing by reason of this limitation, then, cannot be simply perfect, but it is reduced to something which is simply perfect and which is of a different character, but includes the perfection of the imperfect being in a more excellent way. Consequently, an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but an imperfect stone is not reduced to a stone which is simply perfect, but to the Highest Being and the Greatest Good which virtually include this perfection.

To the *last*,¹⁹ some say ²⁰ that a greater number of finite goods is better than a lesser number, but that the same is not true of infinite goods. This, however, does not seem to answer the difficulty, for it seems that whatever is better, if it can exist, should be assumed to exist in some being and in particular in that being which is supreme and exists necessarily, for whatever can be a good exists there and it is necessary that it exist there. Now if several infinite goods existed, this would be better. Therefore in a nature of the highest good it seems that more than one infinite good must be assumed to exist.

To this I reply that when the major premise declares that "those things are to be assumed to exist which would be better if they did exist", the term "if" implies the assumption of something possible or something impossible. If the first, then I say the major is true and the minor false, for what the minor implies is not possible but includes incompatible notions. But if the term "if" implies the assumption of the impossible, then the minor is true and the major false. For if some things are better only inasmuch as they assume the coexistence of incompatible notions, then they are not really better, nor for that matter are they really good. It is the same with something that can exist only if we assume the coexistence of incompatible notions. Such a thing is simply non-existent, and the same is true of the impossible basis postulated for it.

V

CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

Summary of the Argument

QUESTION : Can any certain and unadulterated truth be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the Uncreated Light ?

PRO ET CONTRA

BODY OF THE QUESTION

The opinion of Henry of Ghent

Scotus's critique of Henry (in six articles)

Article I. Henry's arguments lead to scepticism

Article II. Rejection of scepticism

- a. Certitude of first principles
- b. Experimental knowledge
- c. Knowledge of our own acts
- d. Certitude of sense knowledge

Article III. Reply to Henry's arguments

Article IV. Concerning Henry's conclusion

Article V. Solution of the Question

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

Article VI. To what extent Henry's arguments hold

[V. CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE]

Finally, on the subject of what we can know, I ask *whether any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the Uncreated Light?*

[Pro et Contra]

I argue that no such truth can be known ¹ :

[Arg. i]. From [St Augustine] : *De Trinitate*, BK. IX † : “But we gaze upon the indestructible truth by reason of which we may define perfectly what the mind of man should be according to the eternal reasons”. And again : “When we accept or reject something correctly, our incontestable conviction arises from other immutable rules above our minds”. And again : “Grasping by simple intelligence the unspeakably beautiful art that lies beyond the eye of the mind. . .”. And in the same work ‡ : “In the eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we behold the form . . . and we have within us like a Word the knowledge of what we have conceived”.

[Arg. ii]. Also in BK. XII ** : “But it pertains to higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to eternal reasons”.

[Arg. iii. And in the same BK. XII †† : “And not only are there immutable reasons for sensible things posited in place, etc. . .”. That Augustine here is speaking of the eternal reasons that are really in God is proved by the fact that he says in the same passage that

† IX, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., XLII, 966).

‡ cap. vii (Migne, P.L., XLII, 967).

** XII, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., XLII, 999).

†† XII, cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1010).

it is the privilege of the few to attain them. For he would not say this if he were speaking of first principles, since the latter are not the privilege of the few but the many, inasmuch as first principles are common and known to all.

[Arg. iv]. Also in Book xiv,* speaking of the unjust man who correctly praises and blames many things in the mores of men, he asks : “By what norms do they judge, etc. . .”. And at the end, he adds : “Where are these rules written except in that book of light. . .”. That “book of light”, however, is the divine intellect. Therefore, he wishes to say that it is in this light that the unjust man sees what justice demands must be done. And he sees this in something or by something impressed upon him by this light, for as Augustine says in the same place : “. . . whence every just law is transferred to the heart of man not by passing from one place to another, but by being impressed, as it were, even as the image is transferred from the ring to the wax without leaving the ring”. Therefore, we see in that light by which justice is imprinted upon the heart of man. This light, however, is the Uncreated Light.

[Arg. v]. Likewise, in the *Confessions*, BK. XII † : “If both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me, nor do I see it in you, but both of us see it in that immutable truth which is above the mind”. Now there are many other places where statements of Augustine could be found to support this conclusion.

To the contrary :

Romans I ‡ : “For since the creation of the world, God’s invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being understood through the things that are made. . .”. Now the invisible things of God are these eternal reasons. Consequently, they are known from creatures. Therefore, even before these eternal reasons are seen, we have certain knowledge of creatures.

* xiv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1052).

† XII, cap. xxv (Migne, P.L., XXXII, 840).

‡ Rom. I. 20.

[Body of the Question]

[*The opinion of Henry of Ghent*]

One opinion ² regarding this question maintains that a natural order exists among general notions. Let us discuss two of these which are relevant here, viz. the notion of "being" and the notion of "true".

That "being" is the first of these notions is proved from the fourth proposition of the *Liber de Causis** : "The first of created things is being" ; and in the commentary on the first proposition : "Being is of stronger adherence". The reason for this is that entity is something absolute, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar. From this it follows that a thing can be known as an entity even though its truth value is as yet unknown. Consequently, the thing which is true can be known before its truth is known.

The way the mind functions provides a further proof. A being can be grasped by an act of simple understanding, and in such a case the thing which is true is known. But the truth value itself is known only by an act of judgment. Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment.

Now if we ask about our knowledge of a being or of the thing which is true, they tell us that the intellect by reason of its purely natural powers can know the "true" in this sense. The proof is this. It is hardly fitting that any nature exist without its proper activity, as Damascene says.† The more perfect the nature in question the less fitting that it should lack such operation, as the Philosopher points out in speaking of the stars in *De caelo et mundo*, BK. II.‡ For it would be highly improper for the stars to have the power of progressive movement and still lack the means necessary for locomotion. If the proper

* *Liber de causis*, prop. i, iv.

† *De fide orthodoxa*, II, cap. xxiii (Migne, P.G., xciv, 949).

‡ II, cap. viii (290^a, 30).

operation of the intellect, however, is to know the thing which is true, it seems hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with what is prerequisite for such an operation.

But as for knowing the truth itself, they tell us that there are two exemplars, one created, the other uncreated. This is in accord with Plato, who mentions in the *Timaeus** one exemplar that is made, i.e. created, and one that is not made, i.e. uncreated. The created exemplar is the species of the universal caused by the thing. The uncreated exemplar is the idea in the divine mind. Consequently, a twofold truth and twofold conformity to an exemplar exists. One is the conformity to the created exemplar, and it was in this sense that Aristotle maintained that the truths of things are known through their conformity to the intelligible species.³ Augustine, also, seems to hold this view in his work *De Trinitate*, bk. viii,† where he maintains that the knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and of a particular nature. In virtue of such knowledge we judge the truth of any occurrence to be such or such.

But it seems wholly impossible that such an acquired exemplar should give us infallible and completely certain knowledge of a thing. The advocates of this opinion give three reasons for such a conclusion. The first is based upon the thing from which the exemplar is abstracted, the second upon the subject in which the exemplar inheres and the third upon the exemplar itself.

The first reason runs something like this. The object from which the exemplar is abstracted is itself mutable; therefore it cannot be the cause of something unchangeable. But it is only in virtue of some immutable reason that someone can be certain that something is true. An exemplar such as this, then, provides no such knowledge. They claim this to be Augustine's argument in his *Eighty-three Questions*, q. ix,‡ where he tells us not to look

* *Timaeus*, 28.

† viii, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xlii, 966).

‡ q. ix (Migne, P.L., xl, 13).

for truth from the senses, for what the senses perceive constantly undergoes change.

The second reason goes like this. Of itself the soul is changeable and subject to error. Now a thing which is even more changeable than the soul itself cannot correct this condition or prevent the soul from erring. But the exemplar which inheres in the soul is even more mutable than the soul itself. Consequently, such an exemplar does not regulate the soul so perfectly that it makes no mistake. Some special higher influence, then, is required. This, they say, is the argument Augustine uses in his work *De vera religione** : "Since the law of all arts", etc.

The third reason is that no-one possesses certain and infallible knowledge of the truth unless he can distinguish the truth from what has only the appearance of truth, for if he is unable to tell the true from the false or from what appears to be true, he can still be in doubt whether he is being deceived or not. Now truth cannot be distinguished from what merely appears to be true by means of the aforesaid exemplar. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor : Such a species can either represent itself as species or, as happens in dreams, present itself as an object. In the latter case, we have falsity ; in the former, truth. There is nothing about such a species then that suffices to differentiate the first mode of representation from the second and thus to distinguish the true from the false.

From all this they conclude that if man can know the infallible truth and possess certain knowledge it is not because he looks upon an exemplar derived from the thing by way of the senses, no matter how much such an exemplar may be purified and universalised. It is necessary that he look upon the uncreated exemplar. And the way they assume this to take place is this.⁴ God does not function as exemplar in the sense that He is the object known so that unadulterated truth is known by looking at Him. For God is known only under some general

* cap. xxx (Migne, P.L., xxxiv, 147).

attribute. But God is the reason why we know inasmuch as He is the sole exemplar and the proper reason for the created essence.

The following example is used to explain how God can be the reason why we know and yet not be known in Himself. Some sunlight is reflected while other rays come directly from their source. And even though the sun is the reason why we see something by reflected sunlight, the sun itself is not seen. But for an object illumined by direct light, the sun is a reason for knowing that is also known. In similar fashion, then, when the Uncreated Light as it were illumines an intellect by a direct glance, then this Light as seen is the reason for seeing the other things in it. In the present life, however, this Uncreated Light illumines our intellect indirectly as it were. Consequently, though unseen itself, it is the reason why our intellect sees.

Now they claim that the uncreated exemplar is related to the act of vision in three ways, viz. as a stimulating light, as a transforming species, and as the character or exemplar which produces a like form [in the intellect]. From this they conclude further that a special influence is required. For just as naturally we do not see this essence in itself, neither do we see it naturally as the exemplar of any essence. As Augustine puts it in his work *De videndo Deum** : "It is in His power to be seen. If he wishes it, He is seen ; if He does not wish it, He is not seen". Finally, they add that perfect knowledge of truth results when the two exemplar species concur in the mind, viz. the created exemplar which inheres in the soul and the uncreated exemplar which enters from without. And it is in this way that we have the word of truth perfectly.

(First ⁵ I argue against the opinion in itself ; secondly I refute the reasons adduced in its favour or turn them to my advantage. Under the first heading falls the fourth article. It is an *argumentum ad hominem*, as it were, whereas

* cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xxxiii, 603).

the third article is *ad rem*. The second heading includes the material in the third and sixth articles. The fifth article, therefore, is the solution to the question.)

Against this opinion, in the first [article] I show that these arguments are not a basis for any true opinion. Neither are they in accord with the mind of Augustine. Instead they lead to the view of the Academicians.⁶ In the second [article], I show how the view of the Academicians, which seems to follow from these reasons, is false. In the third, I answer these arguments in so far as they are inconclusive. In the fourth, I argue against the conclusion of this opinion [of Henry]. In the fifth, I solve the question. In the sixth, I show how these reasons, in so far as they are Augustine's, prove what Augustine intended to prove rather than what they are here used to prove.

[Article I. *Henry's Arguments lead to Scepticism*]. First, these reasons seem to imply the impossibility of any certain natural knowledge. Consider the first.⁷ If an object is continually changing we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light, for there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is. Neither is there any certitude in knowing a changeable thing as unchangeable. It is also clear that the antecedent of this argument is false, viz. that what the senses can perceive is continually changing. This is the opinion attributed to Heraclitus in *Metaphysics*, bk. iv.*

Likewise, if the mutability of the exemplar in our soul makes certitude impossible, then it follows that nothing in the soul could prevent it from erring, for everything inhering in such a subject is also mutable—even the act of understanding itself.⁸ (It follows further that, inasmuch as the act of understanding is even more mutable than the soul in which it resides, it will never be true nor contain truth.)

* iv, cap. v (1010^a, 6).

Likewise, according to this opinion, the created species which inheres in the soul concurs with the species that enters from without. But no certitude is possible where something incompatible with certitude concurs. For just as we can infer only a contingent proposition from a necessary and a contingent proposition combined, so also a concurrence of what is certain and what is uncertain does not produce certain knowledge.

The same reasoning clearly applies to the third argument. For if the species abstracted from the thing is a concurrent factor in all knowledge, and if we cannot judge when such a species represents itself as such and when it represents itself as object, then it makes no difference what concurs with such a species. We shall never have a certain norm for distinguishing the true from what merely appears to be true. These arguments then seem to lead to the conclusion that all is uncertain, the opinion of the Academicians.

That such a conclusion is not what Augustine intended I prove from the second book of his *Soliloquies**: "Everyone concedes without hesitation that the proofs of the sciences are most true". And Boethius says in *De hebdomadibus*†: "A common conception of the mind is that which is conclusive for anyone who hears it". And the Philosopher in *Metaphysics*, bk. II,‡ says: "First principles are known to all. . .". On the basis of these three testimonies, the following argument is constructed. Whatever pertains to all the members of a given species, springs from the specific nature itself. Now since the knowledge of conclusions depends solely upon the evidence of first principles and of the syllogistic inference, then if everyone has infallible certitude about first principles and further, if the form of the perfect syllogism as defined in *Prior Analytics*, bk. I,** is naturally evident to everyone, then anyone can know naturally any conclusion demonstrable from self-evident principles.

* II, cap. xi (Migne, P.L., xxxii, 893-894).

† (Migne, P.L., lxiv, 1311).

‡ II, cap. i (993^b, 4).

** *Analytica priora*, I, cap. ii (24^b, 22-26).

Secondly, it is clear that Augustine concedes the certitude of those things known through sense experience. Hence he says in *De Trinitate*, bk. xv *: "Far be it that we should doubt about those things which we learn to be true through our bodily senses, for through these we learn the heavens, the earth, the sea and all that are in them". If then we are not deceived nor in doubt about the truth of these things, as is clearly the case, we are certain of things known through the senses, for where doubt and deception are excluded, we have certitude.

Thirdly, it is clear that in the same work Augustine also concedes that we have certitude regarding our actions.† "He is alive whether he be asleep or awake, for it is a part of living also to sleep and to see in dreams". And if it be objected that to live is not a second act but a first act,⁹ he adds in the same place : "If anyone should say, 'I know that I know or that I live', he cannot be deceived, no matter how often he reflect on this first knowledge". And in the same place : "And if one says, 'I am happy', how can one say without being impudent, 'Perhaps you are deceived'? And if I reflect *ad infinitum*, I know that I will, and so on". And in the same place : "If anyone says I do not wish to err, will it not be true that he does not wish to err. . .". "And other arguments", he says, "can be found which hold against the Academicians, who maintain that nothing can be known by man". And in the same work : "If anyone has read our *Contra Academicos*,‡ the arguments against the perception of truth given by the Academicians will not move him". Likewise, in the same book **: "Those things which are known in such a way that they can never slip from the mind but pertain to the nature of the soul itself, of such kind is the knowledge that we live. . .".

(Note ¹⁰ that there are four kinds of knowledge of which we are necessarily certain, viz. (1) things knowable

* xv, cap. xii (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1075).

† loc. cit. (1074).

‡ *Libri tres contra Academicos* (Migne, P.L., XXXII, 905-958).

** xv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1078).

in an unqualified sense, (2) things knowable through experience, (3) our actions, (4) things known at the present time through the senses. An example [of each] : (1) A triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles], (2) The moon is eclipsed, (3) I am awake, (4) That is white. The first and third require the senses merely as an occasion, because even if all the senses erred, there would still be certitude purely and simply. The second and fourth hold in virtue of this proposition : "Whatever happens frequently through something that is not free, has this something as its natural *per se* cause". From this principle certitude follows in the second and fourth cases when the other proposition is necessary. Therefore you can let the arguments from the authority of Augustine go until the second article, which is *ad rem*, or to the [fifth article] which is the solution.) (The ¹¹ first is manifest, the third is conceded to be self-evident ; otherwise we could not judge what is self-evident. The second and fourth have an infinity of self-evident truths to which others are added which are based on the testimony of several senses.)

And so the first article is clear, viz. that the reasons [of Henry] are inconclusive, that his opinion is false and not in accord with the mind of Augustine.

[*Article II. The Rejection of Scepticism*]. As regards the second article, lest the error of the Academicians be repeated in regard to any of those things which can be known, we must see what is to be said of the three types of knowledge mentioned above, viz. whether it is possible to have infallible certitude naturally : (1) of self-evident principles and conclusions, (2) of things known by experience, and (3) of our actions.

[*a. Certitude of First Principles*]. As to the certitude of principles, I have this to say. The terms of self-evident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other. Consequently, the intellect uniting these terms in a proposition, from the

very fact that it grasps these terms, has present to itself the necessary cause, and what is more—the evident cause, of the conformity of this proposition with the terms that compose it. This conformity, then, the evident cause of which the intellect perceives in the terms, cannot help but be evident to the intellect. That is why the intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them in a proposition without having this relationship of conformity arise between the proposition and the terms, any more than two white objects could exist without a relationship of similarity arising between them. Now it is precisely this conformity of the proposition to the terms that constitutes the truth of a judgment. Such terms then cannot be combined in a judgment without being true, and so it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms, and therefore, perceiving the truth. For what is first perceived evidently includes the perception of the truth of the proposition.

In *Metaphysics*, BK. IV,* the Philosopher confirms this reasoning by a simile. There he points out that the opposite of a first principle such as “It is impossible that the same thing be and not be”, cannot enter the mind of anyone because then the mind would possess contrary opinions simultaneously. This is indeed true of contrary opinions, that is, propositions formally opposed to each other. For the opinions attributing existence and non-existence to one and the same thing are formally opposed. And so in the question at hand, I argue that there is some kind of repugnance existing between intellections in the mind, even though it is not exactly a formal opposition. For if the intellect possesses the knowledge of “whole” and of “part” and combines them in a proposition, since they include the necessary reason for the conformity of the proposition to the terms, if the intellect were to think this proposition false, two mutually repugnant acts of knowledge would coexist, even though the

* IV, cap. iii (1005^b, 23–24).

opposition is not precisely formal. The one act of knowledge would be co-present with the other even though the first is the necessary cause of the very opposite of the second, which is impossible. For just as it is impossible for white to be at the same time black because the two are formally contraries, so it is also impossible to have the white where you have the precise cause of blackness. The necessity in this case is of such a kind that it would be a contradiction to have the one [viz. the knowledge of the terms and the proposition] without the other [viz. the knowledge of the conformity between the two].

Once we have certitude of first principles, it is clear how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident,¹² and the certitude of the conclusion depends solely upon the certitude of the principles and the evidence of the inference.

But will the intellect not err in its knowledge of principles and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived about the terms? I reply that so far as this kind of knowledge goes, the senses are not a cause but merely an occasion of the intellect's knowledge, for the intellect cannot have any knowledge of the terms of a proposition unless it has taken them from the senses. But once it has them, the intellect by its own power can form propositions with these terms. And if a proposition be evidently true by reason of the terms involved, the intellect by its own power will assent to this proposition in virtue of the terms and not by reason of the senses from which it externally received the terms. To give an example: If the notion of "whole" and the notion of "greater than" be taken from the senses and the intellect form the proposition "Every whole is greater than its part", the intellect by its own power and in virtue of the terms will assent to this proposition without the shadow of doubt. And it does not assent to this because it sees these terms verified in some thing, as it does when it

assents to the proposition "Socrates is white", because it saw the terms united in reality.

Indeed, if the senses from which these terms were received were all false, or what is more deceptive, if some were false and others true, I still maintain that the intellect would not be deceived about such principles, because the terms which are the cause of the truth would always be present to the intellect. And so it would be if the species of whiteness and blackness were impressed miraculously in sleep upon one who was blind from birth and they remained after he awoke. The intellect could abstract from these and form the proposition "White is not black". And it would not be deceived with regard to this proposition even if the terms were derived from erring senses, because the formal meaning of the terms at which the intellect has arrived is the necessary cause of this negative truth.

[*b. Experimental Knowledge*]. As for what is known by experience, I have this to say. Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and holds for all instances. He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his soul: "Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause". This proposition is known to the intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce. The chance cause, however, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance effect. Consequently, if the effect occurs frequently it is not produced by chance and its cause therefore will be a natural cause if it is not a free agent. But this effect occurs through such a cause. Therefore, since the latter

is not a chance cause, it is the natural cause of the effect it frequently produces.

That such an effect occurs frequently through such a cause is a fact gathered from experience. For once we find such a nature associated at one time with this accident and at another with that, we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature. Hence, such an effect is not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature but is rather the effect of this nature as such.

It should be noted further that at times we experience [the truth] of a conclusion, such as: "The moon is frequently eclipsed". Then, granting the validity of this conclusion because it is a fact, we proceed by the method of division to discover the reason for this. And sometimes, beginning with a conclusion thus experienced, a person arrives at self-evident principles. In such a case, the conclusion which at first was known only by experience now is known by reason of such a principle with even greater certainty, namely that characteristic of the first kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-evident principle. Thus for instance, it is a self-evident principle that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented. Now, if a person discovers by way of division that the earth is such an opaque body interposed between sun and moon, our conclusion will no longer be known merely by experience as was the case before we discovered this principle. It will be now known most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned fact,¹³ for it is known through its cause.

Sometimes, however, we experience a principle in such a way that it is impossible to discover by further division any self-evident principle from which it could be derived. Instead we must be satisfied with a principle whose terms are known by experience to be frequently united, for

example, that a certain species of herb is hot. Neither do we find any other prior means of demonstrating just why this attribute belongs to this particular subject, but must content ourselves with this as a first principle known from experience. Now even though the uncertainty and fallibility in such a case may be removed by the proposition "What occurs in most instances by means of a cause that is not free is the natural effect of such a cause", still this is the very lowest degree of scientific knowledge—and perhaps we have here no knowledge of the actual union of the terms but only a knowledge of what is apt to be the case. For if an attribute is an absolute entity other than the subject, it could be separated from its subject without involving any contradiction. Hence, the person whose knowledge is based on experience would not know whether such a thing is actually so or not, but only that by its nature is it apt to be so.

[*c. Knowledge of Our Own Acts*]. Regarding the third type of knowledge, viz. of our acts, I say that we are as certain of many of these as we are of the first and self-evident propositions, as is clear from *Metaphysics*, BK. IV.* There the Philosopher says to the arguments of those who say that all that appears is true that they look for proofs of whether we are now awake or asleep. "All these doubts, however, amount to the same thing, for they all think that there is a reason for everything." And he adds: "They seek the reason for things of which there is no reason, for there is no demonstration of a principle of demonstration". According to him, then, the fact that we are awake is as self-evident as a principle of demonstration.

That such a thing is contingent matters not, for as we have pointed out elsewhere, there is an order among contingent propositions.¹⁴ Some proposition is first and immediate. Otherwise, we should have an infinite regress in contingent propositions or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of

* IV, cap. vi (1011^a, 6-13).

which are impossible. And just as our certitude of being awake is like that of self-evident propositions, the same is true of many other acts in our power such as "I understand", or "I hear", and other such acts which are being performed.

For even though there is no certitude that I see white located outside, either in such a subject or at such a distance (for an illusion can be caused in the medium or in the organ or in a number of other ways), still for all that there is certitude that I see even when the illusion is in the organ itself, which seems to be the greatest of all illusions (for instance, when the same kind of act takes place in the organ without any object present as naturally should take place only when such an object is present). In such a case, if the faculty should act, that which is called vision would truly be present whether vision be action or passion or both. But if the illusion were not caused in the organ proper but in something near which seems to be the organ, for instance, if the illusion did not take place in the bundle of nerves but in the eye, a species similar to that which naturally results from an object would be impressed. In such a case there would still be an act of vision, for we would see such a species or what is to be seen therein because it is sufficiently distant from the organ of sight in the bundle of those nerves. This is evident from Augustine in *De Trinitate*, bk. xi, c. ii,* because after-images of vision are seen when the eye is closed. It is also evident from the Philosopher in *De sensu et sensato*,† because the flash of fire produced by violently elevating the eye and transmitted as far as the closed eyelid is seen. Although these are not the most perfect, they are true visions, for in this case a sufficient distance intervenes between the species and the principal organ of vision.

(Note ¹⁵: Knowledge of a principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity. It is not unchangeable in the other sense, for it is simply

* xi, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., xlii, 987).

† cap. ii (437^a, 23-24).

perishable. Thus the intelligible species, not the image, is weak. Nevertheless, it is unable to change from a true to a false representation. But the object, although perishable, cannot change from something true to something false. As a result, it is able to conform knowledge to itself or to cause knowledge or truth by being what it is, for a true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably, that is, knowledge conformed to true entity.) (Note ¹⁶: According to Augustine, necessary or immutable truth is "above the mind"—understand "taken precisely as evident truth". For what is necessarily and immutably true causes this evident knowledge of itself in the mind, As evident, such a truth is not subject to the mind so that it could appear either true or false in the way that a probable truth is subject to the mind inasmuch as it is in the power of the mind to make it appear true or false by looking here or there for reasons that prove or disprove it. In this way we must understand the statement that the mind judges about other things and not about immutable truth. For it is only in the case of something probable and not in the case of something necessary that the assertion of its truth—an act of judgment—lies within the power of the mind. But this does not mean that the mind asserts the truth of a necessary proposition in a less perfect manner. According to Aristotle, the latter can be called a "judgment", whereas Augustine understands judgment as something that is in the power of the one judging and not as something that is immediately and necessarily determined by a factor beyond one's control. And so it is patent how the mind "judges" about a necessary conclusion that is not immediately evident of itself and therefore does not force itself upon the mind as something evident. The mind can even bring up sophistical reasons against the conclusion in question and on the basis of these reasons refuse its assent. But this it cannot do with something that is

first known [viz. a primary principle] according to *Metaphysics*, BK. IV).*

[*d. Certitude of Sense Knowledge*]. But how can a person be certain of those things which fall under the acts of the senses, for instance, that something outside is white or hot in the way that it appears to be? I reply: Regarding such an object, either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same about it. If the latter be the case, then we have certitude of this thing perceived by the senses in virtue of the aforementioned principle, viz. "What occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this thing". Therefore, if the same change repeatedly occurs in the majority of cases when such an object is presented, it follows that the transformation or image produced is the natural effect of such a cause, and thus the external thing will be white or hot or such as it naturally appears to be according to the image so frequently produced.

But if the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside; for instance, if sight says that the staff which is partly in the water and partly in the air is broken, or if sight says, as it invariably does, that the sun is smaller in size than it really is, or in general, that everything seen from a distance is smaller than it is in reality, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and know which sense is in error. This we know by reason of some proposition in the soul more certain than any sense judgment together with the concurrent testimony of several of the senses. For there is always some proposition to set the mind or intellect aright regarding which acts of the senses are true and which false—a proposition, note, which the senses do not cause but merely occasion in the intellect. For instance, the intellect has this proposition reposing in it: "The harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which

* IV, cap. iii (1005^b, 15 ff.).

gives way before it". So evident is this proposition upon analysis of its terms that the intellect could not call it in doubt, even if its terms were derived from erroneous senses. Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction. Now both sight and touch attest that the stick is harder than the water and that the water gives way before the stick. It follows therefore that the stick is not broken as the sense of sight judges. Hence, in the case of the "broken staff" the intellect judges by something more certain than any testimony of the sense. And so too with the other cases. Even though the terms be derived from erring senses, the intellect knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself. Now the sense of sight as well as that of touch tell us that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision and to a distant object. Therefore, the actual size of the object is equal whether seen from near by or from afar. Sight errs, consequently, when it declares the size to be less. This conclusion is inferred from self-evident principles and from the repeated testimony of its truth by two senses. And so when reason judges that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two kinds of knowledge. The first is a knowledge for which the intellect requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause—a knowledge in which it would not be deceived even if all the senses were deceived. The other is a knowledge acquired by the oft-repeated testimony of one or more senses which are known to be true by reason of the proposition so frequently quoted, viz. "Whatever occurs in most instances, etc.".

[*Article III. Reply to Henry's Arguments*]. In this third article, we must answer the three arguments [of Henry] ¹⁷ in the light of what has been said.

As for the *first argument* (viz. that based on the change in the object) the antecedent is false. For sensible things are not in continual motion ; indeed, they remain the same for some time. Neither is this the opinion of

Augustine. It is rather the error of Heraclitus and his disciple Cratylus, who did not even wish to speak but only move his finger, as *Metaphysics*, BK. IV,* relates. But even if the antecedent were true, the consequence would still be invalid, for as Aristotle pointed out, we could still be certain of this truth, viz. that all things are in continuous motion.

Likewise, it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced does not represent anything under an immutable aspect. For it is not precisely this *mutability* in the object that causes the knowledge; it is the *nature* of this mutable object that does so, and this nature is immutable. Hence, the knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself. And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably united. And so by means of two terms produced by two mutable things (though not in so far as they are changeable, but in so far as they are natures) it is possible to have a knowledge of their immutable union.

(Even ¹⁸ though something mutable is not signified in so far as it is mutable, how is it that its relation to another thing is immutable? I reply that the relation is immutable in this sense, that the opposite relation could not exist between the extremes; neither could this relation be non-existent, given these extremes. By the destruction of one or both extremes, however, this relation is also destroyed. To the contrary: How can we assert that the proposition is necessary if the identity of the extremes could be destroyed? I reply: When a thing is non-existent, it has no real identity, but in such a case, if it is in the mind it has an identity inasmuch as it is an object known, and this identity is necessary only in a qualified sense inasmuch as the extremes cannot exist in thought without possessing this identity. Neverthe-

* IV, cap. vi (1011^a, 4-13).

less, this identity need not exist, even as the term need not be known. Therefore, the proposition in the mind is necessary only in a qualified sense inasmuch as it cannot become false. But it would only be necessary in an unqualified sense in the divine intellect, for the terms have an identity that is simply necessary in no other form of existence save that which they possess by being known by God.)

It is also evident that something can be represented under an immutable aspect even if that which does the representing is something mutable in itself. For the essence of God is represented to the intellect as something immutable by means of something that is radically changeable, whether the latter be the species or the act of knowing. This is evident from a similar case, for something can be represented as infinite through what is finite.

As to the *second*, this changeability of the soul can be understood in a twofold sense : one from affirmation to negation and vice versa, such as from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge or from a lack of understanding to understanding ; the other from one contrary as it were to another, such as from being right to being deceived, or vice versa. The soul, however, is changeable with regard to any object only in the first sense of mutability, and there is nothing which exists formally in the soul that will remove this kind of mutability. But the soul is not mutable in the second sense except in regard to such propositions as are not evident from their terms. But with those propositions that are evident from their terms, the soul cannot be altered in the second way for the terms which are apprehended are themselves the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of the judgment involving the aforesaid terms. Therefore, even if the soul is mutable in the sense that absolutely speaking it can pass from the state of being correct to a state of error, it does not follow that it can be set aright only by something other than itself. At least it can be set aright

in regard to those objects about which the intellect cannot err once the terms are grasped.

To the *third argument*, I say that if it held at all, it would rather be valid against that opinion which denies the intelligible species—the view of the man who has advanced the opposing theory [viz. Henry of Ghent].¹⁹ For the species which is able to represent the sensible in dreams as though it were an object would be the sense image or phantasm and not the intelligible species. Therefore, if the intellect were to use the sense image alone so that the object would be present to the mind through the sense image and not in virtue of any intelligible species, there seems to be no way of distinguishing between what is true and what merely appears to be true by means of something in which the object itself appears. But if we assume the existence of a species in the intellect, the argument does not hold, because the intellect is unable to use such a species as though it were an object in itself for the simple reason that it is not able to use such a species in sleep.

You may object that if the sense image can represent itself as object, then it follows that the intellect could err by reason of this error in the faculty of the imagination, or at least, as is the case in dreams or with madmen, the intellect could be so bound that it could not operate. It can be said in reply that if the intellect is bound when there is such an error due to the imaginative faculty, then the intellect does not err for the simple reason that it does not act.

But how will one know or how will the intellect ever be certain that the imagination does not err when the latter faculty must be free of error if the intellect is not to err? I reply that the following truth reposes in the mind. "A faculty does not err in regard to an object that is properly proportioned to it unless the said faculty is indisposed". Now it is known to the intellect that the imaginative faculty is not indisposed during a waking

state to such an extent that the sense image would represent itself as an object, for it is self-evident to the intellect that when it knows, it is awake, and that, consequently, the imagination is not bound in a waking state as it is in sleep.

But there is still another objection to the aforementioned certitude about our actions. It runs as follows. I seem to see and to hear, whereas in reality I neither see nor hear ; consequently, I have no certainty on this point. I reply that it is one thing to show someone who denies a given proposition that it is true and quite another to indicate to someone who admits the given proposition how it is true. For example in *Metaphysics*, bk. iv,* the Philosopher does not adduce the inconsistency that "contrary opinions would be present in the soul at one and the same time" against those who deny the first principle [viz. of contradiction], for they indeed would concede this as a premise. Instead he brings out other inconsistencies which are more manifest to them though they are not more evident in themselves. But he does show those who grant this first principle how this principle is known. For it is known in such a way that its opposite could not even enter the mind. This he proves from the fact that otherwise contrary opinions could exist simultaneously in the mind. Such a conclusion is, in this case, even more inconsistent than the hypothesis.

So it is in our case. If you hold that nothing is self-evident, I will not argue with you for it is clear that you are a quibbler and are not to be convinced. This is apparent from your actions, as the Philosopher indicates in *Metaphysics*, bk. iv,† for if you dream of obtaining or going after some nearby object, after you awake you no longer seek it as you would do, or would have done, had you been that close to getting it while awake.

If, however, you admit that some proposition is self-evident and that a power indisposed can err with regard to anything, as is clear in the case of dreams, then from

* iv, cap. iii (1005^b, 25 ff.).

† iv, cap. v (1010^b, 10).

the fact that something can be recognised as self-evident it follows that a person can tell when a faculty is disposed and when it is not. Consequently, in regard to our actions it is possible to know that a faculty is so disposed that what appears to be self-evident is actually so.

As to the form of this sophistical argument, then, I say this. Just it appears to the dreamer that he sees, so also the opposite of some self-evident speculative principle might appear to him. But from this it still does not follow that such a principle is not self-evident. Likewise it does not follow that it is not self-evident to the hearer that he hears. For if a power that is indisposed can err with regard to either truth, a power that is disposed cannot. And it is self-evident when it is disposed and when it is not. Otherwise, nothing else would be recognised as self-evident, for one could never tell what would be self-evident, or whether this is something to which the intellect is disposed or to which it would assent in this way.

[*Article IV. Concerning Henry's Conclusion*]. In the fourth article I argue against the conclusion of [Henry's] view ²⁰ as follows : What, I ask, is meant by certain and unadulterated truth? Either it means infallible truth, that is, a truth which excludes all doubt and deception. And in this case, we have proved and declared already in the second and third articles that such truth is possible on purely natural grounds. Or by such truth he means truth as an attribute of "being". In which case, since we can know "being" we can also know its attribute "true". And if we know "true" we can also know truth by a kind of abstraction. For any form that can be recognised in a subject can also be known in itself and in the abstract apart from the subject. Or truth is to be understood in still another way, as truth of conformity to an exemplar. If the exemplar in question is taken to be created, we have what we seek to prove. If conformity to an uncreated exemplar is meant, why such

conformity cannot be recognised unless the exemplar itself is known, for unless the term of a relation is known the relation itself cannot be known. Consequently, it is false to assume that an eternal exemplar is the reason why we know something when this exemplar itself remains unknown.

Secondly, I argue further that simple intelligence ²¹ can know by way of definition all that it knows in a confused manner by the simple expedient of discovering the definition of the thing known by way of division. This definitive knowledge seems to be the most perfect kind of knowledge that pertains to simple intelligence. From this most perfect knowledge of the terms, however, the intellect can understand the principle most perfectly ; and from the principle, the conclusion. Intellectual knowledge seems to be complete with this, so that no further knowledge of truth over and above the aforementioned truths seems necessary.

In the third place, either the Eternal Light, which you say is necessary in order to have unadulterated truth, causes something naturally prior to the act or not. If it does, then this thing is produced either in the object or in the intellect. But it cannot be produced in the object, because the object, in so far as it exists in the intellect, has no real existence but only intentional existence. Therefore, it is incapable of any real accident. If this thing is produced in the intellect, then the Eternal Light transforms [the mind] to know pure truth only through the medium of its effect. If this be the case, then it seems that common opinion attributes knowledge to the Uncreated Light to the same extent as does this, for the common view assumes that knowledge is seen in the active intellect, which is the effect of the Uncreated Light, and indeed is a more perfect effect than this accidental created Light would be.²² If this Uncreated Light does not cause anything prior to the act, then either the Light alone causes the act [of knowledge], or the Light

with the intellect and object do so. If the Light does so alone, then the active intellect has no function whatsoever in knowing pure truth. But this seems inconsistent because the latter is the most noble function of our intellect. The active intellect, then, which is the most noble [faculty of knowledge]²³ in our soul, must concur in some way in this action.²⁴

And the inconsistency here inferred also follows from the aforesaid opinion in another way. For according to the one who holds this opinion, any agent using an instrument is incapable of performing an action which exceeds the action of the instrument. Therefore, since the power of the active intellect could not arrive at the knowledge of pure truth, the Eternal Light using the active intellect could not produce this knowledge or have anything to do with the act whereby pure truth is known and still have the active intellect function as an instrument. And if you say that the Uncreated Light causes this unadulterated truth together with the intellect and the object, this is the common opinion which assumes that the Uncreated Light acting as the remote cause produces all certain truth. Consequently, either this opinion [of Henry] is inconsistent or it is not at variance with the common view.

[*Article V. Solution of the Question*].²⁵ As to the question, then, I say that because of what Augustine has said, one should concede that infallible truths are seen in the eternal rules, where the term "in" can be taken in the sense of "in an object". There are four ways in which this could be done : (1) either as in a proximate object, or (2) as in that which contains the proximate object, or (3) as that in virtue of which the

proximate object moves [the intellect], or (4) as in a remote object.

[The First Way]. In explanation of the first, I say that all the intelligibles have an intelligible being in virtue of the act of the divine intellect. In these intelligibles all the truths that can be affirmed about them are visible so that the intellect knowing these intelligibles and in virtue thereof understanding the necessary truths about them, sees these truths in them as in an object. Now these intelligibles inasmuch as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect are "truths" because they are conformed to their exemplar, viz. the divine intellect. Likewise, they are a "light" because they are manifest. And there they are immutable and necessary. But they are eternal only in a qualified sense, because eternity is characteristic of something really existing, and these intelligibles "exist" only in a qualified sense. This then is the first way in which we can be said to see in the Eternal Light, i.e. as in the secondary object of the divine intellect, which object is truth and eternal light in the sense explained.

[The Second Way]. The second way is also clear, because the divine intellect contains these truths like a book, as Augustine testifies in *De Trinitate*, BK. XIV, c. xv*: "These rules are written in the book of Eternal Light", that is, in the divine intellect inasmuch as it contains these truths. And although this book itself is not seen, nevertheless those truths are seen which are written in this book. And to this extent, our intellect could be said to see truths in the Eternal Light, i.e. to see things which are in that book as in something which contains the object.²⁶

And Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate*, BK. XII,

* XIV, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1052).

c. xiv,* that the meaning of "square body" remains incorruptible and immutable, and so on, can be understood seemingly in either of these two ways. For the meaning of a square body remains incorruptible and immutable only inasmuch as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect.

But there is a doubt about this first way. We do not see these truths as they are in the divine intellect, because we do not see the divine intellect itself. How then can we be said to see things in the Uncreated Light—things, which exist indeed in the Uncreated Light as objects known by that intellect, but which we see only in something which is the eternal light in a qualified sense.²⁷ To this the third way gives the following answer.

[The Third Way]. These intelligibles in so far as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect have existence only in a qualified sense. But something that exists only in a qualified sense, to the precise extent that it "exists" in this way, is incapable of any truly real operation.²⁸ If such an operation pertains to it at all, it does so only in virtue of something which exists in an unqualified sense. Therefore, these secondary objects do not enjoy the power to move the intellect, to speak precisely, except by virtue of the existence of the divine intellect, which exists in an unqualified sense and through which the intelligibles have existence in a qualified sense. And so we see in the eternal light in a qualified sense as in the proximate object. But according to this third way we see in the Uncreated Light as in the immediate cause by virtue of which the proximate object moves [the intellect].

We can also be said to see in the Eternal Light in this third way inasmuch as this Light is the cause of the object itself. For the divine intellect produces this intelligible in existence and by its act gives to this object one type of being and to another a second type of being. Consequently, the divine intellect gives them such intelligible content as they possess as objects of knowledge. Now

* XII, cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1011).

it is through their intelligible content that they afterward move the intellect to certain knowledge. And, properly speaking, it could be said that our intellect sees in the Light, because the Light is the cause of the object. This is clear from a simile : for we are said to understand properly in the light of the active intellect, although this light is nothing more than the active cause (i.e., that which makes the [potential] object actual, or that in virtue of which the object moves, or both).

The fact then that the divine intellect, the true Un-created Light, has a twofold causality (viz. that it produces objects in intelligible being and that it is also that in virtue of which the secondary objects produced actually move the intellect)—this fact can supply as it were a third type or mode of interpretation as to how we can be said to see truly in the Eternal Light.

But suppose someone should object to these two ways of supplying a third interpretation on the following grounds. We should rather be said to see in God willing or in God in so far as He is will, for the divine will is the immediate principle of every act directed towards something outside Himself.

I reply that the divine intellect, as far as it is in some way prior to the act of the divine will,²⁹ produces these objects in intelligible being, and thus the intellect seems to be a purely natural cause in their regard. For God is not a free cause of anything unless volition as an elicited act somehow precedes the thing in question. Now, inasmuch as the intellect produces objects in intelligible being prior to the act of the will, it would seem to co-operate as a prior cause with these intelligibles in the production of their natural effect—which effect consists in this: Once these intelligibles are grasped and formulated in a proposition they cause the conformity of what is grasped [viz. the proposition] to themselves [as terms]. Consequently, it seems to involve a contradiction that an intellect should form such a proposition and still not

have this proposition conform to the terms even though it is possible that the intellect should not grasp the terms or formulate them in a proposition. For even though God freely co-operates with the intellect when it combines or does not combine these terms, still once the terms have been formed into a proposition, the conformity of the latter with the terms seems to follow as a necessary consequence from the very meaning of the terms—a meaning which they have by reason of the fact that the intellect of God has naturally produced these terms in intelligible being.

From all this, it is clear why a special illumination is not required in order to see in the eternal reasons, for Augustine assumes that we see in them only such truths as are necessary in virtue of their terms. Now it is in just such truths that we have the greatest necessity between the effect and both its proximate and remote causes (that is, both on the part of the divine intellect in its relation to the objects which move [our intellect] and on the part of the objects in relation to the truth of the propositions about them). Even though the necessity of perceiving such a truth is not so great that not to perceive it would include a contradiction, still there is a necessity present which arises from the proximate cause [viz. the intelligibility of the terms] assisted by the remote cause [viz. the divine intellect which gives such ideas their intelligibility]. For once the terms are grasped and formed into a proposition, they are naturally able to make evident the conformity that exists between the proposition and its terms even though it be granted that God co-operates with these terms in producing their effect, not by a natural necessity, but by a general [free] influence. But whether it be by a general influence, or what is more, by a natural necessity, that God co-operates with the terms in producing their effect, it is quite clear that no special illumination is required.

The assumption as to what Augustine meant is clearly

justified by what he says of the infidel philosophers in *De Trinitate*, BK. IV, c. xxxv* : "Some of them have been able to see through and beyond all creation and with their mind's eye to reach at least in some degree the light of immutable truth, a thing which they ridicule many Christians, who live meanwhile by faith alone, for not being able to do". He wishes to say, therefore, that Christians do not see in the eternal rules the things they believe and yet the philosophers see many necessary truths therein. And the same with *De Trinitate*, BK. IX, c. vi† : "Not of what sort the mind of one particular man happens to be, etc."—as if he were to say : "It is not contingent but necessary truths that are seen there". And in the same work he argues against those philosophers : "Just because they argue most truly that all that happens in time takes place on account of eternal reasons, are they therefore able to perceive therein how many kinds of animals exist or how many seeds of each there were in the beginning, and so on. . . . Have they not sought all these things not by that unchangeable knowledge, but by the history of places and times, and have they not believed the written experience of others?" Consequently, he means that contingent truths known by the senses alone or believed on the account of others are not known through the eternal rules. And yet special illumination is required even more for what must be believed than for necessary truths. Indeed, this special illumination is least needed in the case of the latter ; general illumination alone suffices.

On the contrary, Why then does Augustine say in *De Trinitate*, BK. XII, c. xiv : "It is only for the few to attain the intelligible reasons with their mind's eye", and in the *Eighty-three Questions*, q. xlvi : "Only the pure of soul reach them"? I reply that he does not mean by this purity a freedom from vices, for in *De Trinitate*, BK. XIV, c. xv, he holds that the unjust man sees in the eternal rules what a just man must do and how he must regard

* IV, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., XLII, 902).

† IX, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., XLII, 966).

things in their light. And in the fourth book, in the chapter cited above, he maintains that the philosophers saw truth in the eternal reasons even though they lacked faith. And in the same question, he holds that no one can be wise without a knowledge of the ideas in the way, for instance, that they would concede Plato to be wise. But this purity must be understood of the elevation of the intellect to the contemplation of these truths as they are in themselves and not as they appear in the sense image.

Here we must remember that the sensible thing outside causes a confused sense image, something with only an incidental unity in the faculty of imagination, which represents the thing according to its quantity, colour and other sensible accidents. And just as the sense image represents things only confusedly and according to an incidental unity, so many perceive only such incidental combinations. Now, primary truths are primary precisely because their terms are grasped in their proper nature and apart from all that is merely incidental to them. Now this proposition, "The whole is greater than its part", is not primarily true of the whole as realised in a stone or in wood, but of "whole" in the abstract, i.e. apart from everything with which it merely happens to be joined. Consequently, the mind which never conceives totality except in an incidental concept such as the totality of a stone or the totality of wood, never really understands the pure truth of this principle, because it never grasps the precise nature of the terms to which the principle owes its truth. It is only within the power of the few to attain the eternal reasons, because it is only the few that have an understanding of the essentials, whereas the many grasp things merely in incidental concepts such as those mentioned above. But these few are not said to be distinguished from the others by a special illumination, but by better natural powers, since they have a sharper and more abstractive mind, or be-

cause of greater research which enables one person to know those essences which another equally talented individual does not discover because he does not investigate them.

And in this way we can understand Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate*, BK. IX, c. vi,* regarding the individual on the mountain who sees the pure light above and the mist below. For whoever grasps nothing but incidental notions in the way that the sense image represents such objects, viz. as a kind of accidental aggregate, is like one in a valley surrounded by mist. But by grasping just what things are of themselves, a person separates the essences from the many additional incidental features associated with them in the sense image. Such a one, as it were, has the sense image in the mist beneath him, but he himself is on the mountain to the extent that in virtue of the uncreated intellect, the Eternal Light, he knows this truth and sees what is true from above, as a more universal truth.

[The Fourth Way]. And finally, we can concede that pure truths are known in the Eternal Light as in a remotely known object. For the Uncreated Light is the first source of speculative things and the ultimate end of practical things. The first speculative and practical principles, then, are derived from it. Hence, the knowledge of speculative and practical things by means of principles derived from the Eternal Light, where the latter is known,³⁰ is more perfect and prior to knowledge derived from principles from the respective class of things as such, as has been pointed out in the question on the subject of theology. Such knowledge is more eminent than any other. Now it is in this way that the knowledge of all things pertains to the theologian. In this way pure truth is said to be known, since truth alone without admixture of anything else is known, for it is known through the First Being. And once this Being is known, the principles for knowing in this perfect way are derived

* IX, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., XLII, 966).

therefrom. But any other thing from which principles of knowing something in kind are derived is defective truth.

Only God knows all things purely in this perfect way, for as we have said in the question on the subject of theology,* He alone knows all things precisely through His essence. Nevertheless, every intellect can be moved by some object to know that something is true in virtue of Him, and in this way the knowledge of all things pertains to the theologian, as has been said in the question on the subject of theology. For to know that a triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles], in so far as this is a kind of participation of God and that it has such an order in the universe that it expresses more perfectly as it were the perfection of God,³¹—this is a nobler way of knowing a triangle has three [angles, etc.] than to know this truth from the notion of a triangle itself. Similarly, to know that one should live temperately in order to attain the supreme happiness, which consists in attaining the essence of God in Himself, is a more perfect way of knowing this practical truth than to be aware of it through some principle in the class of mores, for instance, through the principle that one is obliged to live uprightly.

And in this manner Augustine speaks of the Uncreated Light as known in *De Trinitate*, bk. xv, c. xxvii,† where addressing himself, he says: “You have seen many things and these you have discerned through that Light in which you saw them shining forth to you. Turn your eyes to the Light itself and fasten them upon it, if you can, for in this way you will see how the nativity of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God.” And a little later: “This and other things this Light has revealed to your inner eyes. What then is the reason with fixed glance you are unable to see the Light itself, if it is not indeed your weakness? . . .”

* *Opus oxoniense*, prol. q. iii.

† xv, cap. xxvii (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1097).

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

From all that has been said, it is clear how the citations from Augustine to the contrary are to be interpreted. The texts of Augustine concerning this matter can also be explained in terms of one of the aforementioned ways of seeing.

[*Article VI. To What Extent Henry's Arguments Hold*]. As to the sixth article, we must see how the three reasons adduced in favour of the first opinion in so far as they are taken from Augustine do prove some truth, although they do not establish that false conclusion for which they were advanced.³²

Here we must recognise³³ that we should not expect pure truth from sensible things as from a primary and essential cause, for sense knowledge has to do with something incidental, as we have pointed out,³⁴ even though some of the acts of the senses are certain and true. But the essences of things are known in virtue of the active intellect, a participation of the Uncreated Light, which illumines the imagination and in this way true purity [of truth] results. In this fashion, the first argument of Henry is solved. And according to the mind of Augustine, it proves nothing more.

To the second reason of Henry, I say that the soul can change in the sense that it has now one act, now another, accordingly as objects differ. For the soul is not material and is unlimited in the sense that it can know and love anything whatsoever.³⁵ Likewise, it can be active or inactive, for it is not always in act. But with regard to the first principles the truth of which is known from their terms, or with regard to conclusions evidently deduced from the terms, the soul cannot change from one contrary state to another, i.e. from truth to falsity. For rules³⁶ known in the light of the agent intellect keep the mind from erring, and even though the intelligible species

of the terms is mutable in its being, still in representing in the light of the agent intellect, the intelligible species represents things in an immutable way, and the terms of a first principle are known by two intelligible species and consequently the union [of the terms in a proposition] is true and evidently certain.

As for [Henry's] third argument, we must point out that it is telling against his own position, since he admits of no species other than the sense image or sensible species. But the argument is not effective where an intelligible species is held to represent the essence. However, it must be admitted that if the sensitive powers are not impeded, the sensible species truly represents the things. In sleep, however, the powers of the external senses are bound. Wherefore, the imaginative power, conserving the sensible species according to the different movement of humours in the head, apprehends those species as the things themselves of which they are but likenesses, for they have the force of things, according to the Philosopher in *De motibus animalium*.^{*} The third reason proves no more than this.

^{*} cap. vii (701^b, 20).

VI

THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Summary of the Argument

QUESTION : Can it be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of mankind ?

PRO ET CONTRA

BODY OF THE QUESTION

Part I. A kind of *a priori* proof of the resurrection

Method of procedure

First proposition : The intellective soul is the specific form of man

Proof based on testimony of philosophers

Proof from reason : (1) An unsatisfactory formulation ; (2) Scotus's formulation—(a) proof of the antecedent ; (b) proof of the consequent

Second proposition : The intellective soul is immortal

Arguments for immortality

Arguments against immortality

Scotus's opinion

Reply to the arguments for immortality

Third proposition : The human soul will not remain outside the body forever

Arguments for a resurrection

Scotus's opinion

Reply to the arguments

Evaluation of the *a priori* proof

Part II. The *a posteriori* proofs of the resurrection

Evaluation of the *a posteriori* arguments

Part III. Solution to the Question

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

[VI. THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE
HUMAN SOUL]

I ask : *Can it be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of mankind ?*

[Pro et Contra]

Proof that it can be known ¹ :

[Arg. i]. A natural desire cannot be in vain.† Man, however, has a natural desire to live forever, and it can be known by natural reason that such a desire exists. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor : Where a natural aversion for something exists, it is only because of a natural desire or love for something else. But man has a natural aversion for death. This is evident both from experience and from what the Apostle says to the Corinthians‡ : “We do not wish to be unclothed, but rather clothed over”.

[Arg. ii]. Also, it is naturally known that we seek happiness by our very nature. This is clear from *Nicomachean Ethics*, БК. I,** with regard to beatitude in general and from *Nicomachean Ethics*, БК. X,†† for beatitude in particular. But from natural reason it is known that beatitude must be eternal. Hence, it is known from natural reason that man is ordained to some eternal perfection. Proof of the minor : Augustine‡‡ proves it thus : “And if life quits him by his dying, how can a blessed life remain with him? And when it quits him, without doubt it either quits him unwillingly, or willingly

† Averroes, *Metaphysica*, II, com. I.

‡ II Cor. v. 4.

** *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, cap. vii (1097^b, 1ff.), X, cap. vii–viii (1177^a, 12ss).

†† X, cap. vii–viii (1177^a, 12ff.).

‡‡ XIII, cap. viii (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1022).

or neither. If unwillingly, how is the life blessed which is so within his will as not to be within his power? And whereas no one is blessed who wills something that he does not have, how much less is he blessed who is quitted against his will, not by honour, nor by possessions, nor by any other thing, but by the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all. . . . But neither is that a blessed life which is such as to be unworthy of his love whom it makes blessed”.

[Arg. III]. Furthermore, it is known naturally that an entire species cannot fail to attain its end. At least the end must be achieved in some individuals. But it is naturally known that beatitude is the end of the human species. Therefore, it is naturally known that at least some individual can attain it. But he cannot attain it in this life because of the many concomitant miseries such as the vicissitudes of fortune, bodily infirmity, imperfect knowledge and virtue, instability and fatigue in the exercise of even the most perfect acts, inasmuch as no operation, be it ever so delightful in the beginning, can continue to be delightful. Furthermore, when such an operation causes what is delightful to become distasteful, it will no longer be performed. Now it is known by natural reason that the beatific vision is not something distasteful. Neither is it something that the soul can possess alone in separation from the body, for in this way *man* would not attain his goal. Consequently, this end will be attained in another life by the whole man, body and soul together. It seems, then, that natural reason can reach this conclusion at least in regard to those ways by which man will attain his end.

[Arg. IV]. Furthermore, by natural reason it is known that every species required for the integrity of the universe, is eternal. For the universe as an integral whole is eternal. Now man is the most perfect species, at least among terrestrial beings, for, *Physics*, BK. II,* “we are in some way the end of all things”. Therefore, etc.

* II, cap. II (194^o, 35).

To the contrary :

[Arg. i]. Augustine, speaking of the life that is eternal and immortal in *De Trinitate* bk. XIII, c. ix,* says : "Whether human nature can receive this . . . is no small question. . . . Assuredly, of those who endeavour to discover it from human reasonings, scarcely a few, and they endowed with great abilities and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone".

[Arg. ii]. Furthermore, in *Acts* xvii,† it is related that certain Athenians listening to Paul said : " 'He seems to be a herald of strange gods', because he proclaimed to them Jesus and the resurrection". Nevertheless, these Athenians were philosophers whose *forte* was the use of natural reason, as is clear from the case of the convert Dionysius, who was one of them. But it does not seem that what appeared to them to be so far from the truth is known adequately by natural reason. Hence, it is evident here that what Paul adduces in this connexion is meant to be nothing more than a kind of persuasive form of argumentation.

[Arg. iii]. Furthermore, when Paul said in *Acts* xxvi,‡ "that Christ was to suffer, that he first by his resurrection [from the dead was to proclaim light to the people and to the Gentiles . . .] Festus said with a loud voice, 'Paul, thou art mad !' "

[Body of the Question]

[Part I. A Kind of A Priori Proof]

This much is clear, if any argument proves the resurrection, it must be one based on something that is proper to man and does not belong to other perishable things. But such a thing would not be matter, not even incorruptible matter.² Neither is it some form that can be destroyed. For even if such a form exist in man and

* XIII, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1023).

† *Acts*, xvii. 18.

‡ loc. cit. xxvi. 23-24.

indeed, one even more excellent than any brute form, still this would not provide an adequate argument for the resurrection of man as a whole. Hence, the argument must be based upon that form which is specific to man or upon some operation which man enjoys by reason of this form.

[*Method of Procedure*]. The method used to establish the thesis is to proceed from three propositions. If all three of these can be known by natural reason, the proposed conclusion will follow. The three propositions are these: (1) *The intellective soul is the specific form of man*; (2) *The intellective soul is incorruptible*. From these two it follows that the specific form of man is incorruptible. To these a third is added: (3) *The specific form of man will not remain forever outside the composite*. Hence it follows that at some time the same composite will be restored. This second return Damascene calls the resurrection*: "The resurrection is the second rising of what has been dissolved". Let us consider these three propositions in order and see to what extent they are evident.

[*First Proposition. The intellective soul is the specific form of man*]. This first proposition is said to be known by natural reason and is proved in two ways. The first proof is based upon the testimony of philosophers who assert this as something known by natural reason alone. The other proceeds from natural arguments which lead to this conclusion.

[Proof based on the testimony of the philosophers]. As to the first, Aristotle defines the soul in the *De anima*, BK. II,† as "the act of the natural organised body", and so on. And in the beginning of BK. III,‡ he speaks of "the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks . . .", where he seems to make the intellective soul at least a subjective part,³ of what he has previously defined as the soul in general.

Furthermore, all philosophers commonly assign "rational" as the difference that properly defines man,

* *De fide orthodoxa*, IV, cap. xxvi (Migne, P.G., xciv, 1220).

† II, cap. i (412^a, 28).

‡ III, cap. iv (429^a, 10).

meaning by "rational" that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.

In fact, to put it briefly, no philosopher of any note can be found to deny this except that accursed Averroes in his commentary on *De anima*, BK. III,* where his fantastic conception, intelligible neither to himself nor to others, assumes the intellective part of man to be a sort of separate substance united to man through the medium of sense images. But neither he nor his followers to the present day have been able to explain this union. Nor can it be maintained that in virtue of such a union man himself understands, for according to him, man as such is nothing more than a kind of irrational animal which excels the other animals by reason of an irrational sensitive soul that is more excellent than other souls.

[Proof from reason]. As to the second, it is not easy to find either an *a priori* or an *a posteriori* argument, unless it be based on a function proper to man, for the form is known from its proper function, even as matter is known from the existence of change.

[1. *An Unsatisfactory Formulation*]. One argument ⁴ based on the function of the intellect that is used to establish the proposed conclusion is this. To understand is a function proper to man. Therefore, it has its source in the form proper to man. The intellective form then is that proper to man.

This argument, however, is open to criticism inasmuch as those who propound it admit that the intellect has only a passive and not an active relation to intellection. Hence, this proposition "A function that is proper proceeds from the proper form" really does not prove that the intellective part is the proper form of man, for this operation does not proceed from the form but according to them ⁵ it is caused by the intelligible object, or according to the view of others it proceeds from the sense image.⁶

[2. *Scotus's Formulation*]. I put this argument, then,

* III, com. 5.

in another form. *Man formally and properly understands ; therefore, the intellectual soul is the proper form of man.*

[a. Proof of the antecedent]. The antecedent seems to be clear enough according to the testimony of Aristotle in *De anima*, BK. III,* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. I,† since to understand is the proper operation of man. Now an operation, in contradistinction to an act of fashioning something or to an action, is formally in the one who performs the operation and is not produced by the agent in something else. Similarly Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. X,‡ makes man's happiness consist in understanding. Now it is clear that this felicity is formally in man. Consequently the operation in which this felicity consists must also be in man formally.

Nevertheless, we should try to prove the antecedent by reason lest some contentious individual deny it. Now in the antecedent, I take "to know" or "to understand" in the proper sense of the term as an act of knowledge which transcends every type of sense knowledge.

[*First proof*]. One way of proving this antecedent, then, is this. Man knows by an act of knowledge which is not organic ; hence he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term. The consequence is evident for the reason already given, since intellection properly speaking is a knowledge which transcends all sense knowledge. All sensation, however, is organic knowledge as Aristotle shows in *De anima*, BK. II. There the antecedent of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a certain kind of sensible,⁷ and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes.⁸ But we do experience in ourselves some knowledge which we do not have in virtue of some organ, for if it were organic, this knowledge would be limited precisely to the sensibles of some determined kind, which is the very opposite of what we actually

* III, cap. iii, passim.

† *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, cap. vii (1098^a, 7).

‡ X, cap. viii (1178^b, 21).

experience. For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs from another, and consequently we know both extremes. This consequence is evident from the Philosopher, who uses this argument in *De anima*, BK. II,* in regard to common sense.

But to this some object, *first* of all, that organic knowledge is that which is present in some determinate part of the body, whereas the aforesaid knowledge by which we distinguish sensibles from things that cannot be perceived by the senses, is present in the body as a whole and for this reason is not had in virtue of some organ in the proper sense of the word. For an attribute of the whole is as material as something which exists in one of its parts. Nevertheless, this knowledge does not transcend in perfection the whole class of sense knowledge since it is primarily in the body as a whole and hence is just as material in character as the knowledge in only a part of the whole. *Secondly*, they deny the assumption that this act of knowledge is not present in virtue of some organ because it is there by reason of the organ of the imagination. Proof for this is found in the fact that when this organ is damaged, such knowledge is no longer possible. Neither is the proof from the limitation of the organ to a certain kind of sensible conclusive, because the imagination extends to all sensibles.

The first objection, however, has already been excluded by what was treated above, for through this act of knowledge we discern the difference between the whole class of sensibles and something that is outside the class as a whole. Neither does the argument that this act is impeded by damage done to the imagination prove anything. For this is due to the functional relation that exists between these powers and not because the act of understanding is exercised through the medium of an organ.

[*Second proof*]. Another proof for the principal antecedent is based on the fact that we possess some immaterial

* *De anima*, III, cap. i (425^a, 30 ff.).

knowledge. No sense knowledge, however, can be immaterial ; therefore, etc.

This word "immaterial" is frequently used by the Philosopher in this connexion, but it appears to be ambiguous. There are three relevant ways in which it can be understood. (a) Either this knowledge is immaterial because it is incorporeal in the sense that it is not an operation that involves a corporeal part or organ. In this sense, the present proposition is the same as that previously posited with regard to non-organic knowledge. (b) Another way in which this knowledge could be immaterial would be that it is not extended in any way. In this case much more is asserted than the fact that it is not organic. For although everything organic is extended inasmuch as it is received into something extended [viz. the organ], this is not the only reason. It would still be extended if it were received immediately by the composite as a whole, because the composite is itself extended. (c) Immateriality can be understood in a third sense, namely with reference to the object, inasmuch as this knowledge considers the object under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting from the "here and now" and such like, which are said to be material conditions. If we would prove this knowledge to be immaterial in the second sense and not merely in the first our proposed conclusion would follow all the more. But it seems that the only way we could do this would be from the conditions which characterise the object of such an act (unless perhaps we could do so on the basis of reflection, since we experience ourselves reflecting on this act of knowledge, for what has quantity is not capable of reflecting upon itself.) At any rate the proof of the antecedent ultimately rests upon the object of this act.

The proof is as follows. We possess some knowledge of an object under an aspect it could not have as an object of sense knowledge ; therefore, etc.—Proof of the antecedent : (i) We experience in ourselves that we

know the actual universal. (ii) We experience that we know being or quality under a more general notion than that characteristic of the primary object of even the highest sense faculty. (iii) We experience that we also know relations that follow from the nature of things, even when the latter are not capable of being perceived by the senses. (iv) We experience that we distinguish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such. (v) We experience that we know conceptual relations, which are second intentions, such as that of the universal, the genus, the species, the judgment and other logical intentions. (vi) We also experience that we know the very act whereby we know these things and we experience that this act exists within us. This we do by an act of reflection upon the direct act and its recipient. (vii) We experience that we assent to propositions such as the first principles without a possibility of error or contradiction. (viii) We also experience that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning, so that we are unable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the reasoning process or to the conclusion that is inferred. But the knowledge of any of these cannot be attributed to any sensitive faculty ; therefore, etc.—Should a contentious individual deny that such acts are present in man or that he experiences these acts in himself, a person ought not to argue with him any further, but he ought to be told that he is a brute animal. It is the same with one who says : “I do not see colour here”. We should not argue with such a one but simply tell him : “You need senses because you are blind”. And so by a certain “sense”, namely internal perception, we experience these acts within ourselves. Hence, if someone were to deny their existence we would have to say that he is not a man because he lacks this interior vision which others experience.—The assumption that a sense faculty is not the source of any of these acts [viz. (i) to (viii)] is proved as follows : The actual universal has such an indifference

about it that what is known in this way can be predicated simultaneously of all the singulars of which it is characteristic ; no sense faculty, however, knows things in this way. The same is even more evident as regards the second, for no faculty can know something under an aspect more universal than that of its proper object, even as vision perceives nothing under some aspect common to colour and to sound. Consequently, a knowledge of something in even more general terms than that characteristic of the first object of even the highest sense cannot be a sensation. The same holds true of the fourth, for no sensation can distinguish between the most universal of all sensible objects and that which is not sensible, because it cannot perceive both extremes. This is also true of the relations which exist between things imperceptible to the senses or between such things and those which can be perceived by the senses, for the sense faculty has no ability to perceive such relationships. And this is all the more true of those relations which are purely conceptual, since the senses can be moved to perceive only what is included in a sensible object as such. But conceptual relations are not included in any existing thing as such, whereas the senses have to do with existing things as existing. The same argument could be applied to the actual universal, for it is absurd that the actual universal should exist as such. The other, regarding our ability to reflect upon the act and the faculty, is proved from the fact that anything that has quantity cannot reflect upon itself. As for the other two (viz. the act of judgment and the assent to the same or the act of reasoning and the assent given to the evidence for the same), what was said of conceptual relations proves these acts do not proceed from a sense faculty, for neither of these two exist without a conceptual relation.

[*b. Proof of the consequent*]. The consequence of the first enthymeme ⁹ is proved as follows :

[*First proof*]. If we formally possess such an act, since

it is not our substance as such—for it is not always present in us—it follows, therefore, that this act needs a proper subject. Now the latter cannot be something extended, whether it be a part of the organism or the whole composite, for then this operation itself would be extended and would lack the prescribed characteristics. Neither would it be concerned with such objects as have been described above. Hence, it is necessary that this act be in us in virtue of something unextended and that the latter be formally in us. Now this can be nothing else than the intellective soul, for every other form is extended.

[*Second proof*]. Another way to prove this consequence would be to consider the condition of the object of this act, for if any form inferior to the intellective form functions, it is always with reference to an object having characteristics the very opposite of those cited above.¹⁰ Therefore, if we have an operation which regards an object under the aforementioned aspects, this will not be present in us in virtue of any form other than the intellective. Hence, it is by reason of this form that it is present in us, and consequently the intellective form itself is formally in us, for otherwise we would not formally function in this way.

[*Third proof*]. We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man, namely volition, for man is master of his acts to such an extent that it is within his power to determine himself at will to this or to its opposite, as has been said in BK. II, dist. xxii or xxiii, q. iii.* And this is something known by natural reason and not merely by faith. Such a lack of determination, however, cannot exist in any organic or extended appetite, because every organic or material appetite is determined to a certain class of suitable objects so that what is apprehended cannot be unsuitable nor can the appetite fail to seek it. The will, therefore, by which we can will in such an indeterminate way, is not the appetite of a

* *Opus oxoniense*, II, dist. xxv, q. unica (Vivès ed.).

material form, and in consequence it belongs to something which excels every such form. But this is just what we assume the intellective form to be. And therefore, if this appetite is formally in us inasmuch as its act is in us, it follows that this form is our form.

[*Second Proposition: The intellective soul is immortal*]. The method of dealing with the second proposition, viz. that the intellective soul is immortal, is the same as that used with the first. The testimony of those philosophers who held this is adduced first.

[*Arguments for immortality: 11 Arg. 1*]. Aristotle, in *De anima*, BK. II,* says that the "intellect differs from the rest as what is eternal differs from what is perishable". And if someone objects that it is something different and apart only in so far as its operations are concerned, the proposed conclusion still follows, for according to Aristotle in *De anima*, BK. I,† if it can be set apart by reason of its operations it can also exist apart.

[Arg. II]. Furthermore, in *De anima*, BK. III,‡ he says that the senses differ from the intellect, because something that stimulates the sense excessively tends to impair it so that afterwards even an object that does not stimulate the sense so strongly is less capable of being perceived, whereas such is not the case with the intellect. Quite the contrary, once the highest intelligibles have been grasped what is less intelligible becomes even better known. The intellect consequently is not weakened in function, and from this it follows further, the intellect is imperishable in its being.

[Arg. III]. Also, in *Metaphysics*, BK. XII, c. i,** he says: "The causes that produce motion, for instance, exist previously whereas those which are the essence, that is, the substantial form, exist simultaneously (*Add 'with the effect considered as a whole'*). For when a man is healthy, then health also exists. . . . But we must inquire whether anything remains afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this, for instance

* II, cap. ii (413^b, 25).

† III, cap. iv (429^a, 29-429^b, 4).

‡ II, cap. ii (413^b, 29-31).

** XII, cap. iii (1070^a, 21 ff.).

the soul may be of this sort—not all the soul, but the intellect”. Hence, what Aristotle wishes to say is that the intellect is the form which exists after the composite ceases to exist, even though this form does not exist prior to the composite.

[Arg. iv]. Also, he says in his work *De generatione animalium**: “It remains for the intellect alone to enter from the outside”. Hence, the intellect does not receive existence by way of generation but rather from an extrinsic cause; consequently, it cannot cease to exist by perishing. Neither can any inferior cause corrupt the soul since its existence does not come under the power of any such cause, for it owes its existence directly to a higher cause.

[Arg. v]. Also, some arguments can be constructed from the dicta of the Philosopher. One of his principles is that a natural desire is not in vain.¹² Now the soul has a natural desire to exist forever.

[Arg. vi]. Also, in *Metaphysics*, BK. VII,† he has this to say: “Matter is that in virtue of which a thing can exist or not exist”. Therefore, according to him, whatever has no matter lacks the capacity to be non-existent. Now the intellectual soul, according to him, is devoid of matter since it is a simple form.

[Arg. vii]. Also, in *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK. III,‡ he says that a brave man must expose himself to death for the state. And this he appears to repeat in BK. IX of the same work.** Now he speaks according to the dictates of natural reason. Consequently, the immortality of the soul can be known by natural reason. Proof of this consequence: No-one is obliged or is even able to seek his complete non-existence for the sake of some virtuous good whether that good be something in himself or in another or a good of the community, for according to Augustine a person cannot desire non-existence.†† If the soul were not immortal, however, the one who is dying would be accepting complete non-existence.

* *De generatione animalium*, II, cap. iii (736^b, 28).

† VII, cap. xv (1039^b, 29).

‡ *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, cap. vii (1117^b, 8).

** IX, cap. viii (1169^a, 20).

†† III, cap. viii (Migne, P.L., XXXII, 1282).

[Arg. viii]. Also, one teacher¹³ argues as it were from the words of the Philosopher as follows : What perishes, perishes by reason of its contrary or because it lacks some necessary prerequisite for its existence. The intellective soul, however, has no contrary. Neither is the existence of the body a necessary prerequisite for the soul's existence, since the soul possesses its own proper *per se* existence. The latter is the same whether the soul is in the body or out of it. The only difference is that when the soul is in the body, it communicates its existence to the body, whereas when it is outside it does not do so.

[Arg. ix]. Also, what is simple cannot be separated from itself. The soul is simple ; therefore, it cannot be separated from itself, nor can it, in consequence, be separated from its existence, for it does not have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself. It is otherwise with something composite which has existence in virtue of the form. This form can be separated from matter, thus destroying the existence of the composite.

[*Arguments against immortality*: Arg. i]. The Philosopher, however, seems to take the opposite view, for at the end of *Metaphysics*, bk. vii,* he expresses the opinion that the only parts which could be separated from the whole are the elements, i.e. the material parts, for in this sense he understands elements here. In addition to these elements it is necessary to assume the existence of some form in the whole which is the totality of that which exists. This form could not exist in separation from the material part once the whole no longer exists. Hence, if he grants that the intellective soul is the form of man, as is evident from the proof of the preceding proposition, he does not admit that it exists in separation from matter, once the whole no longer exists.

[Arg. ii]. Likewise, it seems to be one of his principles that what begins to exist ceases to exist. Hence, in his work *De caelo et mundo*,† against Plato, he seems to consider it impossible that anything could have come into

* vii, cap. xvii (1041^b, 12 ff.).

† i, cap. x (279^b, 31-32) ; cap. xii (282^b, 4).

existence and still be eternal and imperishable. And in the *Physics* he says * : "Whatever has a beginning has an end".

[*Scotus's Opinion*]. It can be stated that although there are probable reasons for this second proposition, these are not demonstrative, nor for that matter are they even necessary reasons.¹⁴

[*Reply to the arguments for immortality*]. The testimonies of the philosophers—the first way used to prove the proposition—can be solved in two ways. First of all, it is doubtful what the Philosopher really held on this point, for he speaks differently in different places and has different principles, from some of which one thing seems to follow whereas from others the very opposite can be inferred. Wherefore, it is probable that he was always doubtful about this conclusion and at one time seems to be drawn to one side and at other times to the other depending on whether the subject matter he was treating at the moment was more in accord with the one or with the other.

Another answer, and one more in accord with facts, is that not all the statements by the philosophers were established by proofs both necessary and evident to natural reason. Frequently, what they gave was nothing more than rather persuasive probable arguments or what was commonly held by earlier philosophers. For this reason, the Philosopher in *De caelo et mundo*, bk. II,† in the chapter on the two difficult questions, says : "We must now attempt to state the probable solution, for we regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence". Hence, in those matters where they could find nothing better without contradicting the principles of philosophy, "slight indications" frequently had to suffice for the philosophers. As he says in the same chapter : "Accounts of other stars are given by the

* III, cap. iv (203^b, 9).

† II, cap. xii (291^b, 25-29 ; 292^a, 6 ff.).

Egyptians and Babylonians . . . from whom many of our beliefs about particular stars are derived". Therefore, the philosophers agreed to things sometimes because of probable persuasive reasons, at other times because they had asserted as principles, propositions which were not necessary truths. And this reply would suffice for all the testimonies cited above ; even if they clearly asserted the proposed conclusion, they still do not establish it. Nevertheless, these arguments can be answered in order as follows.

[To 1]. To the first : Aristotle understands this separation to mean nothing more than that the intellect does not use the body in performing its operation, and for this reason it is incorruptible as to function. This is to be understood in the sense that it is unlike an organic power which perishes precisely because the organ decays. This type of decay pertains exclusively to an organic faculty. For according to the Philosopher in *De anima*,* BK. I, if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would indeed see as well as the youth. Hence, the faculty of vision grows weak or decays only from the standpoint of its organ and not in so far as its operation directly is concerned. From the fact that the intellect, however, is incapable of decay in the sense that it has no organ by which it could perish, it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable as to function in an unqualified sense, for then it would indeed follow that it is also imperishable in being as the argument maintains. What does follow is this. So far as its ability to operate alone is concerned, the intellect is incapable of dissolution in the same sense that an organic power is corruptible. Absolutely speaking, however, the intellect is assumed to be perishable according to the Philosopher's statement in *De anima*, BK. III,† that the intellect perishes in us once the interior sense perishes. And this is just what one would have to maintain if he assumed the soul to be a principle which has an operation proper to the composite

* I, cap. iv (408^b, 18-30).

† III, cap. v (430^a, 23) ; I, cap. i (403^a, 7-10).

as a whole. The composite, however, is perishable. Consequently, its operative principle is also perishable. That the soul is the operative principle of the whole composite and that its operation is also that of the whole is just what Aristotle seems to say in *De anima*, BK. I.*

[To II]. To the next, I say that an excessively stimulating object damages the senses only incidentally inasmuch as it damages the organ by disrupting that balance which constitutes the quality of being properly disposed. On the other hand, since the intellect has no organ, it is not damaged by a more highly intelligible object. But from this it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable unless it first be proved that it does not depend for existence on a composite being that can perish.

[To III]. To the third argument based on *Metaphysics*, BK. XII, some reply that Aristotle assumes this as something doubtful since he uses the word "perhaps".—However, he does not say "perhaps" when he speaks of the intellect persisting after the whole, but says: "Not all the soul, but the intellect". Only afterward does he add: "For it is *perhaps* impossible that all [the parts of the soul . . .]", where he doubts whether it is possible for the entire soul to outlive the composite. Nevertheless, he has no doubts that the intellect does not depend for its existence on the whole composite which is perishable.

If Aristotle expressly asserts this, then it can be said that he was convinced of this because of probable reasons and not because it was anything demonstrated to him by necessary reasons.

[To IV]. As for the other, it is very doubtful what Aristotle held in regard to the origin of the intellectual soul. For if he assumed that God does not immediately produce anything new, but merely moves the heaven with an eternal movement and this only as a remote agent, then by what separate¹⁵ agent did Aristotle assume the soul was produced from without? If you

* I, cap. v, passim.

say it was by one of the Intelligences, then we encounter a double difficulty ; one, because an Intelligence cannot create a substance (as I prove in BK. IV, dist. i) * ; the other, because such a being cannot immediately produce anything new any more than God could, for according to the Philosopher's principles regarding the immutability of the agent it follows that the action of such a being is eternal. Neither do we see any way in which Aristotle could claim that the intellective soul is the effect of some natural agent ¹⁶ without violating his principles, because he seems to assume the soul to be imperishable in *Metaphysics*, BK. XII.† And no form that is the effect of a natural agent is imperishable in an unqualified sense.

But it can be said that he assumed the soul received existence immediately from God and that this existence was something new. For it would follow readily enough from his principles that it would have received existence, since Aristotle assumed no eternal bodiless pre-existence ; neither did he hold that the soul existed previously in some other body ; nor does it seem possible according to reason that a soul which presupposes no material principle could have received its existence from anyone other than God.

To the contrary : If this explanation were true, Aristotle would have admitted creation.—I reply that this does not follow, for he did not assume a production of the intellective soul distinct from the production of the composite, just as he did not assume one production for fire and another for the fire form. What he posited was the animation of the organic body and this incidentally involved the production of its soul. Now we admit two types of production, one from the soul's non-existence to existence and this we call creation, the other is the passage of the body from an inanimate to an animate state and this is the production of a living body by a change in the proper sense of the word. If anyone, therefore, were to assume merely the second type of production

* *Opus oxoniense*, IV, dist. i, q. i, n. 28.

† XII, cap. iii (1070^a, 25-28).

he would not thereby postulate a creation. And this was the case with Aristotle.

But even if you avoid asserting a creation according to Aristotle, how is it possible to save the idea that something new is produced by an agent that is immutable?—I reply that the only way is to explain what is new in terms of something in the patient or recipient of the action. According to Aristotle, if a new effect depended solely upon the active cause, some variation in the efficient cause itself would be required. But a new effect that depends upon both the recipient and the agent can be accounted for in terms of something new in the recipient alone and not in the agent. And thus we could say that in the present instance God by a natural necessity changed an organic body into a living substance just as soon as the body was capable of receiving life. And natural causes will determine just when the latter becomes ready to receive it, and hence at this moment God produces this new change so that it comes to life.

But why must this new entity be attributed to God as to its [immediate] efficient cause?—I reply that the reason is this. Just as God, the first agent, is continually operating by some action on a patient which remains constantly in the same condition according to Aristotle, so likewise if something is capable of receiving some new form which cannot be caused by any secondary cause, God must be its immediate cause; and yet for all that something new comes into existence. For it is necessary to postulate some active potency that corresponds to every passive potency. Now if there is no such created cause corresponding to the new passive potency, then its immediate corresponding cause will be divine.

[To v]. The other argument about the natural desire will be answered in the reply to the initial arguments,¹⁷ for the first three proceed from this notion.

[To vi]. As for the argument about matter in *Metaphysics*, BK. VII,* this description of matter holds not merely

* VII, cap. xv (1039^b, 29).

in the sense that a thing which has matter as one of its parts is able to exist and not exist, but also that a thing composed of matter or received into matter is able to exist and not exist. Otherwise the form of fire could not be non-existent, for matter is not a part of the fire form.

[To vii]. To the other about the brave man, there is a great dispute whether according to right reason one must expose himself to death in this way. Be that as it may, one could solve this objection the way the Philosopher does.* One could say that by performing such a great act of virtue, this individual has obtained the highest good, whereas if he had saved his life by omitting this act, he would have deprived himself of this good and what is more, his life would be morally evil. Absolutely speaking it is better to have this greatest good even momentarily than to be without it or to have a long, but a morally evil, life. Wherefore, evident proof is had from this that according to right reason the common good is to be preferred to one's individual good, because even if a man is unaware that his soul is immortal, he is still bound to expose his entire personal good to destruction in order to save the common good. And that must be loved all the more, absolutely speaking, to save which the existence of another is regarded as of little account.

[To viii]. As for the arguments of certain teachers, if the meaning is that the soul has the same *per se* existence¹⁸ in the composite as it has outside the composite, where *per se* existence is understood as contrasted with the existence characteristic of an accident, then the fire form, if it were to exist apart from matter, would also have *per se* existence, and then we could admit that the fire form is imperishable. But if by *per se* existence is meant that characteristic of the composite in the line of substance, then it is false to say that the soul has *per se* existence outside the body. For were such the case, it could not communicate its being to another, for even in what is divine, *per se* being in this sense is incommunicable.

* *Ethica Nicomachea*, ix, cap. viii (1169^a, 15-17).

Hence, there is no way in which the soul has *per se* existence without the body, for if we take the term in the second sense the antecedent of the argument is false, whereas if we take it in the first sense, the consequence is invalid, unless you add that it has this existence naturally and without a miracle. But this latter is something we believe, but it is not known by natural reason.

[To ix]. To the other, not all destruction is the result of separating one thing from another. Take the being of an angel, and let it be assumed as some do that its existence is distinct from its essence.¹⁹ Such a being is not separable from itself and nevertheless it can be destroyed if its existence is succeeded by the opposite of existence.

[*Third Proposition: The human soul will not remain outside the body forever.* Arg. i]. They say that the third proposition can be proved from this that a part which exists outside the whole is imperfect.²⁰ This form [viz. the soul], however, is so noble that it will not remain forever imperfect; therefore it will not exist apart from the composite forever.

[Arg. ii]. Likewise, according to Aristotle in his work *De caelo et mundo*,* nothing unnatural is eternal. But the separation of the soul from the body is unnatural, because it is contrary to the natural inclination of the soul. For according to the Philosopher the soul has a natural inclination to perfect the body.

[*Scotus's Opinion*]. So far as this proposition is concerned, it seems that if the Philosopher had assumed the soul to be immortal, he would have held that it continued to exist outside the body rather than in the body, for everything composed can be destroyed by its contraries.

[Reply to the arguments]. Neither do the reasons given above prove the proposition.

[To i]. The first does not because this major: "The part without the whole is imperfect", is true only of that part which receives some perfection when it is in the

* II, cap. iii (286^a, 18).

composite. Now the soul does not receive perfection but communicates perfection. Consequently, one could twist this argument in favour of the opposite view. For there is nothing absurd about a thing existing apart, even though it does not communicate its perfection to another, so long as it is equally perfect existing in this way. This is clear from the [similar] case of an efficient cause. For it is not repugnant that such a cause should exist without causing an effect. Now the soul, so far as its own being is concerned, is equally perfect whether it is separated from or joined to a body. There is, of course, this difference. As separated, the soul does not communicate its being to another.

[To II]. This also answers the other argument, since there are two kinds of natural inclinations. One regards the primary act or actualisation, and this is the natural inclination of the imperfect for its perfection and is something that accompanies an essential potency in relation to its second act. But there is another inclination towards a second act where the latter is a perfection to be communicated and this is the natural inclination that accompanies an accidental potency. Of the first, it is true that the opposite of the natural inclination is something unnatural and not eternal, because it would imply eternal imperfection, which the Philosopher regards as something improper inasmuch as he has postulated that causes exist in the universe which will in time do away with any imperfection. The second inclination, however, even though it would be forever suspended, implies nothing unnatural in the proper sense of the term since no imperfection is involved. Now the inclination that the soul has for the body is of the second type. Or it can be said with Avicenna that once the soul has perfected the body, this desire of the soul has been sated, since the purpose of this union is that the soul through the medium of the body may acquire those of its perfections which it could not acquire without the senses or without a body.

But if at any time the soul was joined to the body, then it has acquired the perfections that it simply desired to acquire in this way.

[*Evaluation of the a priori proof*]. Of the three propositions used to construct a kind of *a priori* argument in the sense that the proof is based on the nature of the form of man that is to be restored, I say that the first is known by natural reason and that the contrary error, which is proper to Averroes only, is of the very worst kind. Not only is it opposed to theological truth but to philosophical truth as well. For it destroys knowledge itself inasmuch as it denies any act of knowledge distinct from sensation or any act of choice distinct from sense appetite and hence does away with all those virtues which require an act of choice in accord with right reason. One who errs in this way, consequently, should be banished from the company of men who use natural reason.

The other two propositions, however, are not known adequately from natural reason even though there are a number of probable persuasive arguments in their favour.²¹ The reasons for the second, indeed are more numerous as well as more highly probable. For this reason, the Philosopher appears to have held this doctrine more expressly.²² For the third, however, the reasons are fewer. The conclusion, then, which follows from these three propositions is not sufficiently known *a priori* by natural reason.

[Part II. *The A Posteriori Proofs*]

The second way to prove the resurrection is by *a posteriori* arguments. Some probable arguments of this kind were mentioned in the initial arguments, for instance, those concerning the happiness of man. To the latter this argument based on the justice of a rewarding God is added. In the present life the virtuous suffer

more punishments than those who are wicked. It is this line of argument that the Apostle seems to have in mind in the first letter to the Corinthians* : "If with this life only in view we have had hope in Christ, we are of all men the most to be pitied, etc".

[*Evaluation of the a posteriori arguments*]. These *a posteriori* arguments, however, are even less conclusive than the *a priori* proof based on the proper form of man, since it is not clear from natural reason that there is one ruler who governs all men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.²³ It could also be said that the good act is itself sufficient reward for anyone, as Augustine says in the *Confessions*, bk. I † : "For it is even as Thou hast appointed, that every inordinate desire should bring its own punishment", so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin.

It is clear then that when the saints argued *a posteriori* for the proposed conclusion, they did not intend to give anything more than probable persuasive proofs. Gregory, for instance, having put down certain such proofs says ‡ : "Whoever does not wish to believe because of these reasons, let him believe because of faith". The same is true of Paul's teachings in the *Acts*** and in the first epistle to the Corinthians †† where he uses the example of the grain that falls into the earth, or where he argues from the resurrection of Christ that if Christ be risen, the dead will rise again, or where he appeals to the notion of a just reward. Such arguments are nothing else than probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons derived from premises that are matters of belief, as is evident if we examine them individually.

[Part III. Solution to the Question]

To put it briefly, then, we can maintain that natural reason cannot prove that the resurrection is necessary, neither by way of *a priori* reasons such as those based on

* 1 Cor. xv, 19.

† *Confessions*, I, cap. xii (Migne, P.L., xxxii, 670).

‡ *Moralia in Job*, xiv, cap. xl (Migne, P.L., lxxv, 1077).

** Acts, xvii. 31 ; xxvi. 23.

†† 1 Cor. xv.

the notion of the intrinsic principle in man, nor by *a posteriori* arguments, for instance, by reason of some operation or perfection fitting to man. Hence we hold the resurrection to be certain on the basis of faith alone. Furthermore, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, BK. XIII, c. ix,* the second proposition used in the first [or *a priori*] proof [viz. of the immortality of the human soul] is not held because reason dictates this, but solely because of the Gospel† where Christ tells us: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul".

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

To the *first argument* ²⁴: If the argument is based on the notion of natural desire taken in an exact and proper sense, and a natural desire in this sense is not an elicited act but merely an inclination of nature towards something, then it is clear that the existence of such a natural desire for anything can be proved only if we prove first that the nature in question is able to have such a thing. To argue the other way round, therefore, is begging the question. Or if natural desire is taken in a less proper sense, viz. as an act elicited in conformity with the natural inclination, we are still unable to prove that any elicited desire is natural in this sense without first proving the existence of a natural desire in the proper sense of the term.

But suppose that someone were to argue that whatever is immediately desired, once it is known, is something that is desired naturally, since such proneness seems to arise only from some natural inclination. One answer to this objection would be to deny the first statement, since a person with bad habits is inclined to desire immediately whatever is in accord with these habits just as soon as such a thing presents itself. However, if nothing else intervenes, nature of itself is not vicious; neither is it vicious in everyone. Consequently, if everyone

* XIII, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1023).

† Mt. x. 28.

immediately desires such a thing as soon as he knows of it, it would follow that the desire in this case is not vicious. The first answer to this objection, then, is not adequate. Therefore it could be answered like this. We must show that such knowledge is not erroneous but is in accord with right reason. Otherwise, it does not follow that just because everyone, on the basis of an erroneous conception, were immediately to elicit an act of desire, this desire is in accord with an inclination of nature. Indeed, it is rather the opposite that follows. Now it is not clear by natural reason that the argument establishing eternal existence as something desirable is not erroneous, since man must first be shown to be capable of such a thing.

To put it briefly, then, every argument based on natural desire seems to be inconclusive, for to construct an efficacious argument, it would be necessary to show either that nature possesses a natural potency for eternal life, or that the knowledge which immediately gives rise to this desire, where the latter is an elicited act, is not erroneous but in accord with right reason. Now the first of these alternatives is the same as the conclusion to be established.²⁵ The second is more difficult to prove and is even less evident than the conclusion.

As for the proof that man has a natural desire for immortality because he naturally shuns death, it can be said that this proof applies to the brute animal as well as to man. And should some one bring up the statement of the Philosopher in *De generatione et corruptione*, bk. II* that it is better for everything to exist forever than not to exist forever, this is really an argument for the opposite view ; first of all, because it holds equally well for both brute and man, and secondly, because Aristotle himself adds : "Since it is impossible, however, for all things to exist forever because of their great distance from their source, therefore God adopted the remaining alternative and completes the perfection of nature by making generation continuous". It is just as if Aristotle wished to

* *De generatione et corruptione*, II, cap. x (226^b, 25 ff.).

say that since there is a natural desire to exist forever, in those beings incapable of such existence there is a desire for such continued existence as is possible, viz. through the continuity of the species in diverse individuals. And so one could grant that just like the other beings that can be generated, man too has a natural desire to exist forever—not indeed in a single individual, but in a continual succession of individuals.

As for the principle that one flees from one thing only because he loves its opposite, however, it appears that this is always valid. We can admit that it follows from this principle that if one shuns death now, he loves life now, and the same can be said at any given moment. But from this it does not follow that he loves to live forever.

To that argument from the Apostle, I reply that we who do not wish [to be unclothed or who are averse to dying] are we who are made certain or inspired by faith. We are indeed naturally averse to dying inasmuch as such an aversion is in accord with an inclination of nature. But it is not known to natural reason that this aversion is in accord with an inclination of nature.

To the *second argument* : I concede that it is true man naturally seeks happiness not only in general but also in particular, as will be made clear in distinction XLIX.* But it is not known by natural reason that man naturally desires that particular beatitude which consists in what we believe it to consist,²⁶ for it would be necessary to know by natural reason that such an act pertains to us as an end. Consequently, when you prove by the Philosopher that not only is beatitude in general desired naturally (from *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 1)† but also beatitude in particular (from bk. x),‡ I reply that the beatitude which the Philosopher considered particular, namely the beatitude which consisted in the most perfect speculation about the highest causes, is in fact a knowledge through universals.²⁷ By descending to particulars, then, Aristotle

* *Opus oxoniense*, IV, dist. XLIX, q. ix, nn. 2–3 (Vivès, VOL. XXI, 318).

† *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, cap. vii (1097^b, 1ff.).

‡ x, cap. vii–viii (117^a, 12ff.).

did not seem to go beyond the most perfect speculation possible in this life. Hence, having inquired into the nature of this happiness of man, Aristotle adds ²⁸ : "To be happy it is necessary for man that his body be healthy, that he have food, companionship, that he does not crave too much or want too much". Since we assume that man is capable of a speculation far more perfect than anything possible in this life, the special happiness which we postulate is not known naturally to be our end, neither is it known naturally that we seek it as an end.

When you argue from Augustine's proof that happiness cannot be anything but eternal, a person who holds that human happiness is possible in this life will reply that he does wish to lose it. For according to right reason, he must wish whatever is the lot of his nature. But to a person who has no faith, right reason seemingly reveals the lot of our nature to be mortal both in body and soul. Therefore, he must wish to lose life and therefore to lose the happy life. And when you say that such a life is not happy which had not been loved by the one who possessed it, this is true only if such a life had not been loved at a time when it was both possible and fitting to have it. But it is not known by natural reason that to be happy forever is something in accord with our nature.

As for the other [or *third* argument], we grant that man knows he can attain his end in some individual, and consequently, that he knows he can attain happiness in the degree recognised to be man's end. When you say that such happiness is not possible in this life, I reply that this impossibility is not known by natural reason. When you adduce the misfortune, bodily infirmity, imperfection of virtue and knowledge, the answer is that these are inconsistent with the type of perfect happiness known to be characteristic of an Intelligence ²⁹ but they are not inconsistent with the happiness known to be within the reach of man.

To the *fourth*, it might be said that in the universe it is the species that will go on forever through the continuous succession of individuals. It is this which the Philosopher postulated by his doctrine of continuous generation. But it is not the life of any single individual or individuals within the species that will continue to exist.

From all this it is apparent how much thanks must be given to our Creator, who through faith has made us most certain of those things which pertain to our end and to eternal life—things about which the most learned and ingenious men can know almost nothing according to Augustine's statement in *De Trinitate*, BK. XIII, c. ix* : "Scarcely a few, etc".³⁰ "But if faith be there—that faith which is to be found in those to whom [Jesus] has given the power to become the sons of God—there is no question about it,"³¹ for of this He has made those who believe in Him most certain.

* XIII, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1023).

NOTES

NOTES

SECTION I

¹ The mss read either *phicos* or *phycos*. The text is faulty here as it is in so many other instances. Scotus's meaning, however, seems clear enough.

² *In quid* and *in quale* are two basic modes of predication. They refer primarily to the five predicables of Porphyry, namely, the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident, though Scotus extends the idea of *in quid* and *in quale* predication to the transcendental order. Briefly, the difference between the two is this. To predicate *in quid* means to predicate either the entire essence (i.e. the species) or at least the determinable part of the essence (e.g. the genus). The term is derived from *quiddity* or essence and such predication represents an answer to the question: What is it? (*Quid est?*). To predicate *in quale* means to predicate a further determination or qualification of the essence. This qualification (*quale*) may be either essential (e.g. a specific difference) or non-essential (e.g. a property or accident). Since the specific difference is really a part of the essence or quiddity, Scotus sometimes speaks of it as being predicated *in quale quid* or *in quale substantiale* in order to distinguish it from properties or accidents which are said to be predicated either *in quale accidentale* or simply *in quale*. To predicate something *in quid*, says Scotus, it is not enough that the predicate be an essential note but that it be predicated *per modum subsistentis*, which from the viewpoint of grammar means that it must be predicated as a *noun*, not as an adjective or participle or adverb. Predication *in quale*, whether it be an essential qualification or not, is always predicated *per modum denominantis*, which from the viewpoint of grammar means it is predicated as a modifier. "Substance", "whiteness", "rationality", "rational animal", "life", "truth", "goodness", if used as predicates,

tic usage, if the predicate of a necessary or *per se nota* proposition is part of the essential definition of the subject, the latter is said to "contain the predicate essentially" and the predicate is said to be predicated according to the first mode of *per se* predication. If the predicate, however, is an attribute or property (see above, note 4) it is said to be "contained virtually in the subject" of which it is predicated necessarily and according to the second mode of *per se* predication. Since every modification or qualification presupposes some subject that is modified or qualified, the subject is said to have a natural priority or primacy in regard to the modification or qualification. Applying this to the notion of "being" conceived quidditatively or as a noun, Scotus argues that since "being" is the ultimate subject or determinable element to which every concept not irreducibly simple can be reduced, "being" has a primacy in regard to all such concepts or "primary intelligibles". Since "being" is furthermore the ultimate subject of which the attributes and ultimate differences are predicable, "being" can be said to enjoy a virtual primacy in regard to these notions. Since the latter will express either a property (*proprium*) or an essential determination (specific difference or transcendental modification), Scotus declares that all notions that are ultimate qualifications (such as the attributes like "one", "true", etc., or ultimate differences like "substantial", "infinite", "finite", etc.) are "contained virtually [i.e. as a *proprium*] or essentially [i.e. as a specific difference or transcendental determination] in something else which does include 'being' essentially [i.e. in something which is a primary intelligible]".

⁶ Scotus alludes to the theological teaching that in the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine is no longer present after the act of consecration, though the species or appearances (accidents) remain.

⁷ For the meaning of *irreducibly simple* cf. note 3 above.

⁸ The *simple intellect* or *simple intelligence* is a term applied to the mind or intellect in so far as it is the principle of the act of simple apprehension or intelligence. The scholastics distinguish three acts or functions of the mind or intellect:

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SECTION I

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would be predicated *in quid*, whereas "substantial", "white", "rational", "living", "true", "good", if used as predicates, would be predicated *in quale*. "Being" (*ens*) can be used either as a noun or as a participle. In the first case it is predicated *in quid* and is equivalent to "a being" or "a thing" with a singular and plural. In the second case, if used as a predicate, it is predicated *in quale* or *denominative*. Used as a participle, "being" always requires a subject which it modifies.

- ³ *Ultimate differences* are denominative terms that are irreducibly simple. In regard to concepts that designate real things or some real aspects of real things (*first intentions*), Scotus distinguishes those which are irreducibly simple and those which are not. *Irreducibly simple concepts* (*conceptus simpliciter simplices*) are such as cannot be reduced or broken down into two more simple concepts that are first intentions, one of which is determinable and the other determining. The concept of "man", for instance, can be reduced to "animal" and "rational". "Animal" in turn can be broken down into "sentient" and "organism". This process, according to Scotus, cannot go on indefinitely. Otherwise nothing would be known. Ultimately we arrive at intelligible elements or notions that are incapable of further analysis and hence are irreducibly simple. Restricting ourselves to real concepts, that is "first intentions", we can say, according to Scotus, that there is but one irreducible simple concept that is determinable or quidditative, and that this is "thing" or "being" used as a noun. But there will be as many irreducibly simple differential, determining, or qualifying concepts as there are different concepts, where *different* is taken in the technical Aristotelian sense. (Things *differ*, according to the Stagirite, only if they have something in common; otherwise they are simply *diverse*. Cf. *Metaphysica*, x, cap. iii, 1054^b, 23-30). Since Scotus gives as examples of concepts that are not irreducibly simple that of the individual, the species and the genus, and since even such concepts must contain an ultimate difference, it seems that we can distinguish three types of ultimate differences, according to him: (1) the *haecceitas* or individuating difference; (2) certain kinds of specific differences; (3) tran-

scendental differences, such as those which limit or contract "being" to the ultimate genera or categories, or such notions as "infinite", "necessary", "accidental", etc. According to Scotus, not every specific difference should be considered to be irreducibly simple. Since we are speaking of first intentions we must take into consideration the nature of the reality designated by the concept. Consider the notion "living body". According to Scotus, "living" is derived from and connotes the life principle which is a form or substance really distinct from the body which has its own *forma corporeitatis*. Since the life principle can be designated by a determinable or non-differential notion (e.g. "substance", "thing", "a being") Scotus does not consider the term "living", as applied to an organism or man, as an irreducibly simple concept. Such a specific difference is not ultimate, though further analysis will eventually yield a specific difference that is irreducibly simple (Cf. *Opus oxoniense*, II, d. III, q. vi, n. 12; I, d. III, q. iii, n. 15; II, d. xxv, q. i, n. 16).

⁴ Attributes or properties (*propria* or *passiones*) are those qualifications which are necessarily connected with their respective subject yet do not enter into its essential definition. "Being" has two types or attributes, those which are simply coextensive, such as "one", "true", "good", and those which are coextensive in disjunction such as "infinite-finite", "simple-composed", "necessary-contingent", etc.

⁵ The *primacy of commonness*, or better, of common predication, which Scotus ascribes to being, simply means that "being" conceived quidditatively or as a noun is predicable of anything that can be grasped by a concept that is not irreducibly simple. The *virtual primacy* that Scotus attributes to "being" in reference to its attributes and ultimate differences does not mean that the formal concept or *ratio* "being" contains these notions in such a way that the latter can be abstracted from the former by an act of intellectual abstraction or analysis as some have claimed. It simply means that these other notions or *rationes* are predicable by a necessary or *per se* predication of some subject that can be designated as "a being" or "a thing". According to scholas-

tic usage, if the predicate of a necessary or *per se nota* proposition is part of the essential definition of the subject, the latter is said to "contain the predicate essentially" and the predicate is said to be predicated according to the first mode of *per se* predication. If the predicate, however, is an attribute or property (see above, note 4) it is said to be "contained virtually in the subject" of which it is predicated necessarily and according to the second mode of *per se* predication. Since every modification or qualification presupposes some subject that is modified or qualified, the subject is said to have a natural priority or primacy in regard to the modification or qualification. Applying this to the notion of "being" conceived quidditatively or as a noun, Scotus argues that since "being" is the ultimate subject or determinable element to which every concept not irreducibly simple can be reduced, "being" has a primacy in regard to all such concepts or "primary intelligibles". Since "being" is furthermore the ultimate subject of which the attributes and ultimate differences are predicable, "being" can be said to enjoy a virtual primacy in regard to these notions. Since the latter will express either a property (*proprium*) or an essential determination (specific difference or transcendental modification), Scotus declares that all notions that are ultimate qualifications (such as the attributes like "one", "true", etc., or ultimate differences like "substantial", "infinite", "finite", etc.) are "contained virtually [i.e. as a *proprium*] or essentially [i.e. as a specific difference or transcendental determination] in something else which does include 'being' essentially [i.e. in something which is a primary intelligible]".

⁶ Scotus alludes to the theological teaching that in the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine is no longer present after the act of consecration, though the species or appearances (accidents) remain.

⁷ For the meaning of *irreducibly simple* cf. note 3 above.

⁸ The *simple intellect* or *simple intelligence* is a term applied to the mind or intellect in so far as it is the principle of the act of simple apprehension or intelligence. The scholastics distinguish three acts or functions of the mind or intellect:

(1) simple apprehension, whereby the mind grasps the meaning of something without affirming or denying anything of it; (2) the act of "composition and division", or immediate judgment, whereby the mind affirms or denies some predicate of some subject; (3) the act of reasoning or mediate judgment, by which the mind infers one proposition from another or other propositions.

⁹ Demonstration, according to Aristotle (*Analytica posteriora*, I, cap. xiii) is of two kinds: demonstration of the fact (*demonstratio quia*) and demonstration of the reasoned fact (*demonstratio propter quid*). The first merely establishes that the conclusion of the syllogism is true, but the second additionally indicates the reason why the predicate of the conclusion inheres in the subject. For the middle term of a demonstration of reasoned fact gives the cause or some ontologically prior principle (e.g. the essential definition) that can be considered as the reason or rational explanation why the predicate must be affirmed of the subject. A demonstration of reasoned fact will always be an *a priori* form of demonstration; an *a posteriori* demonstration, on the contrary, will always be a demonstration of the simple fact.

¹⁰ Scotus has previously discussed why God is the subject of theology but not of metaphysics, and to what extent theology verifies the Aristotelian notion of a science.

¹¹ "Its principle", that is, some self-evident or analytical proposition of which it is the subject.

SECTION II

¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 33 ff.

² The statement of Pseudo-Dionysius that we do not know what God is; we know only what he is not (Cf. *De caelesti hierarchia*, II. Migne, P.G., III, 141; see also St John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, iv. Migne P.G., xciv, 800), was often quoted by the scholastics. This *docta ignorantia* was exaggerated by many. Scotus Eriugena, for instance,

suggests that perhaps it might be more correct to say that God is not good, true, just, etc., since any term or concept we might derive from the universe of creatures is so radically inadequate to express what God is that it could more truly be denied of God than affirmed of Him (Cf. *De divisione naturae*, I, xiv ff. Migne, P.L., cxxii, 462 ff.). Duns Scotus reminds us that this way of speaking cannot be taken too seriously. If our knowledge is purely negative, it is no knowledge of God at all.

³ Henry of Ghent makes use of this distinction in his *Summa*, art. xxii, q. i ad iii; q. iv.

⁴ Henry of Ghent, loc. cit., q. iv; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. iii, art. iv ad iii.

⁵ Henry of Ghent, loc. cit.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Henry maintains that God is already known in a most general manner in every concept the human intellect forms of a created object as "this being". Consequently, he is forced to hold that we cannot know a creature without at the same time having some knowledge of God. This knowledge of God in creatures, however, must be distinguished from a knowledge of God as He is in Himself. See *Summa*, art. xxii, q. vi.

⁸ Henry, *Summa*, art. xxiv, q. vi. For Scotus's answer to Henry's arguments, see p. 35.

⁹ Henry contrasts two radically different notions. By privatively undetermined being, he understands the notion of being that applies to creatures. As creatures actually exist, they are qualified or determinate forms of being. For instance, man is a rational, sentient, organic, material, substantial being. Nevertheless, the mind prescind from all these determinations to form a simple concept of being, *undetermined* but *determinable*. The concept of being that applies to God, however, negates or denies all determination and therefore is called negatively undetermined being. God, in a word, is not only being in an unqualified and un-

determined sense, but His being is incapable of any restriction, limitation or determination. Therefore, being in this sense is *undetermined* and *indeterminable*. Now *determinable* and *indeterminable* beings have nothing positive in common; they agree only in what is denied, namely, *determination*. Therefore, our so-called "concept" of being as common to God and creatures is in reality not one concept but two. But because of their similarity, the mind fails to distinguish between the two, even as the eye fails to resolve two distant objects. This dual "concept" is what Henry calls the "analogous concept of being".

- ¹⁰ In scholastic terminology, "indetermination" as applied to God is a *first intention*. It expresses a perfection of a really existent entity, in this case the positive mode of existence, infinity. Indetermination in the second instance, is characteristic not of a real entity, but of our *concept* of being. It is a *second intention*, since it refers not to some condition of reality but to a characteristic of a concept or *ens rationis*.
- ¹¹ Only what is true can be an object of "knowledge" or *scientia* in the strict Aristotelian or scholastic sense of the term. Hence, "false knowledge" is a contradiction in terms. Similarly certitude, in the technical sense of the term, presupposes that the proposition to which the mind gives its firm assent is a true and not a false statement.
- ¹² The intellect, according to the general view of the scholastics, is a dual faculty comprising the active or agent intellect and the passive or possible intellect. This division is based upon an obscure passage in Aristotle's *De anima* (III, cap. v; 430^a, 18) and underwent a variety of interpretations. With Alexander of Aphrodisias, as well as with some scholastic interpretations of Augustinian illumination, the active intellect is identified with God. With Alfarabi and Avicenna, it is a subordinate intelligence or "angel" somehow connected with the moon. St Thomas considers the active intellect to be a faculty of the soul really distinct from the possible intellect. Scotus also considers it to be a property of the soul but regards it as only formally distinct from, but really identical with, the possible intellect and the soul's substance. The general function of the active intellect is

to render the potentially intelligible in the sense image actually intelligible. The additional specific refinements Scotus has given to this general function do not concern us here.

- ¹³ Notions pertaining to the essence of the object (generic, differential or specific notions) are contained "essentially". Colour, for instance, is contained essentially in redness. A notion is regarded as virtually contained in a given object, if the object has the power or *virtus* of producing the notion in the mind. In a broad sense, "virtual" is not opposed to "essential", since the object has the power to produce a concept of what it contains essentially. In addition, however, the object can be said to contain virtually its necessary properties (*propria*) or any effects it is capable of producing. An object such as a golf-ball could produce a simple notion proper of itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of a circle, according to Scotus, for the notion of circularity is virtually contained in the notion of sphericity. Such an object, however, could not give rise to a simple proper notion of a triangle or pentagon.
- ¹⁴ A pure or simple perfection (*perfectio simpliciter*) is one that does not contain in its formal notion any imperfection or limitation. As such it is opposed to mixed perfections (*perfectio secundum quid*) which involve both perfection and imperfection. Knowledge, volition, existence, wisdom and the like are regarded by Scotus as pure perfections. Matter, corporeity, sense knowledge or even knowledge obtained by a reasoning process as contrasted with intuitive knowledge, all involve limitation and imperfection in their very notion.
- ¹⁵ For this discussion see above, pp. 5-9.
- ¹⁶ Scotus distinguishes between two types of objects that move the intellect of a creature to knowledge, one natural, the other voluntary or supernatural. The natural motivating object of an intellect causes knowledge automatically or necessarily, as it were, by the very fact that it is what it is and is co-present to that intellect. Now the divine essence is a natural or adequate motivating object of immediate

and intuitive knowledge only in regard to the divine intellect itself. For any created intellect, God's essence is a purely voluntary object. The reason, says Scotus, lies in this fact that God's essence cannot be related necessarily or automatically, as it were, to any creature or part thereof—a corollary of the absolute independence of the First Being. All relationships between God and creatures are contingent and dependent upon the divine will, the ultimate source of all contingency. Consequently, in the beatific vision of God in heaven, says Scotus, it is not the divine essence as such that moves the intellect but rather the divine will. In this sense, God is a voluntary object. But the peculiarity of the beatific vision lies in the fact that the divine will motivates but does not terminate this act of intuition. And this is something unique in the order of objects and follows from the fact that God's will is really identical with God's essence (Cf. *Quodlibet*, q. xiv).

- ¹⁷ For the distinction between a demonstration of the fact and a demonstration of the reasoned fact see note 9 above. In this particular instance, the demonstration of the fact referred to is an *a posteriori* argument which proceeds from effect (creatures) to cause (God). In such a process, that which is most unlike creatures, and consequently most distinctive of God, is the last to be demonstrated.
- ¹⁸ See Scotus's proof for the existence of God, pp. 56 ff.
- ¹⁹ The less universal and more specific the concept, the greater its comprehension or intension. The concept of man, for instance, contains the more universal notions of "animal", "organism", "substance", "being", in its intension.
- ²⁰ The scholastics list a number of *loci* from which a dialectician may draw his arguments. The *locus a minori* assumes that what is within the power of the less perfect, is also within that of the more perfect. Now the intellect, a purely spiritual faculty, is more perfect than the imagination, an organic faculty.
- ²¹ See p. 17.
- ²² See p. 17.

²³ For a description of this fallacy see Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis*, cap. v (167^b, 1–20).

²⁴ Intuitive knowledge of God is supernatural. See note 16.

²⁵ See p. 17.

²⁶ See pp. 72 ff.

²⁷ See p. 17.

²⁸ See p. 20.

SECTION III

¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see p. 80.

² This is the solution given by Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. xxi, q. i.

³ See Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, cap. iii (270^a, 12–13); cap. xii (281^b, 18 ff.); II, cap. iv (287^a, 23–24); cap. vi (289^a, 8–9); *Metaphysica*, IX, cap. viii (1050^b, 22–24).

⁴ See p. 183, note 17.

⁵ Cf. *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xxxvi, q. unica, n. 5.

⁶ Cf. St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. ii, art. iii corpus, quarta via.

⁷ "Natural" is understood in the technical sense of a cause that acts by a necessity of nature and not deliberately or freely. Efficient causes, according to Scotus, fall into two classes: (1) those which possess antecedent rational knowledge and act deliberately; (2) those which lack such knowledge and act automatically or by a necessity of nature. See *Quaest. in Metaphysicam*, IX, q. xv, n. 4 (Vivès, vol. VII, 608^b ff.) where he divides all active powers into either *nature* or *will*. Here he proves paradoxically that according to Aristotle's division of rational and irrational powers the intellect is "irrational" in the sense that it acts automatically in the presence of evident truth whereas the will is "rational" in the sense that it can freely choose to love or not to love an object known through reason or intellect.

⁸ In an ascending order one progresses by going from the posterior to the prior; in a descending order, from the prior to the posterior. For instance, in regard to a series of temporally ordered causes where one precedes the other in time, many philosophers (e.g. St Bonaventure) deny the possibility of an infinite regress into the past (an ascending order) and use this argument to establish a creation in time, yet they admit the possibility of effects of created causes continuing indefinitely into the future (infinite regress in a descending temporal order). Scotus, as his answer to the objection that follows indicates, denies categorically the possibility of an infinite regress in an ascending order only in regard to essentially ordered causes. Inasmuch as such causes must exist simultaneously to produce a given effect, a chain of such causes will be non-temporal in character.

⁹ According to Aristotle's theory of colour borrowed from Plato (*Timaeus*, 67E), fine particles penetrate and dilate the medium whereas large particles compress it producing white or black colour respectively. Cf. *Metaphysica*, x, cap. vii (1057^b, 8). Hence "dilating" is regarded as a property of anything white, and "white" may be regarded as a *per se* cause of the same.

¹⁰ See Aristotle, *Physica*, II, cap. iii (195^a, 27 ff.); cap. v (196^b, 24-29); *Metaphysica*, v, cap. ii (1013^b, 29ss).

¹¹ See Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, v, cap. xi (1018^b, 9-11).

¹² See p. 43.

¹³ See p. 46.

¹⁴ Scotus contrasts "nature" as a necessarily acting cause with a free agent acting with purpose or deliberation. See above, note 7.

¹⁵ See pp. 50-1.

¹⁶ Cf. Scotus's third conclusion, p. 50.

¹⁷ See pp. 51-2.

¹⁸ A univocal cause is one whose effect is of the same nature as itself. A father, for instance, is the univocal cause of his

son. An equivocal cause, on the contrary, is of a different nature from its effect. For instance the artist is an equivocal cause of his painting. Since the less perfect cannot be the total cause of the more perfect, the total or principal cause, if equivocal, must be more perfect than its effect. This argument seems to presuppose that efficient causality involves no imperfection and therefore will be found in the most excellent nature. Cf. pp. 46 and 49.

¹⁹ Scotus is not attempting to prove numerical or individual unity at this point but rather a unity of nature. To put it in other words, the triple primacy is characteristic of but one *kind* of being. Whether there is more than one individual of this kind is not discussed here but in the following question on the unicity of God (cf. pp. 87 ff.). Scotus's intention is expressed more clearly in the *De Primo Principio*, chapter iii of which parallels the present question of the *Oxoniense*. He proposes "to demonstrate, if Thou wilt grant it, that some one nature is simply first. However, I say one *nature* for this reason, because in this third chapter the aforesaid three primacies will be shown, not about a unique singular or one in number, but about a unique quiddity or nature. There will, however, be mention of numerical unity later." (*De Primo Principio*, cap. iii; Roche translation, p. 39).

²⁰ "Possible" is taken as the contradictory disjunction of "necessary". It designates a being which exists in virtue of another and hence, of itself, is merely possible. Scotus seems to have been influenced by Avicenna's *possibile esse* and *necesse esse*.

²¹ See note 14.

²² Scotus refers to his theory of "natural appetite" in virtue of which appetite every nature seeks its own perfection. This "seeking", however, is not to be understood in the sense of a conscious striving for some known goal but is merely the ontological relation that exists between a thing and whatever can perfect. In this sense, for instance, *matter* seeks or loves *form* and vice versa. In the present case the subject perfected and that which perfects it (viz. the end) are simply

identical. Hence, Scotus argues that if we say the First Agent has a "natural love" of itself, this is equivalent to saying that it is its own perfection or it is itself.

²³ See Aristotle, *Physica*, viii, cap. vi (259^b, 32 ff.); *De caelo*, ii, cap. iii (286^a, 34 ff.); *De generatione et corruptione*, ii, cap. x (336^a, 23 ff.); *Metaphysica*, xii, cap. vi-vii (1072^a, 9 ff.).

²⁴ A subject is said to be in contradictory potency to something if it can either have it or not have it. The argument here is this. If thought can either be present or absent so far as the nature itself is concerned, then to think requires some effort on the part of the nature and this would eventually produce weariness.

²⁵ The first act or actualisation of a being is that it exists with its various faculties or powers. Thus, for instance, so far as man's body is endowed or informed by the human soul, man is in *first act*. When a man actualises his human faculties or powers by acts of seeing, thinking, willing, etc., he is in *second act*. For Scotus, a rational nature achieves its highest perfection by loving the highest good.

²⁶ *Activum* implies an immanent operation, that is one which is not only initiated by the subject but remains in and perfects that subject. Vital activities such as thought, volition and the like are immanent operations. *Factivum*, on the other hand, implies that the operation is transient, that is, has a term outside the agent. Man's artifacts are produced by a transient activity.

²⁷ Cf. St Thomas, *Sent.*, i, dist. xxxv, q. i, art. i ad iii; *Summa theologica*, i, q. xiv, art. ii.

²⁸ Scotus uses the term *ratio intelligendi* (literally "the reason for knowing"). The allusion here is probably to the notion of an "intelligible species", which in human knowledge is supposed to substitute for the object in such a way as to make universal concepts possible. Even if one were to postulate something analogous to the species in regard to God's knowledge, it would still be identical with His essence and intellect.

²⁹ Since whatever receives something is perfected by the form received, it would follow that the more perfect knowledge would be perfected by the less perfect.

³⁰ See *Quaest. in Metaphysicam*, VII, q. xv, n. 9.

³¹ "Infinity" is regarded here as a degree of intensity which the perfection in question possesses. Scotus distinguishes between intensive and extensive infinity. A thing is said to be extensively infinite if there is no pure perfection (cf. p. 182, note 14) which it does not possess. Nothing, however, is said in regard to the intensity or degree to which such perfections are possessed. Each pure perfection, however, is said to be intensively infinite if it exists in the highest degree possible for that respective perfection. Thus God would not be extensively infinite if He lacked knowledge and love. But His knowledge is intensively infinite if it is a comprehensive knowledge of all that can be known, including His infinitely intelligible nature.

³² Cf. e.g. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, II, v (994^a, 1-2).

³³ Scotus distinguishes between the omnipotence of God as an article of his Catholic creed (omnipotence in the proper sense of the term) and the infinite power of God (omnipotence in a qualified sense) as demonstrated philosophically by reason unaided by faith (Cf. *Quodlibet*, q. vii; *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xlii, q. unica). In this distinction we see the influence of the philosophy of Alfarabi and Avicenna. The latter, influenced by Plotinus's theory of emanation, maintained that God can create only one being immediately, viz. the highest Intelligence. This creature in turn produces subordinate Intelligences. The creation of the earth as well as the heavenly bodies and their souls is the work of these created Intelligences. Even in this theory, however, God is the ultimate cause of all things that emanate directly or indirectly from Him, and therefore the First Cause in some qualified sense at least is omnipotent. As a theologian, however, Scotus could not subscribe to this view, for according to his theology, he believed that whatever God can do through the medium of the secondary cause He has created He can do directly or immediately if He so willed. But Scotus makes this much of a concession to

Arabic philosophy, namely, that in our present state we can only demonstrate that God can create all things either mediately or immediately and in this sense God's power must be infinite intensively. We can give only probable arguments for omnipotence in the proper sense of the term, according to him, and cannot demonstrate that God could create all possible things immediately.

³⁴ See, for instance, Aristotle's doctrine (cf. note 23). Also Averroes, *Physica*, VIII, com. 9; *Metaphysica*, VII, com. 28; IX, com. 41, etc.; Avicenna, *Metaphysices compendium*, I, pars iv, tr. ii, cap. I, etc.

³⁵ See, for instance, St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. xlv, art. v ad iii; Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. xxxv, q. vi; *Quodlibet* IV, q. xxxvii.

³⁶ The classical definition of creation is *esse post non-esse*, that is "existence after non-existence". The question arises: How is *post* or "after" to be understood? The obvious interpretation is to take it in a temporal sense. Avicenna, however, to reconcile the dogma of divine creation and the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world understood *post* in an ontological sense, viz. that the nature of a creature considered absolutely or in itself does not imply existence. Since any thing it possesses in addition to its nature is subsequent to that nature, existence can be said to be subsequent or "after" non-existence. Following Avicenna, St Thomas, Scotus and others tend to interpret this definition in an ontological rather than a temporal sense.

³⁷ See note 28.

³⁸ See pp. 50 and 77.

³⁹ See pp. 49-50.

⁴⁰ See *Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. iii, q. iii, nn. 10, 24, 28; dist. ii, q. vii, n. 42, etc. Briefly, intuition is a simple or non-discursive knowledge of something *as existing*. Abstract knowledge prescind from actual existence or non-existence.

⁴¹ Cf. St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. vii. art. i; *Contra gentiles*, I, cap. xlv, etc.

- ⁴² St Thomas, *Sent.*, II, dist. iii, q. i, art. i; *Summa theologica*, I, q. I, art. ii. See E. Hocedez's introduction to *Aegidii Romani theorematum de esse et essentia* (Louvain, 1930), pp. 17 ff., regarding the particular interpretation to which Scotus is referring.
- ⁴³ In his analysis of a given entity, Scotus often arranges the various perfections or *rationes* the mind distinguishes therein according to an ontological priority, accordingly as one *ratio* presupposes the other for its existence but not vice versa. To conceive the entity under some prior *ratio* in order to discover what additional attributes are implied in virtue thereof is to conceive it according to a *prior instance of nature*.
- ⁴⁴ St Thomas, *Sent.*, II, dist. xliii, q. i, art. i; *Summa theologica*, I, q. vii, art. I.
- ⁴⁵ See p. 39.
- ⁴⁶ See pp. 30-31.
- ⁴⁷ See p. 39.
- ⁴⁸ See pp. 57-8.
- ⁴⁹ See p. 39.
- ⁵⁰ That is to say, a kind of one-to-one correspondence exists between the two by reason of certain essential likenesses or similarities.
- ⁵¹ See p. 39.
- ⁵² Cf. Aristotle, *Physica*, VIII, cap. i (251^a, 8-252^a, 4).
- ⁵³ See p. 40.
- ⁵⁴ Magnitude is considered as being finite by nature. Cf. the first argument in the *contra*, p. 40.

SECTION IV

¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 98 ff.

² Cf. Aristotle, *Topica*, II, cap. x (114^b, 33).

³ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, cap. v (Migne, P.G., III, 819); St Bonaventure, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, q. i, art. i (Quaracchi, VOL. V, 47^a); Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, II, cap. i (993^b, 24-31).

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Topica*, III, cap. I (117^a, 16); St Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III, cap. ix, xi (Migne, P.L., XXXII, 1282, 1288).

⁵ This argument and its accompanying refutation have been added later by Scotus as some manuscripts indicate.

⁶ William of Ware, *Sent.* I, dist. ii. q. ii (Muscat ed. in *Antonianum*, II (1927), 344-350). For Scotus's reply, see pp. 97 f.

⁷ *Opus oxoniense*, prol. q. iii, n. 12.

⁸ The "natural will" and "natural love" according to Scotus are not elicited acts or operations at all. They are merely the ontological relation of perfectibility that exists between whatever can be perfected and that which perfects it (cf. section III, note 22). In this case, everything may be said to love itself, i.e. its own perfection. Only if the thing is a part can it be said to love the whole more than itself since the whole is the perfection of the part. Similarly, God as the ultimate perfection of rational creatures is loved naturally more than the creature itself.

⁹ To use as a means something that should be loved as an end is a perversion of love.

¹⁰ Beatitude in the technical sense implies that the object exhausts the potentialities of the rational being so that the latter is perfectly satisfied and is at rest in the possession of this object. Such an object is necessary to the happiness of this being and therefore it could not be destroyed without destroying the happiness.

¹¹ Cf. the preceding question, pp. 42 ff.

¹² St Bonaventure, *Sent.* I, dist. ii, art. i, q. i ad iv; William of Ware, *Sent.* I, dist. ii, q. i.

¹³ See p. 90.

¹⁴ See pp. 28–9, the third statement.

¹⁵ See p. 89.

¹⁶ See p. 89.

¹⁷ See p. 89.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, cap. ii (269^a, 19–20).

¹⁹ See p. 89.

²⁰ St Bonaventure, *Sent.* I, dist. ii, a. i, q. I ad. ii.

SECTION V

¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 139, 130 ff.

² Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. i, q. ii.

³ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, III, cap. iv (999^a). See Henry's interpretation of this passage, *Summa*, art. i, q. ii.

⁴ Scotus summarises the teaching of Henry in *Summa*, art. i, q. iii.

⁵ Note added by Scotus, according to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript.

⁶ Scotus, following St Augustine, uses the term Academician and sceptic as synonyms. The Academicians or Academics were the adherents of Plato, so called because Plato used to deliver his discourse in the Academy at Athens. The Academy continued after Plato's death and was characterised at different periods of its existence by different philosophical trends. Scepticism, it seems, was introduced by Arcesilas, the founder of the Middle Academy, and later modified by Carneades, who dominated the Third Academy. Cf. St Augustine, *Contra Academicos*.

⁷ See p. 108.

⁸ A marginal note in the Assisi manuscript indicates that the subsequent passage is not found in Scotus's own copy.

⁹ Cf. note 25 of sect. III. Here the objector argues: By life or being alive Augustine means nothing more than that the

body has a life principle, viz. the soul, which is its primary or first actualisation. He does not mean that the soul is conscious, that is, that we are in second act.

¹⁰ Note added by Scotus.

¹¹ Additional note by Scotus.

¹² Cf. Aristotle's definition of the perfect syllogism, which is a syllogism of the first figure. *Analytica priora*, I, cap. ii (24^b, 22 ff.), cap. iv (26^b, 29 ff.).

¹³ Cf. note 9 of sect. I.

¹⁴ *Opus oxoniense*, prol. q. iii, n. 13; I. dist. viii, q. v, n. 24.

¹⁵ Note added by Scotus.

¹⁶ An additional note of Scotus.

¹⁷ See pp. 108 f.

¹⁸ Note added by Scotus.

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet*, IV, qq. vii, viii, xxiii; v, q. iv.

²⁰ See pp. 109 f.

²¹ The acts of "intelligence" as distinguished from "reasoning" are of two kinds: (a) simple apprehension or intelligence whereby the mind grasps the meaning of something without affirming or denying anything of it, and (b) the act of "composition and division", that is, the act of judgment, in which the mind affirms or denies some predicate of the subject of the proposition.

²² The active intellect, according to Scotus, is not really distinct from the soul. Hence, it is a more perfect effect of God than would be the impression or accidental effect produced in the soul by God, the Uncreated Light.

²³ This or some similar qualification must be added, because according to Scotus, the will or faculty of love is more noble than either the active or possible intellect.

²⁴ The marginal note in the Assisi manuscript, *non in libro Scoti*, indicates that the passage in the Latin text within parentheses is not found in Scotus's own copy.

- ²⁵ Cf. p. 105. The elaborate attempt to "save face" for St Augustine in this fifth article not only indicates the esteem in which Scotus held the saint but it also illustrates the cardinal principle he uses in interpreting other thinkers. "I wish to give the most reasonable interpretation to their words that I possibly can" (*Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. viii, q. v, n. 8). The intricate and subtle explanation that follows is typical of the reasoning that earned Scotus the title *Doctor subtilis*.
- ²⁶ According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, the subsequent section in parentheses in the Latin text is missing in Scotus's own copy.
- ²⁷ Scotus tells us (*Opus oxoniense*, I, dist. xliii, q. unica) that prior to their actual existence, God knows all possible creatures whether they shall ever be given existence or not. Absolutely speaking, these creatures may consequently be said to "have an intelligibility" or *esse intelligibile*; this, however, is dependent upon the divine intellect so that one can say that God does not know these things because they are intelligible, but rather they are intelligible because God knows them. For in knowing the possible, God gives it a kind of "existence", viz. that characteristic of the content or object of thought. Even though the human intellect in the present life has no immediate intuitive knowledge of God, of the divine intellect or its thought content, it still remains true that the ultimate reason why the notions derived from created objects are intelligible is because God first gave them intelligibility in knowing them. This intelligibility or meaning can be called the "eternal light" in a qualified sense. And all propositions that are evident from the meaning of the terms can be said to be seen in the eternal light.
- ²⁸ Only something that exists in the proper sense of the word can be an efficient cause. Consequently, we cannot ascribe any such causality to something that exists only in an improper sense as the content or object of thought. Nevertheless, it is the intelligibility of the object that is said to "move" the intellect to know the thing in question. Scotus argues that we should rather ascribe that causality which meaning has in regard to our intellect to the divine mind

or intellect which gave to all created things their meaning or intelligibility.

²⁹ The priority referred to here is one of nature, not of time. Cf. note 43 of sect. III.

³⁰ Such knowledge implies a direct vision of God and is not possessed by man in this life.

³¹ The triangle is considered the first figure in plane geometry. Thus it is symbolic of the Triune God who is first in the hierarchy of beings.

³² See pp. 107-8.

³³ According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, Scotus's personal copy is left incomplete at this point. What follows is supplied from the Vivès edition, VOL. IX, 207.

³⁴ See p. 136.

³⁵ Literally, "It is in respect to every being whatsoever".

³⁶ That is, principles evident from their terms.

SECTION VI

¹ For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 167 ff.

² The matter of the heavenly spheres was considered to be incorruptible in contradistinction to the corruptible terrestrial matter of the four elements.

³ Subjective parts are contrasted with essential parts. The latter refer to the order of comprehension or intension; subjective parts refer to the order of extension or class inclusion. Here the meaning is that the intellectual or rational soul is a member or part of what Aristotle designates by the general term of the soul or life principle of man.

⁴ Cf., for example, St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. lxxv, art. ii.

⁵ St Thomas maintains that the intellect which is perfected by the act of knowledge pertains to the category of passive

potencies. This is the so-called *intellectus possibilis*. Cf. *Summa theologiae*, I, q. lxxxv, art. ii. iii; III, q. ix, art. iii; *Contra gentiles*, II, cap. lxxxv, xcvi, xcvi. Godfrey of Fontaines goes even further in denying all activity to the possible intellect. Cf. *Quodlibet*, VI, q. vii; VIII, q. ii; IX, q. xix; XIII, q. v. Cf. also Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet*, III, q. xii, xiii.

⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet*, V, q. xiv.

⁷ Aristotle, *De anima*, II, cap. ii (424^a, 30 ff.); see also III, cap. i (425^a, 19).

⁸ According to Aristotle, the sensory power consists in "the equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ". (Cf. *De anima*, II, cap. xii, 424^a, 30 s.)

⁹ See pp. 147 f., number 2.

¹⁰ See pp. 150 ff.

¹¹ Cf. Richard of Middleton, *Sent.*, II, dist. xix. art. i, q. 1.

¹² Cf. for example, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, cap. ii (1094^a, 20-21); also Averroes, *Metaphysica*, II, com. I.

¹³ Cf. St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. lxxv, art. vi.

¹⁴ According to Aristotle and the scholastics, a demonstrative proof in the technical sense of the term must have premises that are both necessary and evident propositions. Premises known by faith in revelation are not evident and hence are not technically capable of producing a demonstration. Such premises, though never evident, may be either necessary or contingent propositions. For instance, "God is just" would be considered a necessary proposition inasmuch as it is based on the immutable nature of God and could never be otherwise. On the contrary, "Jesus Christ is the redeemer of mankind" would be considered a contingent proposition because the whole order of redemption like creation depends on the free decrees of God. Now Scotus calls proofs based on necessary though not evident propositions "necessary reasons". The arguments for immortality, however, are based on contingent propositions and hence fail to meet

the technical requirements for an Aristotelian demonstration on two counts.

¹⁵ "Separate agent", that is, a pure spirit or Intelligence. Such celestial beings (the angels of the scholastics) were called "separate substances" inasmuch as they subsisted apart from matter and were not destined by nature to inform or dwell in a corporeal body like the spiritual soul of man.

¹⁶ "Natural agent" is understood here as one which causes generation and corruption.

¹⁷ See pp. 167 ff.

¹⁸ Literally, "existence through itself". Technically, however, *per se* existence or subsistence is used by the scholastics to designate that mode of being characteristic of substance or substantial union in contradistinction to *per accidens* existence characteristic of accidents or incidental aggregates. Scotus's reply to the argument plays upon the ambiguity of the term *per se* existence as applied to a composite substance such as man. Since the component elements of man (body and soul) are not accidents but substances, albeit incomplete as to function at least, each could be said to possess *per se* existence. But the same is true of any material or perishable form. On the other hand, since man as a whole is not an accidental aggregate but a composite substance, the union of soul and body represent a *per se* mode of existence, but one which the soul possesses only as long as it is united to the body.

¹⁹ Cf. St Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, dist. II, pars prima, art. I, q. III; St Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. I, art. II ad III.

²⁰ Confer Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet*, II, q. III; St Thomas, *Contra gentiles*, IV, cap. LXXIX.

²¹ For Scotus, as for Aristotle and the scholastics generally, a probable or dialectical proof does not have the same connotation as it has for the neo-scholastic. A valid and convincing proof may still lack the technical requirements of an Aristotelian "demonstration" as defined by the Stagirite in the *Analytica posteriora*, I, cap. II (71^b, 18-25) or by

Scotus in *Opus oxoniense*, prol. qq. iii-iv lat., n. 26 (Vivès, VOL. VIII, 183^b); III. dist. xxiv, q. unica, n. 13, (xv, 44^b); *Reportata parisiensia*, prol. q. i, n. 4 (xxii, 7^b); III, dist. xxiv, q. unica, n. 16 (xxiii, 454). If such a probable proof is persuasive, it may even give subjective or moral certitude in the sense that all prudent fear of error is excluded, and yet it will not produce strictly demonstrative knowledge or *scientia*.

²² See pp. 154 ff.

²³ Though Scotus claims that natural reason can demonstrate the existence, unicity and infinite perfection of God, he regards the Christian concept of a just and merciful God as a matter of faith. Cf. *De Primo Principio*, cap. iv (ed. Roche p. 146).

²⁴ See p. 143.

²⁵ According to Scotus's theory of natural desire, to admit that human nature is capable of immortality is to admit that man has a natural desire for it; for a natural desire is not a conscious act or elicited volition but is rather the ontological relation that arises between the perfectible and its perfection. Only in a metaphorical sense can this relation be called "desire". Cf. *Reportata parisiensia*, IV, dist. xlix, q. ix, nn. 3-5; see also note 22 of sect. III.

²⁶ Namely, in the beatific face-to-face vision of God.

²⁷ Cf. the question on man's natural knowledge of God, especially the fifth statement, p. 31.

²⁸ *Ethica Nicomachea*, x, cap. viii (1178^b, 35 ff.).

²⁹ That is, a pure spirit or angel.

³⁰ Cf. p. 145 for the complete text.

³¹ St Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIII, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., XLII, 1023).

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